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“Technology” has often served as a signifier of development, progress,
and innovation in the narrative of Japan’s transformation into an economic
superpower.  Few histories, however, treat technology as a system of power
and mobilization.  This dissertation examines an important shift in the
discourse of technology in wartime Japan (1931-1945), a period usually
viewed as anti-modern and anachronistic.  I analyze how technology meant
more than advanced machinery and infrastructure but included a subjective,
ethical, and visionary element as well.  For many elites, technology embodied
certain ways of creative thinking, acting or being, as well as values of
rationality, cooperation, and efficiency or visions of a society without ethnic or
class conflict.  By examining the thought and activities of the bureaucrat, Môri
Hideoto, and the critic, Aikawa Haruki, I demonstrate that technology signified
a wider system of social, cultural, and political mechanisms that incorporated
the practical-political energies of the people for the construction of a “New
Order in East Asia.” Therefore, my dissertation is more broadly about how
power operated ideologically under Japanese fascism in ways other than
outright violence and repression that resonate with post-war “democratic”
Japan and many modern capitalist societies as well.
This more subjective, immaterial sense of technology revealed a
fundamental ambiguity at the heart of technology.  While many elites encoded
technology as the production of all aspects of life, some articulated technology
as unexpected invention, transformative action, and creative self-formation.Such possibility was found within the very technologies that systematically
structured society.  By examining the thought and activities of the philosopher,
Nakai Masakazu, I illuminate another notion of technology as cultural practices
of invention that tactically employed the technologies mobilizing everyday life.
Thus, I also explore other notions of the political in a context where politics
was increasingly incorporated into the wartime effort through technology.iii
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INTRODUCTION
Japan as Technological Superpower
In December 1990 the Science and Technology Agency and the
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy published a report entitled
Historical Review of Japanese Science and Technology Policy, a “post-war
comprehensive history of Japan’s science and technology policies.”
1 The
purpose of the report was to educate the world about how Japan’s science
and technology policy had played an essential role in its economic and social
development and moreover to reflect on how Japan could adopt policies
“aimed at not only creating a wealthy nation but a wealthy world as well.”
2 The
report was written during the 1980s “economic bubble” period when Japan
was viewed as the world leader in technology and technological innovation in
areas such as consumer electronics, automobiles, semiconductors,
manufacturing technology, and robotics.  Numerous books detailing the
Japanese government’s “third-way” approach between the free market and the
planned economy towards nurturing a technological society appeared during
this time with sensational titles such as The Technopolis Strategy: Japan, High
Technology, and the Control of the Twenty-first Century and Japan as a
Scientific and Technological Superpower.
3 Fumio Kodama, Dean and
                                                   
1 Historical Review of Japanese Science and Technology Policy, ed. The Commission on the
History of Science and Technology Policy, iii (Tokyo: Society of Non-Traditional Technology,
1991).
2 Ibid., i, iii.
3 Sheridan M. Tatsuno, The Technopolis Strategy: Japan, High Technology, and the Control of
the Twenty-first Century (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986) and Justin L. Bloom, Japan as
a Scientific and Technological Superpower (Potomac, Md.: Technology International and
Springfield, Va.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 1990).
There is a large amount of literature in English on Japan as a “technological superpower.”
Here is a sample of some of the main titles, many of which are U.S. government sponsored:
Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons and Limitations of Industrial Policy, ed. Hugh2
Professor of Engineering Management at the Shibaura Institute of Technology,
described the Japanese model of promoting technological innovation as a
global “techno-paradigm shift,” and even went so far as to credit the Japanese
cassette tape recorder, VCR, and fax machine for making possible the Iranian
Revolution, the Philippine Revolution, and the Tiananmen Uprising.
4 Thus in
the 1980s and 1990s Japanese technology and technology policy was widely
seen as a progressive force for social development, economic prosperity—and
in some cases, democratic values.
5
Richard Samuels calls the Japanese state’s ideology regarding
technology, “techno-nationalism.” Techno-nationalism is “the belief that
technology must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a
nation strong,” he writes.
6 He dates techno-nationalism from the very
beginning of the Meiji Period with the Japanese government’s aggressive
pursuit of “Rich Nation, Strong Army” (fukoku kyôhei) and “Production
                                                                                                                                                     
Patrick and Larry Meissner (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), A High
Technology Gap?: Europe, America, and Japan, ed. Andrew J. Pierre, et. al. (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), Jean M. Johnson, The Science and Technology
Resources of Japan: A Comparison with the United States (Arlington, VA : National Science
Foundation, Division of Resource Science Studies, Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and
Economic Sciences, 1997), Sheridan M. Tatsuno, Created in Japan: From Imitators to World-
Class Innovators (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), David W. Cheney and William W. Grimes,
Japanese Technology Policy: What’s the Secret? (Washington, D.C.: Council on
Competitiveness, 1991), and Japan’s Growing Technological Capability: Implications for the
U.S. Economy, ed. Thomas S. Arrison, et. al. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1992).
4 Fumio Kodama, Analyzing Japanese Advanced High Technologies: The Techno-paradigm
Shift  (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 173-174.
5 With the burst of the Japanese economic bubble in 1989, however, the discourse around
Japanese technology has gradually shifted to a U.S. neo-liberal paradigm aggressively
pursued by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirô, which views the free market as the best
determiner of technological innovation and development.  But while the Japanese government
has pursued some degree of market liberalization, privatization, and spending cuts, the
tradition of state-sponsored technology development still remains strong.
6 Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological
Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), x.3
Promotion” (shokusan kôgyô) as official policies.
7 Moreover while the
Japanese government report described above stresses the post-war as the
period when Japan truly developed an independent science and technology
policy for national development, Samuels emphasizes the importance of a
“military-led national system of innovation” and policies such as “Nation-
Building through Technological Development” (gijusu rikkoku) during the war
and their continuity with the post-war “commercial-led national system of
innovation.”
8 He demonstrates how over the course of its modern history the
Japanese state has consistently promoted technological autonomy, the
diffusion of technical knowledge to all areas of the economy, and the
nurturance of a balanced technological development by means of managing
competition.  His overall conclusion is that “techno-nationalism” was
“admirable, rational, flexible, and ought to be embraced—mutatis mutandis—in
the United States as well.”
9
For the Japanese government and its admirers, technology and
technology policy represents a modernizing, progressive force that has been
essential to Japan’s national development and security throughout its modern
history.  Technology for them is socio-politically neutral and has been
instrumentally used and promoted by the Japanese government to achieve
prosperity, innovation, and efficiency.  The proper “techno-economic
paradigm” or “cluster of institutions and ideas about how to innovate” simply
provides the instrumental means for developing technology and therefore a
“rich and strong nation.”
10 Japan’s particular “techno-economic paradigm”
                                                   
7 Ibid., 37.
8 Commission, 1.  Samuels, 30.
9 Ibid., x.
10 Ibid., 16.4
helped it modernize and become a technological superpower.  This familiar
story of the Japanese state’s farsighted instrumental development of
technology and a new techno-economic paradigm is a pillar of Japan’s
modernization narrative built up by both Japanese and U.S. intellectuals
alike.
11
Technology as Domination
In twentieth century Europe there has been a rich literature on the
political nature of technology, particularly in Critical Theory.  An overview of
some of the main positions of this debate will help us call into question the
predominant view of technology as a progressive, modernizing force with no
socio-political content.  Max Weber was one of the earliest and most
significant thinkers who highlighted the non-neutrality of technology and
technological rationality.
12  In his famous work, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, Weber traces how the Puritan’s disciplined, ascetic, and
efficient work ethic loses its religious justification and begins to permeate all
spheres of capitalist society, culture, and the economy.  This new
disenchanted order became “bound to the technical and economic conditions
of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals
who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with
                                                   
11 Even Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s comprehensive study of Japanese technological development
emphasizes the particular social networks that enabled the diffusion of technology.  Tessa
Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth Century to
the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
12 Karl Marx discusses how exploitation of labor power is inherent to the very process of
mechanization of the productive forces (i.e. technology); however, his examination is limited to
the factory rather than society as a whole.  See Chapter 15 “Machinery and Modern Industry”
in Karl Marx, Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, Volume 35, Karl Marx: Capital, Vol.
1 (New York: International Publishers, 1996), 374-508.5
economic acquisition, with irresistible force.”
13 Purposive and instrumental
forms of activity, organization, and technology became embodied in large
bureaucracies and administrations building an “iron cage” of reason whereby
people are transformed into “specialists without spirit, sensualists without
heart.”
14 Formal systems of rationality that optimize calculability and control,
and are concerned with “efficiency of means” rather than “choice of ends”
come to dominate people’s everyday lives, according to Weber.
15 Thus for him
the formation of a technological society is not so much a linear march of
progress but a de-humanizing and inescapable process of rationalization.
In the 1960s, Herbert Marcuse went even further than Weber in
specifically linking the spread of technological rationality to the naturalization
of capitalist relations of domination.  He writes:
Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through
technology but as technology, and the latter provides the great
legitimation of the expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres
of culture.
In this universe, technology also provides the great rationalization of the
unfreedom of man and demonstrates the “technical” impossibility of
being autonomous, of determining one’s own life.  For this unfreedom
appears neither as irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to
the technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and
increases the productivity of labor.
16
Technological progress means the entrenchment of capitalist forms of
mobilization and even discourse becomes “limited to posing and resolving
                                                   
13 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons (London:
Routledge, 1992),181.
14 Ibid., 181, 182.
15 Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 68.
16 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (New York: Beacon Press, 1968), 158.6
technical problems.”
17 Thus technology is by no means neutral but affects the
totality of social relations.  “When technics becomes the universal form of
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical
reality—a ‘world’,” Marcuse writes.
18 People therefore become “one-
dimensional” and critical consciousness is subverted.
Jürgen Habermas extended Marcuse’s rather abstract view of
technology as legitimating political power by pointing to two important changes
to liberal capitalism that occurred in the early twentieth century: “an increase in
state intervention in order to secure the system’s stability, and a growing
interdependence of research and technology, which has turned the sciences
into the leading productive force.”
19 First, the nature of politics changed as the
state took up the role of intervening in the economy by maintaining growth, a
degree of social security, increased consumption, and stable employment, for
instance.  “[Politics] is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the
avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the
realization of practical goals but toward the solution of technical problems,”
Habermas writes.
20 As a result, the public sphere becomes depoliticized, and
concerned more with the proper functioning of the system rather than any
practical vision of the “good life.”
21
Second, with science and technology becoming a leading productive
force, “a perspective in which the development of the social system seems to
                                                   
17 Feenberg, 70.
18 Marcuse, 154.  Quoted in Feenberg, 70.
19 Jürgen Habermas, “Science and Technology as ‘Ideology’” in Jürgen Habermas, Toward a
Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1970), 100.
20 Ibid., 103.  Brackets mine.
21 Ibid., 103, 104.7
be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress” arises.
22
“Purposive-rational action” expands outside the realm of economic activity and
is “reproduced at the level of social systems” into which people are functionally
integrated.  Class conflict is diffused into the “manipulative compulsions of
technical-operational administration” that manifests itself less as a force of
domination than as one of incorporation and mobilization.
23 In sum the
essence of this pervasive “technocratic consciousness” is “the elimination of
the distinction between the political and the technical.”
24 In response,
Habermas insists on the autonomy of “communicative action” and calls on
“removing restrictions on communication” so that people can reassert their
concern with practical issues (i.e. the “goals of life activity”) rather than
technical ones.
25 Only rational communication and the assertion of universal
democratic principals can reign in the excesses of a depoliticizing technocratic
consciousness, according to Habermas, and therefore ultimately realize the
“project of modernity.”
26
Re-Conceptualizing Technology in Japan
Building on Weber and Marcuse, Habermas’s insights into the non-
neutrality of technology and its role in incorporating the practical-political into
the technical is useful in problematizing the standard narrative of technology
as a progressive, modernizing force of development and prosperity; however
                                                   
22 Ibid., 105.
23 Ibid., 107, 109.
24 Ibid., 113.
25 Ibid., 120.
26 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vols. 1-2, trans. Thomas McCarthy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity—An Incomplete Project,”
trans. Seyla Benhabib in The Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster
(Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983).8
his theory is too universalizing to fully capture the development of
technological social systems in different contexts, particularly Japan’s.  For
example, one thing I demonstrate in my dissertation is that “the technical” was
to a certain extent problematically articulated as the ethical and the practical-
political during the transformation of capitalism in early twentieth century
Japan, thereby throwing into question the dichotomy between the technical
and a distinct, autonomous political sphere.  It was not simply the case that the
technical sphere only sought to de-politicize and neutralize practical-political
struggles in Japan; they attempted to incorporate and mobilize them as well.
In re-articulating technology as a system of technologies that produced all
aspects of society, the Japanese state in fact tolerated and encouraged many
of the rational norms that Habermas affirms such as freedom, autonomy,
individuality, self-development, and creativity; however, they did so only
insofar as they did not fundamentally threaten the ultimate goals of winning the
war and establishing an empire in Asia.  The concept of “repressive tolerance”
put forth by Marcuse might be a useful way to frame the Japanese state’s
employment of technology to incorporate the practical-political energies of the
people.
27 Thus whereas the narrative of technology “eliminating the distinction
between the political and the technical” in the early twentieth century might
corroborate with the experience of modernity in certain European contexts, the
same cannot be said to completely apply to Japanese modernity.
                                                   
27 Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance” in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and
Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 95-137.
According to Marcuse, “tolerance” is granted both to the right and the left of the political
spectrum only insofar as they do not challenge the class structure of society, and is limited by
state monopolization of violence and the predominant interests of the privileged sections of
society.9
Japan as Coeval Modernity
My dissertation therefore seeks to trace the development of a
“technocratic consciousness” in wartime Japan in order to further illustrate
some of the many ways that technology has operated as an ideology of power
and mobilization in Japanese history.  Histories of Japanese modernization
oftentimes occur against the ideological backdrop of a narrative of universal
(i.e. “Western”) societal and cultural modernization whereby Japan is often
portrayed as “deficient” or “pre-modern.” Such a narrative posits a set of
cognitive and social transformations as “good and inevitable.”
28 Dilip
Parameshwar Gaonkar writes:
On this account, the cognitive transformations include or imply
the growth of scientific consciousness, the development of a
secular outlook, the doctrine of progress, the primacy of
instrumental rationality, the fact-value split, individualistic
understandings of the self, contractualist understandings of the
self, and so on.  The societal transformations refer to the
emergence and institutionalization of market-driven industrial
economies, bureaucratically administered states, modes of
popular government, rule of law, mass media, and increased
mobility, literacy and urbanization.
29
With regards to the history of Japanese technological development, this
narrative tends to follow the same trajectory, excluding or de-emphasizing
elements that do not fit.  The wartime period (1931-1945) is considered to be
particularly anti-modern, irrational, and ultra-nationalist.  The 1991 government
report on the history of Japanese technology policy described above for
example briefly treats wartime institutions such as the Technology Board, the
                                                   
28 Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities” in Alternative Modernities, ed.
Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 1.
29 Ibid., 1-2.  He is describing the view of the neo-conservative Daniel Bell.10
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and the Science and Education
Bureau of the Ministry of Education; however, these are mentioned only
insofar as they fit into the government’s larger narrative of Japan developing
“effective ways to establish its own research and development know-how
independently, thus bridging the large wartime gap between Japan and the
West, and finally catching up with the West in numerous areas of science,
technology and industry.”
30 The post-war is the real locus of Japanese
development into a technological superpower—the pre-war and wartime
merely being an interval for Japan to play catch-up to the West.
 In the 1930s and 1940s, Japan experienced similar changes to liberal
capitalism that Habermas outlined above—increased state intervention and
the emergence of science and technology as a leading productive force—in
his description of the development of a “technocratic consciousness.”
31
However, the result in the Japanese context was neither merely a tendency
toward forming “one-dimensional” subjects, as Marcuse describes, nor simply
an attempt to functionalize the political through the technical.  As we shall see,
what I call the Japanese “technological imaginary” in fact sought to incorporate
and mobilize the practical-political energies of the people in various “rational”
ways in order to establish a “New Order” in Japan and ultimately East Asia.
32
                                                   
30 Commission, 45.  A mere nine pages are devoted to the wartime period.
31 See Japan’s War Economy, ed. Erich Pauer (London; New York: Routledge, 1999) for more
on state intervention in the economy and Morris-Suzuki and Samuels for more on the rise of
science and technology as a productive force in the Japanese economy.
32 I use the term “technological imaginary” rather than “technocratic consciousness” because it
brings out the utopian, creative sense of technology at the time.11
The Question of Fascism in Japan
Since the technological imaginary developed together with fascism in
Japan, it is necessary to take up a consideration of fascism and technology’s
place within it.  According to the modernization theory framework, Japan never
sufficiently developed a certain type of “modern” mental outlook based on
scientific rationalism, pragmatic instrumentalism and secularism, and a certain
type of institutional order based on popular government, bureaucratic
administration, and a market-driven industrial economy.  Nor did they
sufficiently develop a certain type of cultural modernity that takes the form of
critique that privileges the individual’s need for self-expression and self-
realization over the claims of community.  Thus according to this framework,
Japan strayed off the path of modernization in the 1930s by “succumbing” to
an anti-modern, ultra-nationalist authoritarianism and expansionism.
33
While “fascism” has been a contentious term for English-language
scholars writing about wartime Japan, those who have used the term have
borrowed from Maruyama Masao’s conception of “fascism from above.”
 34
Maruyama believed that Japanese fascism in the end was not spread by a
mass movement “from below” like in many cases in Europe but by the various
organs of the state.  Furthermore Japanese fascism was “particular” in its
emphasis on emperor-centered familialism, anti-modern agrarianism, and
                                                   
33 For an overview of the modernization theory approach as applied to prewar Japan see
James William Morley, “Introduction: Choice and Consequence” in Dilemmas of Growth in
Prewar Japan, ed. James William Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 3-30.
The authors attempt to apply a “value-free” definition of modernization and many conclude
that Japan was only “partially modern.”
34 Masao Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” and “The Ideology and
Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” in Masao Murayama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern
Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1-24, 25-83.  For
an overview of some of the English and Japanese language scholarship on fascism, see
Gavan McGormack, “Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism?” Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars 14, (1982):2-19.12
emancipatory pan-Asianism.  Its social foundation was the “pseudo or sub-
intellectual” strata of the middle-classes: “small factory owners, building
contractors, proprietors of retail shops, master carpenters, small landowners,
independent farmers, school teachers (especially primary schools), employees
of village offices, low-grade officials, [and] Buddhist and Shinto priests.”
35
Unlike Europe, intellectuals such as “urban salaried employees, so-called men
of culture, journalists, men in occupations demanding higher knowledge such
as professors and lawyers, and university and college students” were not “the
driving force of fascism” although they passively adhered to it.
36
While different English-language scholars have reformulated various
points of Maruyama’s thesis or have refused to use the term altogether in
order to bring out Japan’s “particularity,” most emphasize the anti-modern,
authoritarian, and spiritualist/communitarian elements of Japanese fascism
more than its rational, modernizing components.
37 In their modernization
theory framework, Europe forms the model of fascism to which Japan always
appears particular—for example, the lack of a charismatic leader or a mass
fascist-style party or the continuity between Meiji institutions and those of the
                                                   
35 Maruyama, 58.  Brackets mine.
36 Ibid., 58.
37 Miles Fletcher refutes Maruyama’s “pseudo-intellectual” fascism thesis in his study of the
Shôwa kenkyûkai intellectuals. William Miles Fletcher, The Search for a New
Order:Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1982).  Peter Duus and Daniel Okimoto propose “corporatism” as a more appropriate
framework than “fascism.” Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, “Fascism and the History of
Prewar Japan: The Failure of a Concept” Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (1979):65-76.
After comparing 1930s Japan with Europe, Kasza uses the term, “renovationist authoritarian
right” to describe the wartime political system instead of “fascism.” The “renovationist
authoritarian right” was between the more status-quo oriented “conservative right” and a
fascism demanding a sweeping socio-political revolution.  See Gregory J. Kasza, “Fascism
from Below? A Comparative Perspective on the Japanese Right, 1931-1936” Journal of
Contemporary History 19, no. 4 (1984):625.  Herbert Bix uses the term “emperor-system
fascism” to describe the political system of the period.  See Herbert Bix, “Rethinking Emperor-
System Fascism” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 14, (1982):20-32.13
1930s was enough evidence to “prove” that Japan was not fascist.
38 Instead of
deriving a standard model from the German or Italian experience, however, we
should view fascism as a set of “common ideas that justified the new regimes,
and the common programs they adopted.”
39 Focusing solely on the
particularities and minutia of a so-called pure model of fascism ignores the
importance of fascism as a broader historical force that developed
simultaneously in different contexts.  More importantly a focus on fascist
particularity overlooks common processes of modernization in fascism such as
rationalization, social reorganization, and for our purposes, the promotion of
science and technology.
Instead of defining modernity as a fixed set of societal and cultural
institutions emanating from “the West” and passively and uniformly adopted by
Japan or “Asia,” I insist on Japan as a “coeval modernity.”  In coeval
modernities, the “many regions, many people, many industries, and many
polities are in contact with one another despite geographic, cultural, and social
distance,” and are undergoing similar processes albeit in different ways.
40 As
Gaonkar writes, “everywhere, at every national/cultural site, modernity is not
one but many; modernity is not new but old and familiar; modernity is
incomplete and necessarily so.”
41 What makes modernity simultaneously
multiple and familiar (not same!) is the endless process of translation through
contact, as Naoki Sakai points out.  “Thus, alternative modernities produce
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combinations and recombinations that are endlessly surprising,” Gaonkar
writes.
42 Therefore forms and processes such as science and technology,
industrialization, bureaucratization, and fascism occur on a global scale but
are “creatively adapted” to specific local sites in response to how people
understand and negotiate their historical situation.  Forms and processes such
as fascism may be familiar but are pluralized by being translated into local
historical and cultural contexts.
Yet we should not shy away from employing a working definition of
fascism.  Roger Griffin provides a useful conceptualization of fascism, one that
captures the modernizing, revolutionary aspects of fascism that are often
overlooked in studies on wartime Japanese politics.  He writes:
Fascism is best approached as a genuinely revolutionary, trans-class
form of anti-liberal, and in the last analysis, anti-conservative
nationalism.  As such it is an ideology deeply bound up with
modernization and modernity, one which has assumed a considerable
variety of external forms to adapt itself to the particular historical and
national context in which it appears, and has drawn on a wide range of
cultural and intellectual currents, both left and right, anti-modern and
pro-modern, to articulate itself as a body of ideas, slogans, and
doctrine.  In the inter-war period it manifested itself primarily in the form
of an elite-led ‘armed party’ which attempted, mostly unsuccessfully, to
generate a populist mass movement through a liturgical style politics
and a programme of radical policies which promised to overcome the
threat posed by international socialism, to end the degeneration
affecting the nation under liberalism, and to bring about a radical
renewal of its social, political and cultural life as part of what was widely
imagined to be the new era being inaugurated in Western civilization.
The core mobilizing myth of fascism which conditions its ideology,
propaganda, style of politics, and actions is the vision of the nation’s
imminent rebirth from decadence.
43
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Griffin’s definition of fascism as a “palingenetic form of populist ultra-
nationalism” is useful because it interprets the anti-modern, tradition affirming,
and spiritualist elements of fascism as a type of forward-looking, revolutionary
transformation of society rather than the affirmation of a return to some idyllic
past or preservation of the status quo.  Moreover, it accounts for the
modernizing elements of fascism such as the fascination with technology and
its use to create a new order.  Thus, Griffin’s definition is helpful in analyzing
the specific combination of so-called “anti-modern” and “modern” tendencies in
Japanese fascism’s project of “overcoming modernity” to create a “New Order
in East Asia.”
44
Pan-Asianism
The “China Incident” of July 1937, signaling the outbreak of full-scale
war, was the occasion for an explosion of essays, books, articles, journals,
speeches, public debates, and organizations devoted to the formation of a
pan-nationalist, multi-ethnic “New Order in East Asia” in Japan and the
colonies then under its control (particularly in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria).
In November and December of 1938, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro
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announced the “construction” of a “New Order in East Asia” as a goal that all
peoples of the Japanese empire should actively strive towards.  Between 1937
and 1940 numerous terms describing this “New Order” circulated among the
public: “management of the continent,” “East Asian League,” “East Asian
Cooperative Community,” “Japan-Manchuria-China bloc economy,” the “East
Asian Coordinated Economy,” and “Long-Term Construction of East Asia” are
only some of the principal terms.  In August 1940, the term “Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere” became the overarching signifier for theories of pan-
Asianism with Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke’s official pronouncement in
which he included the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China as well.
45
Broadly speaking, the New Order was characterized as a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural community based on a culture of independence, autonomy,
prosperity, and mutual cooperation among the various communities.
46  It was
to be a rapidly developing, modernized and self-sufficient economic sphere
with a strong military defense.  It was envisioned as an anti-imperialist, non-
exploitative, anti-communist, anti-liberal, and non-capitalist “Asian” community
(“the West” most often being signified as exploitative, individualist and
capitalist).  It was to be based on so-called “Eastern” values of harmony,
practicality, unity with nature, Confucianism and the “kingly way.” Finally,
Japan was to “lead” and “guide” East Asia (not dominate and control) since
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she was the only Asian country to successfully fuse so-called “Eastern values”
with “Western” rationality, science, and technology in order to avoid imperialist
domination and therefore build a strong, independent nation-state.  As we
shall see, this fascist “New East Asian Order” ideology, which sought national
rebirth through revolutionizing all areas of society in East Asia, was to serve as
a powerful mobilizing ethic within the technological imaginary of wartime
Japan.
Technology and Fascism
In this dissertation, I analyze how technology in wartime Japan (1931-
1945) meant much more than simply advanced machinery and infrastructure
but included a subjective, ethical, and visionary element as well.  For many
bureaucrats and intellectuals, technology began to embody certain ways of
creative thinking, acting or being, as well as values of rationality, cooperation,
and efficiency or visions of a society without ethnic or class conflict.  My main
argument is that political and intellectual elites held a more subjective view of
technology as something that permeated every aspect of life.  These elites
generated policies to control and produce society.  I call this more subjective,
practical, and mobilizing view of technology the “technological imaginary”
since it motivated everyone from bureaucrats planning the corporatist “New
Order for Science and Technology” to cultural critics advocating the cultivation
of a “neo-realist” technological aesthetic in film and mass media.  Far from
being merely an era of anti-rationality and anti-modernity, the 1930s and
1940s were in fact a period of rich debate over the meaning of technology in
modernity.  Therefore my dissertation problematizes the framework of Area
Studies, which particularizes Japan as always behind or as “straying from” the18
universal norms, institutions, and developmental trajectory of “the West.” As
we shall see, Japanese elites were very involved in the global, modern project
of articulating the notion of technology into specific social contexts.
Several authors have examined the connections between technology
and fascism.  Most notably, Jeffrey Herf analyzes how German intellectuals
such as Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, and Werner
Sombart reconciled the “antimodernist, romantic, and irrationalist ideas
present in German nationalism and the most obvious manifestation of means-
ends rationality, that is, modern technology.”
47 These “reactionary modernists”
appropriated reason to pathological, irrational, and romantic ends of
“community, blood, will, self, form, productivity, and finally race.”
48 However,
he assumes that there exists an “enlightened” employment of modern
technology (means-ends rationality) that these reactionary modernists twisted
to their “irrationalist” goals.
49 For Herf, technology is still neutral and
instrumental, and he does not question how technology itself can operate as
political domination in so-called democratic contexts as well.  Moreover, as we
shall see, Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals who articulated the
technological imaginary actually affirmed and promoted similar values of
rationality, cooperation, innovation, and efficiency that also operate in non-
fascist societies.  It was not the case that Japanese elites merely “perverted”
the rational values of technology by infusing them with irrationality and
romanticism.  Rather, they sought to bring out the practical, political, and
inventive nature of technology in the service of building a technological society
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in which every aspect of life was rationally planned and mobilized for exhibiting
its maximum potential and creativity.  In short I argue that the technological
imaginary in wartime Japan highlighted a very dangerous form of power
inherent in the nature of technology itself, which if brought to its logical
conclusion would create a fully rationalized, hyper-modernizing fascist
utopia.
50
Utopian notions of technology, of course, were not particular to fascism
although they lent themselves to similar purposes.  Charles Maier traces how
Taylorism spread beyond rationalizing work techniques in the factory and
became a powerful political ideology of industrial management and social
reorganization.
51  He shows how “scientific management” lent itself to visions
of overcoming class conflict both on the left and the right in early twentieth
century U.S. and Europe.  According to these visions, society would be re-
organized along the lines of a “coherent system” of “efficiency, optimality,
enhanced productivity and expanded output.”
52 For example, in the U.S. during
the Progressive Era, Charles Ferguson and Thorsten Veblen put forth the
engineer as the ideal person to “impose optimality upon society” and end the
waste and conflict produced by capitalism.
53 In France, “Saint Simonianism
embodied a proto-technocratic ideology that rejected traditional class divisions
in favor of the unity of all ‘productive’ and ‘industrious’ elements, bourgeois,
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peasant, and proletarian.”
54 In Italy, the Futurists envisioned the fascist state
as a “dynamo,” and therefore, “more than a state.”
55 In the Soviet Union,
communists celebrated the potential of technology to create social revolution.
56
Finally, in Germany industrialist-engineers such as Walther Rathenau and
Wichard von Moellendorf employed technological paradigms in pushing for a
“planned economy” (Planwirtschaft) that would eliminate competition and
transform capitalists into public employees.
57 Thus technology became a
powerful signifier of social harmony, innovation, and efficiency all around the
world in the face of the crisis of capitalism and growing labor unrest.
The Technological Imaginary in Japan
A more subjective, utopian notion of technology captured the
imaginations of a wide range of pre-war and wartime Japanese elites as well.
William Tsutsui examines how American scientific management ideology was
translated into the Japanese context and developed into post-war modern
Japanese industrial management.
58 With regard to the prewar and wartime
periods, he examines the thought and policies of a number of engineers,
managers and bureaucrats such as Ueno Yôichi and Yoshino Shinji who were
involved in the state-sponsored Efficiency Movement and the Industrial
Rationalization Movement (sangyô gôrika undô).
59 Kawahara Hiroshi
examines the history of technocracy—the rule of technical experts—during the
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period.
60 The proponents of technocracy included heavy chemical industrial
combine (zaibatsu) leaders such as Nissan’s Ayukawa Gisuke who promoted
the idea of “public holding companies” over private corporations and Ôkochi
Masatoshi of The Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (Riken),
proponent of the philosophy of “scientific industry.”
61 Engineers organized
themselves into the Japan Artisan’s Club in 1920 (becoming the Japan
Technology Association in 1935), asserting that technology was the basis of
national culture and ethics.  Heavily influenced by the New Deal system in the
U.S. and Nazi economic policies, they pushed an agenda of encouraging
labor-management cooperation, improving administrative and bureaucratic
efficiency, increasing the number of engineers in national policy positions, and
intensifying the colonization of East Asia.  Their leader, Miyamoto
Takenosuke, became head of the Technology Division of the Asia
Development Board and played a key role in drafting the Outline for a New
Order of Science and Technology in 1940.
62
Subjective, ethical notions of technology permeated the social sciences
as well.  In sociology, Matsumoto Junichirô and Hayase Toshio introduced the
ideas of the U.S. technocracy movement to Japan and their importance for the
New Deal system in the U.S., socialism in the Soviet Union, and fascism in
Germany.
63 In economics, Ôkuma Nobuo emphasized the study of
reproducing human labor, rather than just material production, while Ôkochi
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Kazuo argued for the introduction of policies to promote private consumption
instead of just production.
64  These studies crystallized into a wider discipline
of the “life sciences,” which helped increase the scope of state technocratic
control for the purposes of wartime mobilization.
65 In political science, Rôyama
Masamichi defined technology as the “tactics of managing human life” and
applied technology to administrative reform.  By introducing rational
techniques of management into administration, technological consciousness
and method would begin to hold sway in the conduct of administrators,
eventually spreading to local government and the numerous organizations
governing daily life, according to Rôyama.
66
In philosophy, the Kyoto School developed the notion of the practical
subjective (shutaiteki) nature of technology.  From the 1920s the Kyoto
philosopher Nishida Kitarô used the term “technology” as a synonym for
poiesis or what he called “acting intuition” (kôiteki chokkan).
67   For Nishida,
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technology was a concrete combination of the “made world” and “making the
world,” the “mechanical world” and the “world of consciousness.” Technology
was simultaneously subjective and objective, or rather practically subjective
(shutaiteki)—it concerned the simultaneous self-formation of the subject and
the formation of the world.  In fact, the very division between the “mechanical
world” and the “world of consciousness” was the result of “technology” or
“acting intuition” and did not pre-exist it.
68  It was rather poietically
manufactured through practical subjective action or the workings of different
“subjective technologies” in the world.
69 Along these lines, the Kyoto School
philosopher Miki Kiyoshi wrote in a 1938 essay, “Technology is the act of
making things.  The common essence of technology is to make things,
whatever they may be, whether they are tools, machines, mental and bodily
forms, social systems or ideas.”
70 Thus, he also equated technology with the
production of all areas of life.
Social, practical conceptions of technology extended to colonial
administrators as well.  Janis Mimura traces the careers of three prominent
“technology bureaucrats” who played a leading role in planning Manchuria’s
economy and later helped build Japan’s wartime “New Orders” for the
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economy, finance, labor, and science and technology—Kishi Nobosuke, Môri
Hideoto, and Okumura Kiwao.
71 A whole group of bureaucrats developed a
conception of technology as managing the economy and society (what Môri
called “economic technologies”) there.  One of the institutions that colonial
bureaucrats helped establish in 1935 was the Continental Science Board, an
institute in Shinkyô (capital of Manchuria) dedicated to centralizing scientific
and technological research, training engineers and scientists, and promoting
scientific knowledge in the colonies.
72  Suzuki Umetarô, head of the
Continental Science Board after Ôkochi Masatoshi, openly modeled the Board
after the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which systematized the relationship
between research institutes and industry, and scientists and producers, as well
as promoted collective research for the state.
73 The Board was the prototype
for the Technology Board, a national “technology general staff” established in
1941 through the efforts of Miyamoto and other Cabinet Planning Board
bureaucrats.
74
In film, the hard-edged documentary style became prominent during the
wartime period.  The documentary or bunka eiga (“culture film”) was viewed as
the medium that best represented technological society because of the
genre’s combination of scientific and aesthetic elements.  For example, the
famous film critic Imamura Shôhei wrote that the ideal bunka eiga possesses
“a fresh, original perception of the life of the machine, a poetic originality with
regard to the machine, a new yearning for the machine.”
75 For many,
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technology’s most powerful and visible product—the machine—represented
and permeated society yet not in an alienating or oppressive manner.  The
spread of mass media technologies such as film, radio, and mass print among
the people in fact signified the creation of a technological culture full of new
aesthetic sensations and possibilities.
Technology as System of Power in Wartime Japan
While Kawahara, Mimura and others have shown how a “technocratic
consciousness” and a creative notion of technology permeated the Japanese
elites, similar to Herf, they fail to fully recognize how this consciousness
reflected the formation of a broader system of technology as social integration.
Their “technocratic visions” in the end merely served to lend “decisive support
for the military’s aggression abroad and political oppression at home,” Mimura
writes, for instance.
76 In short, these technocratic elites simply used the trope
of technology for unenlightened, undemocratic purposes.  This overlooks a
more disturbing aspect of technology—its ability to mobilize, create, innovate,
and organize something new.  The “technological imaginary” signified more
than an instrumental deployment “from above” of rational means-ends
technology for repressive purposes, but the ideological formation of a new
system of power that actively mobilized the practical-political energies of the
people within limits.
Walter Benjamin partially captures this mobilizing dynamic of the
technological imaginary when he describes the fascist employment of the
“mechanical reproduction of art” (i.e. film, mass media):
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Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses
without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to
eliminate.  Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their
right, but instead a chance to express themselves.  The masses have a
right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an
expression while preserving property.
77
Benjamin describes this mobilization of mass expression through the media as
“the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual
values” such as the aestheticization of warfare and the “Führer cult.”
78 Yet
while he understands the fascist organization of mass expression through
technology and the maintenance of property relations, he overlooks fascism’s
more rational forms of mobilizing popular energies—for him, even machine
technology has been employed for “unnatural” purposes of warfare and death
rather than redistributing resources and property.
79  As we shall see, however,
“cultural technologies” of film and “economic technologies” of managing the
economy and workplace, for example, attempted to incorporate creativity,
innovation, and individuality in more secular, rational ways as well.
80
Instead of perceiving fascism as a predominantly irrational and anti-
modern ideology that subverts reason and modernity, the sociologist
Yamanouchi Yasushi interprets fascism within the framework of a broader shift
from the “class society” to the “system society” that continued into the post-
war.
81 “In this new stage, class conflict and other social struggles have ceased
to serve as major agents of historical change, but are continually subjected to
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rules and eventually institutionalized,” he writes.
82 Following the theory of
Talcott Parsons, Yamanouchi demonstrates how total war mobilization’s
tendency toward “equalization” (Gleichschaltung) helped rationalize,
incorporate, and mitigate social conflict and exclusion for the purpose of war.
83
In the system society, power was not “something impinging on civil society
from outside” but was “resituated within the system as an integrating
mechanism that sustained the systemic relations of civil society.”
84 Power was
resituated into various institutions and members of society instead of
exercised solely from above.  “Authority and power are merely systemic
functions that contribute to sustaining the stable operation of society,”
Yamanouchi writes.
85
Following Yamanouchi, I argue that the technological imaginary shared
by bureaucrats and intellectuals played an essential role in functionalizing (or
“technologizing”) the practical-political energies of the people.  The
technological imaginary broadly envisioned society as an organic system
constituted by a whole series of economic, scientific, cultural, intellectual, and
administrative technologies.  According to this vision, every member of society
would have a productive, creative role in the operation of the social system,
which was dedicated to constructing the “New Order in East Asia.”  Thus
technology took on the meaning of a vast technical system similar to the
“autopoiesis characteristic of organic life.”
86 The incorporation and
systematization of all areas of life through the technological imaginary during
Japan’s wartime mobilization serves as a compelling paradigm for analyzing
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“fascist” and “totalitarian” tendencies that have continued well into post-war
Japan, and might be inherent to the process of technological modernization
itself.
Scope of the Dissertation
More broadly, my dissertation is about how power operated
ideologically under Japanese fascism and totalitarianism in ways more
insidious and subtle than outright violence and repression.  To cover some of
the range of the technological imaginary, I have chosen three figures
representing different areas of society: the bureaucracy, the social sciences,
and culture.  My first chapter, “Techno-Imperialism and the New Order in East
Asia: Môri Hideoto’s Theory of Technology,” explores the thought and career
of Môri Hideoto, a “reform bureaucrat” from the Finance Ministry who helped
design the planned economy in Manchuria and China, as well as the “New
Order for Science and Technology.”  For him, technology primarily meant the
specific laws, institutions and administrative techniques for constructing an
integrated “control economy” in Japan and East Asia.  Môri considered himself
and others to be “creative engineers” engaged in constructing a modern, fully-
mobilized “New Order in East Asia” through specific “economic technologies”
of power such as establishing banks, constructing roads and infrastructure,
employing local knowledge and leadership, restricting capitalist enterprise and
organizing mass organizations.  My argument is that Môri and other
technocrats were instrumental in actively envisioning and constructing a
society in East Asia based on a creative, rather than merely repressive
concept of power.29
Chapter Two, “Subjective Technologies of Mobilization: Aikawa Haruki's
Wartime Theory of Technology,” examines the Marxist economist Aikawa
Haruki who later became a fierce proponent for the establishment of a
technologically advanced, rationally planned “New Order in East Asia” that
would supposedly eliminate social inequality, capitalist exploitation, and ethnic
conflict.  A widely acclaimed “technology critic” and proponent of a multi-
disciplinary “Technology Studies,” Aikawa developed a notion of society as a
dynamic complex of subjective and objective technologies.  He was a
prominent campaigner for the “Outline for a New Order of Science and
Technology,” which was adopted in 1941.  While the Outline centralized
technological policy, research, technical education, and labor allocation,
Aikawa pushed for further measures such as the creation of “vocational
organizations” of scientists, engineers, and workers in every factory, and the
organization of industrial control associations based on technological process
and function.  These measures would help build a technologically advanced
society, and spread virtues of technological rationality, innovation, and
organization throughout the populace.  My argument in this chapter is that
Aikawa was instrumental in highlighting the practical, everyday, creative
nature of technology in a way that furthered Japan’s imperial aims and
totalitarian control over its people.
Chapter Three, “Cultural Technologies of Mobilization: Aikawa Haruki
and the Wartime ‘Culture Film’” explores Aikawa’s theory of a “neo-realist”
technological aesthetics and documentary film, and his involvement in the
production of the documentary, The Present Battle (1942).  The bunka eiga
(“culture film” or documentary) was to be the principal aesthetic form of the
new society of technology, and Aikawa explored different cinematic techniques30
by which to motivate people to actively cooperate with the construction of the
“New Order.” His idea of film production as a dynamic complex of material and
aesthetic technologies, as well as the depiction of management and industrial
technologies at a Hitachi engine factory in The Present Battle present us with
concrete instances of his idea of society as a larger system of interacting
technologies.  My objective in this chapter is to demonstrate how Aikawa and
others viewed technology not only as machines and infrastructure, but as
permeating mass culture and sensation as well in ways that mobilized subjects
for Japan’s imperial mission in East Asia.
In Chapter Four, “Para-Existential Forces of Invention: Nakai
Masakazu’s Theory of Technology and Critique of Capitalism,” I examine the
thought and activity of Nakai Masakazu, professor of aesthetics at Kyoto
University.  Nakai was very interested in the contemporary mass aesthetics of
technology as manifested in film, radio, architecture, print and design.
Engaging with European modernist trends such as surrealism, Bauhaus,
montage film, and Russian avant-garde film theory, he also developed a wider
notion of technology as sensuous, creative activity, and explored new
possibilities of sensation and subjectivity in mass technological
modernity—what he called an inventive “technological beauty and time” in film,
sports, music, and literature, for example.  An essential part of his theory,
however, was a critique and analysis of what he calls the “commodified
nature” and “specialized nature” of life under heavy industrial, monopoly
capitalism, which restrained the critical potential and creative energies of the
people.  My argument is that Nakai developed a wider notion of technology as
sensuous, creative activity that avoided the pitfalls of similar discourses of31
technology that equated the productive, technologically mediated subject with
the mobilized subject of Japan’s total war system in East Asia.
In my final chapter, “Nakai and the Politics of the Everyday,” I examine
how Nakai develops his notion of technology into a politics that would
challenge the dominant systems of technocratic control and mobilization of all
areas of life.  In his famous essay, “The Logic of Committee,” he proposes the
“committee” as an autonomous political vehicle that would transform the social
technologies of capitalist society from within.  The committee would also
contribute to the realization of a mass subjectivity infused with a “cooperative
nature” and “critical nature” yet firmly grounded in the fractured, multiple
practices, techniques, and customs of the people, as opposed to one
particular vanguard social group (e.g. the “working class” or “nation”).  I then
examine the politics of the mass tabloid, Doyôbi, which attempts to realize
some of the ideas put forth in “The Logic of Committee.” Doyôbi was an arena
for proliferating debate on a whole range of concrete everyday issues facing
people who were living within the grid of technocratic structures of 1930s
Japan.  As such, it is suggestive for further reflection on the problem of the
incorporation of practical-political energies into the technological imaginary.
My argument is that Nakai recognized the persistence of the political as
contingency, antagonism, and unexpected points of tension within the very
technologies mobilizing all aspects of life rather than as a firmly delimited,
rational sphere of universal principals and determined political identities.  In
fact, the logic of the political as fixed democratic subjects and set political
norms beyond hegemonic contestation fell into the very logic of the
technological imaginary of people such as Môri and Aikawa, who sought to
create a multiple, organic community of productive subjects building the New32
Order of East Asia.  Thus I seek to illuminate another notion of the political
operating within the technological imaginary of wartime Japan.
Meaning of Technology in Wartime Japan
While it is difficult to isolate a specific definition of technology due to the
differences among intellectuals at the time, nevertheless we can establish a
general meaning.  In wartime Japan, more and more Japanese elites began to
share a view of technology as more than a system of mechanical tools,
machines, and principles representing means-ends/instrumental rationality.
Rather, it began to signify a wider system of social, psychological, and political
techniques that incorporated practical-political goals to a limited degree.  As
opposed to Habermas’s definition of technology as an expanding system of
“purposive-rational action” (rather than practical, ethical action), the meaning
of technology in wartime Japan approached something similar to Michel
Foucault’s definition of technology as a social system of techniques that can
be analyzed and studied.  He lists four types of technology—“each a matrix of
practical reason:”
(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform,
or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us
to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; 3) technologies of
power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to
certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; 4)
technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own
means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as
to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness,
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.
87
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The importance of Foucault’s matrix of technologies lies less in its immediate
application to wartime Japan, but rather in its capture of the more practical,
subjective, and ethical sense at work in the discourse.  Discussions of
economic, cultural, administrative, or even “life technologies” during wartime
Japan all shared this common purpose of producing subjects and society.  As
such, the nature of power was more oriented toward domination through
mobilization and production rather than solely through repression and
violence.
This type of theory of technology, however, brings us to an impasse.  If
technology indeed carries the meaning of the production of all aspects of life,
how is any type of effective political action possible? If there is no outside of
power and its production of life then does not power (or technology) lose any
meaning whatsoever since it has nothing to oppose itself with? This would be
the case if technology had one ontological meaning of “means-ends
rationality,” for example, that determined life univocally.  However, as Andrew
Feenberg notes, “the lower we descend toward the foundations of rational
institutions, the more ambiguous are the elements from which they are
constructed, and the more these are compatible with a variety of different
hegemonic orders.”
88 The fundamental ambiguity of technology allows the
technologies of modern society to be dissimulated and employed by
dominating and dominated alike for different purposes.  Resistance and
critique does not lie outside “our participation in technically mediated social
institutions” but in our activities within them.
89
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Nakai and others recognized this fundamental ambiguity and
ambivalence of technology.  His definition of technology as unexpected
invention, discovery, and invention in everyday life (“chance” and
“opportunity”) reveals the ontological indeterminacy of technology itself.
Aikawa and Môri also understood this fundamental indeterminacy; however,
they strategically encoded technology to mean the system of techniques to
mobilize all areas of life for the construction of a utopian New Order in East
Asia.  Nakai, on the other hand, tactically defined the essence of technology
as those itinerant, uncanny forces of invention embedded in technologically
mediated everyday life—particularly within the new sensations produced by
mass media and culture.
Michel de Certeau uses the term “strategies” to describe the means of
control employed by social and technological systems.  He writes:
I call a “strategy” the calculus of force-relationships which becomes
possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a
city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an “environment.” A
strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper (proper)
and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior
distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, “clienteles,” “targets,” or
“objects of research).  Political, economic, and scientific rationality has
been constructed on this strategic model.
90
Strategies are not tools used by elites; rather, they create a space from which
they then operate on society.  Thus, the “economic technologies” employed by
reform bureaucrats or the “cultural technologies” of bunka eiga (culture films)
themselves generate spaces “above” society to rationally manage or mobilize
it—such is the logic of technocracy or rule by experts.  Moreover, aside from
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forging a space above society, state technologies attempted to determine and
incorporate political subjects within an organicist, productive wartime system,
thereby preventing them from being articulated into other more radically
democratic possibilities.
A “tactic,” on the other hand, is “a calculus which cannot count on a
“proper” (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a border-line
distinguishing the other as a visible totality,” de Certeau writes.
91 Tactics are
the fleeting, punctual, itinerant actions of daily life under the purview of the
dominant strategy yet subtly altering its trajectory or meaning.  They are not
oppositional actions per se, but “play” with the dominant codes or disciplinary
technologies for non-hegemonic purposes.  De Certeau gives “tactical”
examples such as workers using objects or tools for their own use (la
perruque) or rural Brazilians subverting a Christian narrative into a legend of
hope for the poor and oppressed.
92 Faced with the rationalization,
commodification, and specialization of all aspects of life, Nakai and his
colleagues also advocated stimulating the mobile “tactics” of everyday life
instead of building a “strategic” vanguard political force that could be
incorporated or repressed by the state.  Their tabloid Doyôbi encouraged
people to engage themselves with the different kinds of subordination and
freedom in their surrounding reality (the “here and now”), not some abstract
ideology or necessary future.  For Nakai, nearly anything at hand could be
taken up and turned into a “small breeze” of critique.  People in fact responded
by contributing articles on rising commodity prices, the latest American films,
women’s fashion, the middle-school examination system, discrimination of
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Koreans, corrupt local bureaucracy and so on.  Using the image of “flowers
blooming atop of the steel rails” of the specialized, technocratic structures of
modern Japan, Nakai insisted on founding a politics based on the daily
struggles and pleasures of the people within those very structures.
93  Society
could be changed only from within technologically mediated reality, not from
without in some utopic space outside technology, for example.
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe perhaps best summarize the
“strategic” designs of the state’s technological imaginary and Nakai’s “tactical”
notion of technology.  They describe the nineteenth century English novelist
and statesman, Benjamin Disraeli’s project of forging “one nation” from the
“varied ensemble of social and political demands.”
94 His strategy was:
[T]he differential absorption of demands, which segregated them from
their chains of equivalence in the popular chain and transformed them
into objective differences within the system—that is, transformed them
into ‘positivities’ and thus displaced the frontier of antagonism to the
periphery of the social.  This constitution of a pure space of differences
would be a tendential line, which was later expanded and affirmed with
the development of the Welfare State.  This is the moment of the
positivist illusion that the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the
intelligible and ordered framework of a society.
95
By attempting to constitute a “pure space of differences,” the state’s
technological imaginary absorbed and displaced some of the multiple
practical-political energies of the people into the state project of war and
establishing the New Order in East Asia.  Incorporating elements of freedom,
creativity, and individuality into wartime ideology, they tried to create a “closed
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system of differences” that put people in their place within the wartime “New
Order” system and never fundamentally challenged the relations of
subordination.  Nakai’s project, on the other hand, was to reveal the ultimate
impossibility of fixing the social in such a way, which would prevent the
articulation of multiple demands and identities.  The “Logic of Committee” and
his practice of publishing the mass tabloid Doyôbi were attempts to proliferate
“points of rupture” within the technocratic structures of everyday life, and
therefore lay bare the relations of subordination and potential nodes of
struggle and critique.
96 More importantly, through his understanding of
technology as contingent invention, chance, and discovery, he attempted to
articulate an open notion of the political that did not dogmatically link the
energies of the people to one overarching subject position—whether it be the
nation or the proletariat—but through the articulation of the contingent,
antagonistic, multiple energies of the people themselves.  His political project
can be seen as seeking a way out of the “crisis of Marxism” in the early
twentieth century, which increasingly saw the necessity of articulating the
multiple, dissimilar demands of advanced industrial society to the working
class struggle for socialism and democracy in the face of fascism, which also
incorporated a wide range of demands to its aims with increasing success.
97
In examining the technological imaginary of wartime Japan, I illuminate
how fascist ideology and power operated in Japan by seeking to mobilize the
creative energies of the people through the trope of technology.  Technology
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in wartime Japan actively incorporated and defined itself as practical,
transformative, and thoroughly political in working to bring about a utopian
New Order in East Asia.  However, in highlighting the practical, creative nature
of technology, Japanese intellectuals also revealed its fundamental ambiguity,
which could be employed for egalitarian, radically democratic purposes as
well.   Two notions of “the political” were revealed through this creative
ambiguity inherent in the technologies structuring all areas of life—the political
as rational principles, norms, and tasks rooted in determinate socio-political
subjects (i.e. the working class, women, and ethnic minorities) within a
totalized system and the political as the contingent articulation of new political
identities, relations, and objectives among multiple subject positions in an
open system.  Both notions of the political sought to transform social relations
for radically different purposes—fascist totalitarianism and radical democracy.
In light of a growing awareness among scholars, activists, and artists of a
pervasive “technocratic consciousness” that continues to de-politicize people’s
practical, ethical concerns today, my ultimate objective is to examine how
technology tries to mobilize all areas of life and to re-think political practice
when a purely oppositional, vanguardist, “class-struggle” type of politics has
increasingly been incorporated into technological systems of control.  As such,
Japan’s wartime period—a time when the space for traditional forms of
political dissent became increasingly impossible due to repression and
mobilization—serves as a fertile ground for such a problematic.
Japanese names are rendered surname first, in accord with Japanese
practice, except where a name has already been reversed by others to fit a
non-Japanese publication.39
CHAPTER ONE
TECHNO-IMPERIALISM AND THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA: MÔRI
HIDEOTO’S THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Technological Visions of Imperial Bureaucrats
“Technology” (gijutsu—literally, “limb-skill”) was an important lens
through which bureaucrats and intellectuals viewed Japanese and colonial
society during the Fifteen Year War (1931-1945).  For many, technology not
only meant tools, machines, and objective techniques of production, but also
included a subjective and ethical dimension as well.  It was equated with all
kinds of creation and production, not only the economic production of goods,
but more widely, scientific, cultural, intellectual and institutional production,
and even the production of citizens and subjects. Technology was often seen
as representing creation and imagination, and it came to signify the specific
ways by which a modern society, culture, or institution was formed and
organized, not just the material means of production.  In other words
technology was not neutral but always embodied contested values and visions
of modern society.  Thus terms such as “economic technology,” “political
technology,” and “intellectual technology” to distinguish the different types
were prevalent in discussions of technology.  Technology, for example, could
simultaneously mean techniques of discipline and power such as formulating
laws or establishing organizations, and as we shall see in other chapters,
creative social practices such as techniques of using mass media to stimulate40
critique or even invention and discovery within everyday techniques of leisure
and consumption.
1
This chapter will examine one such vision of technology—the imperial
bureaucrat Môri Hideoto’s broad notion of technology and technocracy as
expressed in his many public speeches and articles between 1938 and 1944.
My main thesis is that Môri and other technocrats and intellectuals were
instrumental in actively envisioning and constructing a society in Japan and
East Asia based on a creative, rather than merely repressive concept of
technology and power.  For them, technology in the wide sense of the term
formed the basis of this society, which would overcome the contradictions and
problems of modern capitalist life.  Môri had different labels for such a society
to describe its various aspects—the “production economy,” the “national
people’s economy” (kokumin keizai), and even the “Symbiotic Body of East
Asia” (Dai tôa kyôseitai).  Such a society anticipates Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s description of post-war capitalist societies as “factory-
societies.”
2 In the factory-society, production no longer simply encompasses
                                                   
1 The meaning of technology takes on a similar meaning to Michel Foucault’s conception of
power—the “microtechniques” of social control that proliferate without a plan throughout
society in the form of institutions, forms of behavior, social architecture, and so on.  These
techniques of disciplinary power are not so much coercive and suppressive as they are
creative and formative in guiding people towards the most productive use of their bodies.
These techniques in turn generate unforeseen “ruptures” or tensions that generate creative
forms of resistance.  Technology openly takes on this broader meaning of subject/social
formation in early twentieth century Japan—the numerous material and immaterial devices
that produce the concrete social structure of society.  Although not focusing on technology per
se, Foucault’s conception of the Panopticon as a way that power infuses bodies and social
relations rather than structures them from outside serves as a useful starting point for
conceiving the discourse of technology in the early twentieth century.  See Michel Foucault,
Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 206-207.  For examples of this creative
notion of technology at work in early twentieth century Europe and the U.S., see Mikael Härd
and Andrew Jamison, The Intellectual Appropriation of Technology: Discourses on Modernity,
1900-1939, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).
2 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 9.41
material, economic production within the factory but scientific, cultural,
intellectual, sexual, political, ethical and technological production as well—in
short, the production (and reproduction) of life in its entirety.  Keeping in mind
the differences with the “factory society,” this chapter will explore how Môri
envisions East Asian society as a productive, technological, and “symbiotic”
society.
 In analyzing Môri, I wish to provide a concrete example of the
visionary, imaginative notion of technology that pervaded much of the ruling
classes and therefore Japanese foreign and domestic policy during the period.
In doing so, I hope to challenge the dominant conceptions of Japanese
colonial modernity based on a narrow, simplistic definition of fascism as only
irrational, ultra-nationalistic, anachronistic, and repressive.
3  The flipside of
such a conception unquestioningly sees US and European colonial modernity
during this period as more rational, democratic, and modern.  By examining
the technocratic thought of one of the chief ideologues of the Japanese
                                                   
3 I roughly characterize fascism not only as the employment of power and violence for political
ends, the spiritualist promotion of a unified, organic nation or race over the individual or a
multiplicity of groups, and the rejection of class struggle, parliamentary politics, and capitalism,
but also as the active mobilization of the popular energies of the people to revolutionize the
social order.  For more on such rational techniques by government and civic leaders in Japan
to integrate women, students, workers, and others into larger groups, make them adopt
scientific methods, and settle conflicts under the purview of state institutions, for example, see
Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Narita Ryuichi, eds., Total War and
‘Modernization,’ (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1998).  In short, I disagree with
the modernization school of thought represented by thinkers such as Maruyama Masao who
characterize Japanese fascism narrowly as the repression of subjective freedom and failure to
develop a moral, private sphere separate from the state.  Maruyama therefore focuses on the
so-called particular characteristics of Japanese fascism such as emperor-centered familialism
and agrarianism, and he ignores the many efforts by bureaucrats and intellectuals to
incorporate and mobilize “active and free subjectivity” into the imperial project itself, many of
which are continuous with post-war Japanese efforts by many of the same people to create a
“democratic” and prosperous Japan.  See Maruyama, Masao, “Theory and Psychology of
Ultra-Nationalism” and “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” in Morris, Ivan,
ed., Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969), 1-24 and 25-83.42
imperial bureaucracy, I hope to put this binary into question and outline a
different conception of power and fascism, one which we cannot easily
distance ourselves from or label as particularly “Japanese” or “German,” for
example—one that might even be increasingly characteristic of post-war
capitalist societies and technocratic forms of control.
II.  HISTORICAL PROFILE
The Reform Bureaucrats
Môri was a prominent “reform bureaucrat” (kakushin kanryô), a close
group of right-wing bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers who were at
the center of economic policymaking, planning and administration both
domestically and in the colonies during much of Japan’s fifteen-year war.
4
“Totalitarian in conception, the vision of these bureaucrats involved the rational
and efficient mobilization of the material, political, scientific, and cultural
resources” of the colonies, which also included winning “the hearts and minds
of the people.”
5 Most of them graduated from Tokyo University in the 1920s,
and were heavily influenced by Marxism there.  After graduation, they gained
hands-on experience in industrial planning and establishing a “control
economy” in Manchuria and China in the mid-1930s, and went on to become
section chiefs (kachô) and bureau directors (kyokuchô) in the Ministries of
                                                   
4 Much of this historical profile comes from the following sources: Itô Takashi, “Môri Hideoto
ron oboegaki” (Notes Toward a Theory of Môri Hideoto) in Itô Takashi, Shôwaki no seiji (zoku)
[The Politics of the Showa Era] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppankai, 1993), 235-239. Mimura,
“Technocratic Visions of Empire,” 223-253.  Hata Ikuhiko, Kanryô no kenkyû [Studies on
Bureaucrats] (Tokyo: Kôdansha, 1983), 129-133. Furukawa Takahisa, Shôwa senchûki no
sôgô kokusaku kikan [The Comprehensive National Planning Organs of the Showa Wartime
Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1992), 114-121.
5 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchuria and the East Asian Modern
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 67.43
Finance, Commerce and Industry, Railways, Agriculture and Forestry, Home
Affairs, and Communications, as well as the leaders of the “comprehensive
national policy organs” (sôgô kokusaku kikan) such as the Cabinet Planning
Board (Kikakuin) and Manchuria Planning Agency from the beginning of the
Sino-Japanese War until Japan’s defeat (1937-1945).
6  People such as Kishi
Nobosuke,
7 Shiina Etsusaburô,
8 Minobe Yôji
9, and Okumura Kiwao
10 counted
as among their members.
11
                                                   
6 Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki,” 18-19.
7 Kishi was a protégé of Yoshino Shinji at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and a strong
proponent of the Industrial Rationalization Movement, which sought to organize firms into
cooperative industrial cartels and introduce the latest technology and management techniques
to improve efficiency and cut costs.  See Tsutsui, 58-90.  Influenced much by his time spent
researching the Industrial Rationalization Movement in Germany, he emphasized the spirit of
“cooperative action” among producers, sellers, consumers, scholars and bureaucrats in
establishing a “national economy” different from a competitive, wasteful, capitalist one.  He
helped draft the 1931 Important Industries Control Law, which enforced the organization of
industry-wide cartels and thus established the precedent for state intervention in private
enterprise for the sake of the “public good.” See Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 48-56.  From
1937, Kishi presided over the transformation of Manchukuo’s national economy into a
“national defense economy” as head of Manchukuo’s Industrial Department and later vice-
chief of the General Affairs Agency.  He presided over the Important Industries Control Law of
1937 in Manchukuo, which sought to incorporate private industry’s management expertise,
capital, and technology into the military’s plans to build a self-sufficient, heavy industrial
“Japan-Manchuria economic block.” He successfully lured Nissan’s Ayukawa Gisuke to
Manchuria to set up Manchurian Industries (Mangyô), a semi-private steel, light metals,
automobile, aircraft and mining conglomerate to revitalize the overly bureaucratic South
Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu).  Kishi returned to Japan in 1941 and took over the post of
vice-minister of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  Here he took the leading role in
implementing the “New Order for Industry,” which re-organized industries into “Control
Associations” or public “production cooperative bodies” and restricted profit and dividend
rates.  Ibid., p. 285-296.  As commerce minister and vice-minister of munitions under Prime
Minister Tôjô Hideki, he directed the war economy, presiding over the expansion of executive
powers to order wartime production expansion and centralization of the economic ministries to
facilitate faster communication with industry.  After the war, he was imprisoned for three years
as a class A war criminal.  Joining politics soon after, he was instrumental in uniting all the
conservative parties into the powerful Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which ruled for much of
Japan’s post-war history.  Kishi was party president and prime minister from 1957-1960.  He is
often credited with continuing many of the technocratic policies pursued in Manchuria during
the war into the post-war period, therefore facilitating Japan’s high-speed economic growth.
For more in English on Kishi’s career, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle:
The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
8 Shiina was Kishi’s right-hand man at the Commerce and Industry Ministry and head of the
Control Section within the Industrial Department of Manchukuo.  Here he established the
Temporary Industrial Research Bureau, a think tank that replaced Mantetsu’s Economic44
Môri’s University Years
Originally planning to pursue a journalism career, Môri graduated from
Tokyo Imperial University’s law department in 1925, majoring in political
science.
12  At Tokyo University, he was actively involved in the Yanagashima
settlement, a social welfare project that aimed to actively combat the causes of
poverty following the 1923 Great Kantô Earthquake.  The movement consisted
                                                                                                                                                     
Research Association as the leading organ for studies on developing and administering
Manchuria’s heavy industrial economy, and he helped draft the Important Industry Law.
Shiina then became director of the Commerce Ministry’s General Affairs Bureau under Kishi,
which formulated many of Japan’s wartime industrial control laws.  At the height of the war, he
was head of the General Mobilization Bureau of the Munitions Ministry, which became the sole
comprehensive planning agency for national policy, taking over the functions of the Cabinet
Planning Board and Commerce Ministry.  Like Kishi, he entered into politics after the war,
becoming Minster of International Trade and Industry (MITI, post-war equivalent of the
wartime Ministry of Commerce and Industry), Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as a top
factional leader within the LDP.  Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 141-143, 285, 351-353.  For
Shiina’s influence on creating continuity between the pre-war Munitions Ministry/Ministry of
Commerce and Industry and the post-war MITI, see Johnson, 168-172.
9 Commerce and Industry bureaucrat who was heavily influenced by socialist thought as a
student at Tokyo Imperial University.  From 1935 to 1938, he served in the Planning Division
of the General Affairs Agency, helping to design the very successful first Five-Year Plan for
Manchurian Industry and the Important Industries Control Law.  Here he also forged close
relations to military officers and other “reform bureaucrats” like Môri and Sakomizu Hisatsune
finance bureaucrat).  From 1938, he returned to Japan as an official at the Commerce Ministry
and Cabinet Planning Board, where he was involved mainly with controlling the cotton industry
and regulating commodity prices.  Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki,” 122-23.
10 Okumura was a top bureaucrat in the Ministry of Communications who advocated state
control of postal, telegraph and telephone services to further the “development of culture” and
promotion of social welfare.  Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 60.  In Manchuria, he helped
establish the “special company,” Manchurian Telephone and Telegraph, to control the
communications facilities in Manchuria and coordinate communications services between
Japan and Manchuria.  Ibid., 175.  His interest in developing communications services also
stemmed from his recognition of their importance for state propaganda—domestic and foreign.
He drafted the Electric Power Control Law, which called for state management of electric
power generation and transmission, including setting rates, distributing profits, and hiring and
dismissing employees (passed in watered down form in 1937 after resistance from business).
Along with Môri, he was one of the chief ideologues of the reform bureaucrats at the Cabinet
Planning Board, calling for the spiritual and material mobilization of the people to create a
“higher cultural system” to replace individualistic liberal capitalism.  At the height of the war, he
was deputy chief of propaganda at the Cabinet Information Bureau, which led the information
war and exercised control over scholarship, research, and cultural and literary activity.  He
made frequent propaganda speeches on the radio, urging increased sacrifice and
perseverance for the emperor and for the “liberation of Asia.” Ibid., 336-341.
11 See Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki,” 121-125 for short backgrounds on these people.
12 Itô, “Mori oboegaki,” 236.45
of a large group of leftist faculty and students who built and lived in settlement
houses in the poorer districts of Tokyo and also constructed houses, schools,
and day care centers, for example.  They also provided medical and legal
assistance, conducted social research, and taught adult education classes.
Môri apparently tutored workers at the settlement’s labor school.
13  He also
became close to the diplomat and co-founder of the proletarian Social Masses
Party, Kamei Kanichirô, who was later instrumental along with Asô Hisashi in
mobilizing the labor movement to support the Japanese imperial project and
“new order” policies at home.
14  Kamei came to regard Môri as his most
trusted personal secretary and “brain,” later involving him in his failed project
(ordered by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimarô in 1938) to establish a national
mass party that would dissolve all party divisions and unify the people towards
constructing the “New Order in East Asia.”
15 Kamei taught him German and
                                                   
13 Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki”, 114.  Mimura, “Technocratic Visions”, 129.
14 Takashi Itô, “Shôwa jûsannen Konoe shintô mondai kenkyû oboegaki” (Notes Toward a
Study of the Konoe “New Party” Question in 1938) in Nihon seiji gakkai, ed., Konoe shintaisei
no kenkyû [Studies on the Konoe New Order] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 143.  Kamei
spent time in Germany as a diplomat, studied with the Nazi geopolitical theorist, Karl
Haushofer (who coined the term, Lebensraum or “space for living”), and became an
enthusiastic proponent of Nazi economic policies and their technocratic worldview.  According
to Mimura, Kamei also helped establish the Japan Artisan Club (Japan’s leading political
action group for engineers and technologists) with Miyamoto Takenosuke, advised Nagata
Tetsuzan (leading technocratic military officer) on ideology and political strategy, and Prime
Minister Konoe on the establishment of a “Technology Board” that would centralize and
encourage scientific and technological innovation.  See Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 227-
228.  Thus much of Môri’s thought on technology and technocracy was shaped by his close
relationship with Kamei.
15 Kamei was Môri’s distant relative and Môri later married Kamei’s daughter.  Ibid., 225,
Kamei Kanichirô danwa sokkiroku, [Shorthand Record of a Dialogue with Kamei Kanichirô] ed.
Nihon kindai shiryô kenkyûkai (Tokyo: Nihon kindai shiryô kenkyûkai, 1969), 38.  See Itô,
“Konoe shintô mondai,” for more on this movement.  As we shall see, Môri discusses this
vision of a national party in many of his writings. He was a member of the so-called “Kamei
Group,” a research group that viewed the Sino-Japanese War as a “world-historical event” that
would usher in a new world order.  They conducted research on how to resolve the war and
organize a new Chinese-Japanese mass party, for example.  They concluded that the war
would only be resolved through the formation of an “East Asian Cooperative Body” founded
upon a totalitarian national party.  Thus they resolved to begin efforts to first form a mass
totalitarian party in Japan.  See Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki,” 114.46
French, and also introduced him to the thought of the German totalitarian
economists, Werner Sombart, Friedrich Göttl-Ottlilienfeld, and Othmar
Spann.
16  Thus Môri was exposed to a wide range of progressive and
rightwing reformist thought at Tokyo University, and was even actively
involved in organizing workers.  It is likely that these contacts and activities
later came to influence his technological/technocratic visions of society.
Môri in Manchuria and China
At the insistence of his parliamentarian father and through the
recommendation of Kamei, Môri joined the prestigious Finance Ministry as a
tax official.  He secured a position among the second group of bureaucrats
sent to establish and administer Manchuria’s economy in 1933, again with the
help of Kamei.
17  He was the only one in the group who volunteered to go to
Manchuria, many of who were fearful of the violence, harsh conditions, and
the Kwantung Army’s tyrannical reputation.
18 He served as an official in
“Manchukuo” and China from 1933 until 1938.  In the General Affairs Agency
(Kokumuin sômucho), the agency that effectively wielded power in Manchukuo
along with the Kwantung Army’s Third Division, he was head of the Special
Accounts Division and later head of the National Tax Section, which was
charged with establishing Manchukuo’s financial system.  According to Furumi
Tadayuki, Môri helped establish the powerful Cabinet Planning Section, which
eventually became Manchukuo’s central planning bureau for economic policy,
and Kamei even unsuccessfully asked Hoshino Naoki, head of the General
                                                   
16 Nihon kindai shiryô kenkyûkai, 37, Furukawa. “Shôwa senchûki”, 119-121.
17 Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 223.
18 Hata, 130. Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 136.47
Affairs Agency, to appoint Môri as its head.
19  In May 1937, Môri moved to
China as an economic advisor to Japanese military headquarters in Tientsin
and later to the Army’s Special Affairs Section in Peking.  He developed close
ties to military officers such as Akinaga Tsukizô
20 and Suzuki Teiichi,
21 and he
                                                   
19 Furumi was the right-hand man to Hoshino Naoki, head of the General Affairs Agency in
Manchuria.  Ibid.,  223-234.  Nihon kindai shiryô kenkyûkai, 196. Furumi Tadayuki,
Wasureenu manshûkoku [Unforgettable Manchukuo] (Tokyo: Keizai ôraisha), 101-102.
20 Colonel Akinaga was one of the army’s leading economists, starting his career designing
total war mobilization plans at the Army Ministry.  He was later sent to Tokyo Imperial
University, where he studied Marxism intensively.  In Manchuria, he was the army’s economic
adviser to the General Affairs Agency, where he helped draft Manchukuo’s Five-Year Plans
for industrial development and pushed for the establishment of a centralized Planning Section.
As a top research official in Japan at the Cabinet Planning Board’s First Department, he
headed the “Deliberation Room,” which formulated policy to reform Japan’s “liberal-capitalist”
industrial structure, management style, financial system, method of promoting technological
research, and organization of labor with the goal of eventually creating a non-capitalist,
production-oriented “new order” in Japan and East Asia.  Sakomizu, Minobe, and Môri were
referred to in the press as Akinaga’s “three ravens” or chief planners.  See Furukawa, “Shôwa
senchûki,” 123-124.  Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 285-286. Yôyôko: Minobe Yôji
tsuitôroku, [Minobe Yôji Memorial Record] ed. Nihon hyôron shinsha (Tokyo: Nihon hyôron
shinsha, 1954), 180, 318.
21 General Suzuki was a leading member of the “Control Officers” at the Army Ministry, who
pushed for the mechanization and rationalization of Japan’s military and the development of a
heavy industrial total war economy.  Possessing an active interest in economics, he was
influenced by the writings of Kawakami Hajime (one of Japan’s leading Marxist economists)
and spent one year at the Finance Ministry in 1919.  In China, he was military attaché and
head of the army’s Manchuria-Mongolia Affairs unit, where he requested Okumura’s
assistance in establishing Manchuria’s telecommunications industry. Mimura, “Technocratic
Visions,” 174. At the Cabinet Research Bureau, the precursor to the Cabinet Planning Board
(wartime comprehensive national policy organ), he oversaw the production of the famous
army pamphlet, “The True Meaning of National Defense and Proposals for its Strengthening,”
which called for the “nationalization of heavy industry, limits on private property and land
ownership, and elimination of the peerage system.” Ibid.,  p. 265.  This leftwing, populist
pamphlet greatly influenced the reform bureaucrats’ “New Order” policies for industry, science-
technology, labor, finance, land reform, and establishing a Japan-Manchuria-China economic
block.  At the bureau, he was also instrumental in establishing a Welfare Ministry in 1937,
designed to promote “national health” by creating a national health insurance system and
centralizing the administration of hospitals.  He also helped push through Okumura’s
controversial Electric Power Control Law and led efforts to increase the bureau’s powers to
plan resource mobilization and set national production goals to achieve economic self-
sufficiency.  Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic
Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 70-73.  Suzuki then became
head of the Political Affairs Department of the Asia Development Board, a comprehensive
national policy planning organ set up by the Cabinet Planning Board, designed “to provide
unified civilian and military leadership over the political, economic, and cultural affairs of the
expanding occupied territories in Japan.” Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 234. At the height of
the war, he served as head of the Cabinet Planning Board and Minister of State for the Tôjô48
openly boasted of his good relations with the Kwantung Army.
22  Môri did not
write very much about his experiences in Manchuria and China, and there are
few references by his colleagues about his role there.  He participated in a
roundtable in the capital, Xinjing, sponsored by the leading business
magazine, Tôyô Keizai (Oriental Economist), on the state of Manchukuo’s
planned economy, which brought together all of Manchukuo’s leading
bureaucrats such as Hoshino (head of General Affairs Agency), Akinaga, and
Shiina.  Here, he discussed his role in rationalizing and streamlining
Manchukuo’s tax system.
23  Also, judging from the numerous reports, top-
secret policy drafts, letters, and directives he kept, Môri was somewhat
involved in the unification of the various Chinese currencies into a yen-bloc;
the establishment of banks such as the China Industrial and Commerce Bank;
the construction of roads, ports, communications networks, and railroads; and
the promotion of heavy industry, labor productivity and natural resource
production in Manchuria and China.
While in Manchuria, Môri developed close ties to the right-wing
ideologue, Sugihara Masami, who was conducting a study tour under the
sponsorship of Lieutenant General Nagata Tetsuzan.
24 Sugihara founded
                                                                                                                                                     
cabinet.  After the war, he was sentenced to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal, but
he was released after six years.
22 Hata, 131.
23 Akinaga Tsukizô, Hoshino Naoki, Môri Hideoto, Shiina Etsusaburô, Takahashi Kôjun, et. al.
“Manshûkoku keizai no genchi zadankai,” (On Location Roundtable on the Manchukuo
economy),Tôyô keizai shinpô [The Oriental Economist], (Oct. 24, 1936):36.
24 Itô, “Môri oboegaki,” 236-237.  Based on his experiences in Europe during World War I
conducting research on war mobilization, Nagata was Japan’s leading proponent of the “total
war mobilization” of society.  The leader of the “Control Faction” (tôseiha) of officers and
bureaucrats, he helped establish the Resources Bureau, which was a research organ for
developing the spiritual and material resources necessary for total war.  He was also head of
the Army Ministry’s powerful Military Affairs Bureau during the early 1930s, which was in
charge of centralizing and rationalizing Japan’s economy and military for total war, often
against the grandiose, unrealistic visions of fanatical “Imperial Way” (kôdôha) officers.  He was
assassinated by one of these officers in August 1935.  Tôjô, Suzuki, Akinaga, Ikeda Junkyû,49
Kaibô jidai (Era of Analysis), an anti-liberal journal that was popular among
reform bureaucrats, and one of the most vocal proponents of forming a
totalitarian mass party, establishing an “East Asian Cooperative Body” (Tôa
kyôdôtai), and creating a fully planned and mobilized anti-capitalist economy
organized by work or “function.”
25 Môri became a regular contributor to this
monthly journal upon his return to Japan in 1938, using the penname
Kamakura Ichirô.  It was here that he outlined most of his ideas and visions of
a technological society in East Asia from 1938 until 1944.
Asia Development Board and National Policy Research Association
Upon returning to Japan in 1938, after serving shortly in the Finance
Ministry’s Deposits Bureau, he became the division chief of the newly-created
Asian Development Board’s Economic Section, which directed research and
planning for the development of North China, including the administration of
the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion
Company.
26 The Asian Development Board was established to unify and
centralize policy towards China under civilian control.  It was headed by the
prime minister and divided into four sections—political, economic, cultural and
technological affairs.
27  Major General Suzuki, head of the political affairs
                                                                                                                                                     
and Mutô Akira were among his followers.  Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 21-23.  For more
on Nagata and other “total war officers,” see Barnhart.
25 According to Itô Takashi, Nagata funded the journal. Itô, “Môri oboegaki,” 237.  Sugihara
said that he first learned the concept of “East Asian Cooperative Body” from Môri in their many
discussions in Manchuria.  Itô, “Konoe shintô mondai,” 163.  He published a book of the same
name in 1940.  See Sugihara Manami, Tôa kyôdôtai no genri [The Principles of the East Asian
Cooperative Body] (Tokyo: Modan Nihonsha, 1940).
26 Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 242.
27 Imura Tetsuo, “‘Kôain chôsa hôkoku sômokuroku’ kaisetsu” (Commentary on the Catalog of
the Asian Development Board’s Research Reports) in Jyûgonen sensô jûyô bunken shirizu
(17): Kôain kankô tosho zasshi mokuroku, [The Important Documents of the Fifteen Years
War Series No. 17: Catalog of Books and Periodicals Published by the Asian Development
Board] ed. Imura Tetsuo (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1994), 3.50
division and later director of the Cabinet Planning Board, said Môri was a
rising star at the Board and his most trusted adviser.
28  During this time, Môri
also actively participated in Yatsugi Kazuo’s National Policy Research
Association (Kokusaku kenkyûkai), a think-tank consisting of influential
scholars, bureaucrats, and military officers, which rivaled the Shôwa Research
Association in terms of influence over national policy.  Môri gave several talks
here, including one entitled, “Development Toward an East Asian Cooperative
Body,” and participated on the National Defense Economy Committee, which
compiled a “Proposal to Reorganize Economic Structures” in 1940 as part of
the process of envisioning Prime Minister Konoe’s “New Order” movement.
29
During this time, he was also a member of the secret “Monday Group”
(Getsuyôkai), a group of high-level reform bureaucrats and officers who
privately met every Monday in preparation for the Tuesday cabinet meeting to
formulate and coordinate policies.  Mutô (head of Army Ministry’s Military
Affairs Bureau, avowed expansionist), Yatsugi, Akinaga, Iwakuro Hideo
(Military Affairs Bureau), Okumura, Kashiwara Heitarô (Railway Ministry),
Kawamura Sanrô (Military Affairs Bureau), Kishi, Sakomizu, Shiina,
Shigemasa Seishi (Agriculture and Forestry Ministry), Taniguchi Tsuneji
(Finance Ministry, Budget Bureau Head), and Minobe were also members of
this tightly knit group.
30 At his home in Kamakura, Môri had many visitors,
                                                   
28 Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 242.
29 Yatsugi Kazuo, Shôwa dôran shishi  [Private History of the Showa Upheaval] (Tokyo: Keizai
ôraisha, 1971-1978), vol. 1, 491, vol. 2., 210-211.  Both think tanks gained in importance in
the aftermath of the attempted right-wing coup (2.26 Incident) in 1936 and the establishment
of the Konoe cabinet in 1938.  The National Policy Research Association consisted mostly of
well-established, mid-level or higher people from business, government, academia, and the
military, and they had strong connections to the army.  The Shôwa Research Group, on the
other hand, consisted of younger people from each area, and they had strong connections to
the navy.  Both were “reformist” and technocratic in orientation.  See Furukawa, “Shôwa
senchûki,” 34-35.  For more on the Shôwa kenkyûkai, see Fletcher.
30 Furukawa, “Shôwa senchûki,” 113-114.51
including younger officials at the Finance Ministry, students, and even Chinese
exchange students.
31
At the Asia Development Board, he also became close to the civil
engineer, Miyamoto Takenosuke, head of the Board’s Technology Division
and the leading figure of the technocracy movement in Japan.  From 1918,
Miyamoto and other members of the Japan Artisan Club (Nihon Kôjin Kurabu)
mobilized engineers and bureaucrats into what became the Japan Technology
Association (Nihon Gijutsu Kyôkai), a political interest group and national
policy organ for technical engineers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals.  They
actively pursued an agenda to raise the status of technology experts in
government and society by campaigning for the promotion of technological
research, expansion abroad, and an increase in the employment of experts in
positions of power, primarily through speaking tours, conferences, and their
publication organ, Gijutsu Hyôron (Technology Review).
32   They viewed
technology and technological method as integral parts of Japanese society—
in fact as the very foundation of Japanese culture.
33 Upon being appointed
head of the Technology Division, Miyamoto and Môri immediately began work
on formulating the “New Order for Science and Technology” in East Asia.
34
Passed in May 1941, the Cabinet Planning Board’s “Outline for the
Establishment of the New Order for Science-Technology” drew up measures
to promote and centralize science and technology research, develop a
coherent national policy for an independent “Japanese” science and
                                                   
31 Hata calls them “avid Môri fans.” Hata, 131.
32 They even boasted of branches in Korea.
33 Erich Pauer, “Japan’s Technical Mobilization in the Second World War” in Japan’s War
Economy, ed. Erich Pauer (London: Routledge, 1999), 40.
34 Miyamoto suddenly died in 1941.  Pauer states that his death was a serious blow to the
cause of the technology bureaucrats.  Ibid., 50.52
technology, and foster a “scientific spirit” among the people through technical
education.  It also created a “Technology Board” (Gijitsuin), the brainchild of
Miyamoto, which sought to centralize the science and technology research
and policymaking functions of the various ministries.
35 The Outline also tried to
force industries to share patents and knowledge with each other for mutual
benefit.
36 The overall aim of the “new order” for science and technology
according to Môri, however, was to change the very meaning of technology
from an inhuman, profit-driven means of production to a more human, people-
driven expression of spiritual and material development.  In addition
technology would form the foundation for the development of a new Asia.
The Cabinet Planning Board
In 1941 Môri became one of the chief policy planners of the Cabinet
Planning Board, the comprehensive national policy organ that oversaw the
aggressive implementation of the 1938 National General Mobilization Law
(Kokka sôdôin hô).  This law imposed broad controls on wages, employment,
industrial relations, financing, and profit disposal, and it formed the basis for
more detailed legislation to establish the “New Orders” of industry, finance,
labor, and science and technology during the second Konoe cabinet of 1940.
37
The “New Order” was the reform bureaucrats’ final and most radical attempt to
transform the Japanese economy from a liberal capitalist economy to a
                                                   
35 Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 304.  Kawahara, 91.
36 For more, see Sawai Minoru, “Taiheiyo sensô ki kagaku gijutsu seisaku no hito koma:
kagaku gijitsu shingikai no setchi to sono katsudô,” (One Scene in the Science and
Technology Policy of the Pacific War Period: The Establishment of the Science and
Technology Deliberation Committee and their Activities),Osaka daigaku keizaigaku [Osaka
University Economics] 4, no 2, (Oct 1994):1-23.
37 Nakamura Takafusa, and Hara Akira, “Keizai shintaisei” (The New Economic Order) in
Nihon seiji gakkai, ed., Konoe shintaisei no kenkyû (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 13.53
cooperative, technologically advanced, “production economy.” Môri,
Sakomizu, and Minobe were referred to in the press as the “three ravens” of
the Board.  According to Sakomizu, “Môri was the one that thought up the
themes, I was the one who somehow neatly composed them, and Minobe was
the one who properly arranged them into a jazz and played them for the
people.”
38 The business community attacked them as “reds” and communists
for their efforts to establish Industrial Control Associations, separate
management and ownership, control dividends and profits, and set production
goals, among other things.
39 In 1941, a number of lower-level officials of the
Board were arrested on charges of participating in the re-establishment of the
Communist Party (the “Cabinet Planning Board Incident”).  While this was a
setback for the reform bureaucrats, the war allowed them to implement their
visions in different form.
Môri appears to have been directly involved in the planning of the
“Japan-Manchuria-China Economic Block” while at the Board.  The “Outline for
Japan-Manchuria-China Economic Construction,” passed by the Cabinet in
October 1940, clearly linked the reorganization of the national economy with
the strengthening of Manchuria and China as the heavy industrial core of an
expanding “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” the new term for the
Asian community that promised to “raise the living standard of the various
peoples of East Asia.”
40 His name appears on a committee along with Akinaga
and Minobe to create long-term plans for this economic block.  As the war
progressed, however, Môri disappeared from the spotlight.  With the
dissolution of the Cabinet Planning Board into the Munitions Ministry, he
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39 Nakamura, and Hara, 18.
40 Mimura, “Technocratic Visions,” 328.54
resigned in 1943 and became a director of the Industrial Patriotic Association
(Sanpô), the wartime labor mobilization organization that eliminated
autonomous labor unions and replaced them with factory-level advisory
councils or “Sanpô units” of management and workers.
41 Two months before
the end of the war, he was a department head of the Comprehensive Planning
Bureau (Sôgô keikaku kyoku).  After the war he served as a researcher for the
Cabinet Research Bureau but soon resigned because of health reasons.  He
died in 1947.
II.  MÔRI’S THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY
Creative Engineers and Economic Technologies
Môri talks primarily about two kinds of technology—economic and
production technology.  Both are fundamentally linked to the creative energies
and imagination of the people, and they are not simply physical machinery or
techniques of production.  First, he always refers to himself and other
bureaucrats as “economic technicians” or “creative engineers.”
42 In a 1941
roundtable with his colleagues Minobe, Sakomizu, and Kashiwara entitled,
“Reform Bureaucrats Discuss the New Order,” Môri says, “We must transform
ourselves from legislative bureaucrats into creative bureaucrats.  Although this
is a strange term, the same applies to the technological aspect [of our work]:
up to now, we were only conservative engineers who drafted, managed, and
                                                   
41 Gordon, 320-330.  For more on Sanpô, see Saguchi Kazurô, “The Historical Significance of
the Industrial Patriotic Association: Labor Relations in the Total-War State” in Yamanouchi,
et.al., “Total War and Mobilization,” 261-288.
42 Môri Hideoto, “Shina no sangyô kaihatsu,” (The Industrial Development of China)Tôyô [The
Orient], (August 1939):73.  Môri Hideoto and Miki Kiyoshi, “Ashita no kagaku nihon no sôzô”
(The Creation of Tomorrow’s Scientific Japan), Kagakushugi kôgyô [Scientific Industry], (Jan.
1941): 196.55
interpreted legislation.  From now on, however, we have to be ‘creative
engineers.’”
43 For Môri economic technologies are the specific policies,
institutions, campaigns, and laws needed to construct and organize the “East
Asian Community” (Tôa kyôdôtai) in Japan, China, and Manchuria.  Grounded
in “synthesis, planning, and science,” economic technologies sought to
transform Japan and its colonies from a capitalist order of liberalism and free
trade into a rationally planned, self-sufficient “national economy” (kokumin
keizai).
44 However, as Môri states above, “economic technologies” are not
merely definite means and techniques but require a certain type of bold,
“creative bureaucrat” different from the typical drafter, administrator, and
interpreter of arcane, minute legal codes.  The ideal “leader” must “both grasp
the deductive goals required by the nation (minzoku, ethnic nation) as a whole
and the dynamic facts at work in their lives or their future potential” and then
decide how to mediate and synthesize the two without doing violence to either,
Môri says at the same roundtable.
45  Bureaucrats must think a little less
“deductively” from overall state goals and take into consideration the particular
circumstances and interests of the people, while those who criticize the
bureaucrats, particularly the business people, should think a little less
“inductively” from out of their private interests, and take into consideration the
interests of the whole, according to Môri.
46 Thus, the role of the technocrat or
“economic technician,” according to Môri, is to be a “catalyst” between the
                                                   
43 Môri Hideoto, Sakomizu Hisatsune, et. al., “Kakushin kanryô: Shintaisei wo kataru zadankai”
(The Reform Bureaucrats: Roundtable on Discussing the New Order), Jitsugyô no Nihon
[Business Japan], (Jan. 1941): 54.  Brackets mine.
44 Kamakura Ichirô, “Jihen dai yon ki wa seiji o tenkai su” (The Fourth Period of the Incident
Will Transform Politics), Kaibô jidai, (Dec. 1938):79.  Kamakura was Môri’s penname. Môri,
“Tai shi keizai gijutsu no sôzô,” (The Creation of Economic Technology Towards China),
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45 Môri, et. al., “Shintaisei o kataru zandankai,” 54.
46 Ibid., 55.56
overall state goals of building the new non-liberal economic order and private
economic or political interest.
47
The National Economy vs. The Liberal Economy
The target of the creative bureaucrat’s economic technology, according
to Môri, is the “liberal economic point of view” that permeated the economic life
of Japan and East Asia.
48  Liberalism was based on the following five
principles:
1.  The foundation of all economic phenomena is the economic man,
homo economicus.  His material desire for fame and fortune is the
motivating force of all economic phenomena.
2.  Capital and capital profit are the pillars of economic life.
3.  The essence of economic life is exchange.  The market is formed
from supply and demand; price is thereby constituted and dominates
[society].
4.  The state and taxes or any form of taxation policy arising from the
state are a disturbance of the natural progression of the economy.
5.  The regulator of all economic phenomena is the interest of each
human being.  This interest immediately brings about the harmony
of all interests in nature.
49
                                                   
47 Ibid., 56.
48 Môri cites the Austrian economist, Othmar Spann, who pushed for the establishment of an
authoritarian, corporate state, the German economist, Friedrich Göttl-Ottlilienfeld, follower of
Spann and leading advocate of the Nazi totalitarian economy, and the nineteenth-century
German economist, Friedrich List, who argued against free-trade classical economics and for
the construction of a national economy, as influential to his thought on the anti-liberal “national
economy.” Nihon hyôronsha, Yôyô, 176.  All of these economists were translated into
Japanese. Môri specifically cites List’s The National System of Politcal Economy in Môri,
“Nihon kokumin keizai no keisei to seiji: hô toshite no ‘tôa no shin chitsujo’” [The Formation
and Politics of the Japanese National Economy: The “New Order of East Asia” as Law], Kaibô
jidai, (April 1939): 31.  For more on the intellectual influences and background of the “reform
bureaucrats,” see Furukawa, “Kakushin kanryô no shisô to kôdô” (The Thought and Actions of
the Reform Bureaucrats), Shigaku zasshi [Journal of Historical Studies], (March 1990): 1-38.
49 Kamakura, “Nihon kokumin keizai no keisei to seiji,” 27.57
Social relations in Japan were also based on these five principles of
capitalism, according to Môri.  He writes:
The total development of this capitalist order…completely made the
profit society the structure within the Japanese order.  The entire people
were subordinated to this common society of profit in some aspect of
their lives.  The essence of this common society of profit…is to oppose
some other society, and a conflict of interest within one interest group
becomes a division into another conflicting group, or the conflicting
group then combines with yet another group, [and so on].  The profit
society stands upon the principle of profit, and its actions find their rules
in the action-principle of individualism.
50
In this way conflict becomes the essence of society rather than mutual
cooperation and development.
Moreover, until World War I, Japan’s “national economy” merely had a
“subordinate status” in the free-market world economy dominated by Great
Britain’s abundant resources and capital.
51  This nineteenth-century system
posited itself as “natural law” to which Japan’s national economy was
subject.
52  Môri writes:
This system itself was England’s national economy.  The Japanese
economy, which formed one link in that system, in no way promised the
eternal development of the Japanese nation (minzoku).  In sum, under
the system of free trade, the Japanese economy bought up raw
materials from the world’s cheapest places, processed them with cheap
labor, and exported them; thus by re-processing imported raw
materials, Japan bought its life necessities with the profit.
53
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Under liberalism, Japan merely sought to increase its participation within Great
Britain’s hegemonic order rather than develop a self-sufficient, independent
“national economy.”
54 It only became part of the “international economic
division of labor.”
55
In order to overcome liberalism, new economic technologies were
necessary that would instead make “the nation acquire the status of subject
rather than object of the economy,” and make “concrete” people (kokumin)
directors and generators of the economy, rather than “abstract universal
economic man” or the “natural or self-correcting economy.”
56 Instead of so-
called market forces, the “political power” of the nation or people represented
by the new “creative engineers” would direct the economy for the benefit of all
by “managing the total relations between natural resources, industry, finance
and money, performed in accordance with the planned nature of the entire
economy.”
57
To give an example of “economic technologies,” Japanese bureaucrats
typically dealt with the problem of price fluctuation by setting a “proper price” of
a commodity, according to Môri.
58 Ideally, this higher price would stimulate
production to the point where prices would again lower naturally due to
overproduction.  He criticizes this type of economic technology, however, as
one grounded in the profit principle of liberal capitalist economics—the
assumption that the pursuit of profit will naturally correct the problem of high
                                                   
54 Kamakura, “Tôa kyôdôtai to gijutsu no kakumei,” 5.
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Kamakura, “Nihon kokumin keizai no keisei to seiji,” 26.
57 Kamakura, “‘Tôa ittai’ toshite no seijiryoku” (Political Power as the Unity of East Asia), Kaibô
jidai, (Nov. 1938):11.
58 Kamakura, “Chûshôteki bukka to gutaiteki bukka” (Abstract Prices and Concrete Prices),
Kaibô jidai, (April 1940):5.59
prices.
59 Chronic price fluctuation cannot be fixed by such short-term band aid-
type measures characteristic of a night watchman capitalist state, according to
Môri.  Only by transforming the liberal economy into the planned production
economy can this problem be fixed.  Economic technologies should instead
focus on stimulating the expansion of industrial “fixed capital” to create a firmer
foundation for “expansive reproduction,” rather than the expansion of their
“variable capital,” which merely seeks to expand demand within a market
economy.
60  “Expansive reproduction,” rather than maintaining some sort of
temporary market equilibrium should be the goal of national economic
technology, according to Môri.  Moreover, national economic technologies
should ultimately be concerned with the life of the people.
61 Thus a compulsory
national health insurance scheme should be set up, for example, and health
facilities, occupational assistance facilities, and housing facilities should be
constructed through the imposition of a specific tax for this purpose.
62 This
would enormously improve the health productivity of the people and the
economy.
63 In short life itself is the focus of economic technologies, not the
abstract market principles of capitalism.  “Economic technologies” are a form
of power aimed at stimulating creation and production in all areas of life
through techniques of management and regulation, not a form of power
geared solely toward repression and homogenization of society.
New economic technologies, however, are not only essential to
encourage the active cooperation of the “Japanese nation,” but also of the
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colonial peoples in order to construct a planned, self-sufficient, and rapidly
developing economy in East Asia; otherwise, the empire would become like a
“many-storied building built on sand,” according to Môri.
64
Economic Technologies in the Colonies
Admitting in a 1942 or 1943 speech that he was an economic
technician who “was defeated by the Manchurian and Chinese peasant,” Môri
criticizes others who crudely divided the average Chinese person’s life into
technical categories of industry, agriculture, and economics, rather than take
an integrated, total approach more in tune with local socio-economic relations
and conditions.
65 The economies of Manchuria and China have a tremendous
variety of productive conditions and relations ranging from feudal to capitalist
to a mixture of both, according to Môri.  He states his overall philosophy of
economic technology towards China and Manchuria:
[T]he forms of economic activity are given greater variety by the
conditions of production, which are determined by the particular social
conditions, and probably have a variety ranging from A to Z, for
instance.  In such a case, when the economic technology A’, which
arose amidst the commercial capitalist economic activity of Japan, is
applied to the life spaces of Manchuria and China, the economic
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activities of B’ to X’Y’Z’ are occluded.  Therefore, a total, cooperative
relationship among the economic activities of these spaces cannot be
formed, a partial relationship of domination towards Manchuria and
China is established, and in the end, a large portion of economic life
becomes separated from a cooperative relationship.
66
Instead of arrogantly applying Japanese policies (“capitalist economic
technology”) in a uniform manner, bureaucrats should strive to integrate them
with China and Manchuria’s complex, particular conditions—only then could
they truly build the “East Asian Community.” Môri urges Japanese economic
technicians to understand and synthesize the “life technologies” of the various
ethnicities into their economic technologies for designing the planned
economy in East Asia.
67  They must not only be able to think of the “primary
equations,” but the “tertiary” and “quaternary” economic equations as well;
otherwise, the “life consciousness” of the people and the “synthesizing
consciousness” of the creative bureaucrats would not come together.
68
Môri gives several anecdotes of the “wider economic technology”
towards the colonies he had in mind.
69  For example, he mentions how
“agricultural technicians” who first came to the colonies simply set up the same
agricultural research stations they did in Japan and forced nearby peasants to
plant experimental seeds.  After encountering much resistance, they decided
to use other techniques.  Môri recounts an instance in Northern China where
they gathered elementary school teachers from 2300 villages and lectured for
several days on purchasing, cultivating, harvesting, and selling cotton in that
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particular region and terrain.  After providing the teachers with free cottonseed,
the teachers returned to their villages and asked students to plant them.  A
good crop would guarantee the propagation of cotton planting throughout the
village and set the stage for the establishment of a local cottonseed factory,
thereby further increasing future cotton production.
70  In a 1941 speech to the
Social Policy Institute entitled, “On Constructing the East Asian Economy,” he
recounts another instance where Japanese technicians helped build the
central highway to Sinkiang using Japanese technology, only to see their
roads crumble from the intensely cold temperatures.  However, one provincial
official was later able to make cheaper, more durable roads by working with
local Chinese peasants.
71
In the same lecture, he talks about how Home Ministry engineers used
the Japanese technology of strengthening the riverbeds and banks of the
Yellow River to control flooding in Manchuria.  However, this did not work
because unlike Japan where smaller floods occur frequently, in Manchuria
large floods occur once every ten to forty years.  Strengthening the riverbanks
was not enough to handle such floods.  Thus after three years, the Japanese
engineers finally began to think in terms of the local conditions and built a
system of artificial lakes and dams to siphon off floodwater.
72  He also talks
about a Japanese coal mining company that repeatedly had to fire skilled
Japanese technicians for beating Chinese miners because this would
inevitably dampen enthusiasm and efficiency.
73 Thus in various ways,
economic technicians introduced more flexible technologies that tried to
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employ local knowledge and be more in tune with local conditions to ensure
cooperation and productivity, rather than a “uniform technology,” which Môri
recognized would inevitably restrict Japan’s economy.
74 In a similar way that
domestic economic technologies signified a form of power designed to
mobilize and produce all aspects of life, colonial economic technologies were
designed to co-opt dissent and redirect local knowledge and skill towards
constructing the New Order in East Asia.  In fact, many scholars have argued
that Manchuria was a kind of “laboratory” for domestic policy.
75
Frustrated by the continuing inability of Japanese bureaucrats and
engineers to adapt to the varied conditions of the colonies and their inflexible,
specialized nature, Môri proposed at the height of the war to instead train them
in the particular “life cultures” of the areas in which they would serve.  In a
speech entitled, “Through the Great East Asian War,” Môri says that Hokkaido
University in northern Japan, for example, should become a center for training
leaders in the specific “life cultures” of Siberia and Manchuria, and Taipei
University in the south should become a center for research and training on
the “tropical life cultures” of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.
76 Only
leaders with a total, integrative grasp of the particular cultures in East Asia
could incorporate them into a prosperous, heterogeneous “Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” not bureaucrats who specialize in minute areas or who
artificially divide culture or economy into different specialized areas.
In a 1939 discussion among colonial bureaucrats at the National Policy
Research Association entitled, “Roundtable on Re-thinking the Planned
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Economy through Japan, Manchuria, and China,” Môri distinguishes between
the “requisition economy” view whereby Japan exploits the natural resources
of China and Manchuria for the war economy, and the reform bureaucrats’
“planned economy” view, whereby liberal capitalism is controlled and the
economies of China, Manchuria, and Japan are integrated for the benefit of all
its peoples.
77 “There is a big difference between using the Chinese economy
and the well-being of China or the Chinese peoples,” he says.
78 The question
of “requisition economy vs. planned economy” is especially important when
“the political character of China today is in conflict with Japan,” Môri adds.
 79
He laments the fact that many bureaucrats were not wholly embracing their
new roles as “economic technicians” of a planned economy in East Asia, and
instead pushing for a temporary “requisition economy” to meet immediate war
needs, which would then revert back to liberal capitalism after the crisis had
passed.
80 They lacked a firm “political direction” or ethos for building an
“independent” and “automatic” economy whereby bureaucrats would work with
local colonial peoples to design and implement policy on the ground in line
with the larger guiding ideals of the planned national economy.
81 Ultimately the
planned economy would work like an automatic, well-oiled machine in which
the individual parts work independently without too much management from
above.  Yet in the present urgent context of war with China, bureaucrats were
still falling back on their old habits as specialized “legislative bureaucrats”
rather than “creative engineers.” According to Môri, many colonial bureaucrats
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(“tens”) would come to the Asia Development Board every day to ask for
advice on minute legislative details or on unimportant matters that they should
not even be involved with.
82 Under the present trend toward a requisition war
economy, bureaucrats must change their behavior of monitoring and
supervising every aspect of the colonial economy, and instead formulate new
economic technologies that take into account the range of economic
conditions in China, according to Môri.
83  The “narrow economic technology of
making one hundred things into one” would only spell disaster for Japan by
exacerbating the conflict with the Chinese people and preventing the formation
of an East Asian Community, he writes.
84 If Japan continues to develop
repressive, homogenizing technologies of power, the empire would definitely
crumble, Môri concludes.
The National Life Organization and the Creative Energies of the
Japanese Nation
For Môri, however, economic technology was not just something
leaders carried out from above but needed to be grounded in a mass politics
of collective mobilization both in the colonies and in Japan.  Criticizing an
“administrative control economy” whereby bureaucrats monitor and oversee
economic phenomena as they arise, he calls for an active economic
technology united with the “multiple life functions of national life.”
85 He was a
vocal proponent for establishing a “national life organization” (kokumin
seikatsu soshiki), which he envisions as an “organic life system” of numerous
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vocations (i.e. “life functions”) working for national goals.  “Due to the
complicated pluralization of life functions [in modern society], those who hold
power should not violently squeeze the functions pursued by the people into
something uniform, nor weaken the will and creativity of the people’s life
activities,” he writes.
86 In pursuing his or her everyday economic activity, each
individual would simultaneously realize national economic goals such as
establishing basic raw materials factories and industries, developing an
advanced economy based on high precision manufacturing machinery, and
improving agricultural output.
87 Recognizing the importance of private
economic initiative in improving production technology and creating new
rational management techniques, the national life organization would not
completely reject the principle of profit, but rather curb excessive speculation
by taxing dividends and encourage reinvestment of profits into production.
88
Capitalists would take their place in the vocationalized, highly advanced
national life organization as “industrial technicians” alongside workers,
engineers, peasants, and bureaucrats.
89 Thus each person would not only
gain a “concreteness” they did not have as abstract “economic individuals” in
the liberal economic order but would also actively build the national economy,
instead of being mere objects of social policy or “administrative technology.”
90
In this way the economic technologies employed by “creative bureaucrats”
would be grounded in the “political power” of the national life organization.
91
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Power would no longer be top-down and autocratic, but would be expressed
productively and heterogeneously in the multiple life functions of the people.
For Môri, this is the expressive power of the Japanese ethnos or nation
(minzoku).
The essence of this vocational, cooperative, and plural national life
organization is the “life power of the Japanese nation (minzoku),” says Môri
 .
92
In fact, the organization of society by vocation is a concrete articulation of
national (minzoku) life power.  He writes:
The development of the Japanese nation (minzoku) is the development
of action that continues to live in eternal new life while containing
something absolutely intrinsic, something immemorial of the ethnic
nation that is alive within its essence.  This makes one think of the life
power of the two-faced Janus who had two different life powers.  The
life power of the Japanese nation, however, is not like Janus who had
two separate life powers but rather, a unitary life power that eternally
activates the intrinsic or essential into young, new life.
93
Môri always refers to this national “life power” throughout his essays and
speeches.  The history of Japan from ancient times through the Meiji
Restoration to the recent “Manchuria and China Incidents” is the expression of
this primordial life force that also manifests itself as a fundamental adaptability,
plurality, and vigor to create anew.  The beginning of the China-Japan War,
according to Môri, signifies the overcoming of the liberal capitalist world order
and the formation of the mobilized, self-sufficient national economy through
the national life organization.  Therefore it represents the latest stage in the
expression of the creative life power of the Japanese ethnic peoples.  While
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technology signifies the creation of something new, it is also the expression of
something eternal and immemorial.
Thus the Japanese nation (minzoku) should form an organic “total life
system” of dynamic “life functions” organized and expressed by the national
life organization.
94 He writes:
Although national culture becomes functionally more complex and
multiple as it becomes more advanced, under the completed Japanese
national order (Nihon minzoku chitstujo), we must be confident that no
matter how complicated and multiple national culture becomes, every
single life function can be vocationalized into the organic life system.
95
In fact, complexity and multiplicity of vocations within the national life
organization is only a further sign of national strength, and this should be
“expanded and developed” even further.
96 Vocations in the advanced
technological industries such as heavy chemicals and heavy industry would
have a primary place in the national life organization, and their increasing
proliferation throughout society further demonstrates national power.
97
However, as we saw above, the bureaucrats who ran the control economy
were “taming the people’s will towards action in life” by “rejecting the
multiplicity of the people’s life functions and bringing about their uniformity,”
according to Môri.
98 By undermining popular energies, bureaucrats were
preventing the people from ultimately gaining a “firm conviction” in their own
life functions, and further developing and expanding newer, more advanced
ones.
99 The “reactionary” politics of the bureaucrats was obstructing the birth
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of the organic planned economy consisting of bureaucrat “economic
technicians,” capitalist “industrial technicians,” and workers who were
increasingly organized by technologized  “life functions” and the organic,
machine-like national life organization.
100 They were stuck in an old mindset of
autocratically exercising power from above, instead of seeking to proliferate it
through the people in the form of an organic life system.
In a 1941 speech to engineers at the Japan Artisans Center entitled,
“Lecture on the New Economic Order,” Môri says that through the war, the
“Japanese nation” (minzoku) was transforming itself from “citizens” (shimin) to
“national subjects”  (kokumin); however, they required a further revolution in
their “life consciousness” (seikatsu ishiki) in order for this to be fully realized.
101
An essential aspect of the “New Economic Order” was the formation of a
“national defense consciousness” throughout all aspects of life.
102 This
consciousness was not just a short-term mobilization to win the war, but the
reigning in of liberalism and the creation of a modern, independent, and self-
sufficient economy in East Asia.  The people’s adoption of a “national defense
consciousness” was an abandonment of simple individualism and the
attainment of a higher individual freedom within the national destiny.  As an
individualistic “citizen,” every limit on freedom or deprivation is felt as
restriction, says Môri; however, as “national subjects” who feel the national
destiny in every aspect of their lives, individuals freely undergo difficulties for
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the higher destiny.
103 Freedom is discovered within “tremors, vibrations, and
strife,” Môri says.
104 He urges the engineers to abandon the atomistic,
mechanistic worldview of classical science in favor of the more total,
integrated worldview of quantum mechanics at the basis of recent
advancements in technology.  They must also not just intellectually understand
“national destiny” but actively feel it and become “builders within the storm.”
105
For example, an architect does not just plan and build quality dormitories for
workers, but makes them convertible into integrated barracks as well.
106 As
national subjects, engineers must fulfill both the particular needs of the
workers and the universal needs of the nation.
In sum technology for Môri takes on the meaning of a total
transformation in consciousness on the part of all the people.  Bureaucrats
must abandon their tendency to legislate and monitor everything in minute
detail, and boldly create “economic technologies” that take into account both
national objectives and the particular conditions of the people.  Engineers
must abandon their narrow, specialized worldview (symbolized by “atomism”)
and adopt an integrated one (symbolized by quantum mechanics) whereby
their technical work fulfills both particular and universal goals at the same time.
Finally capitalists and workers must abandon their individualistic ways and
fully take on their “life functions” within the technologized economy.  The
“national life organization” would be the collectivized expression of these “life
functions” and operate as an organic technological system for producing the
New Order in East Asia.  In the New Order, technology is associated with the
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multiple life energies of the nation, or more specifically, the national qualities of
abundant creativity, efficient organization, and integrated, holistic thinking.  In
short for Môri and other technocrats, technology represents a type of rational,
plural, and expressive “political power” of the nation or people.
Pan-Asian Nationalism
For Môri and the reform bureaucrats, the national life organization that
would construct the national economy was inseparable from the construction
of a new political order in East Asia.  Along with the encouragement of more
flexible economic technologies to co-opt and re-direct Chinese resistance,
Môri argues for the necessity of grounding these in a new political order as
well that would unify the various peoples of East Asia into an “East Asian
nation” (Tôa minzoku).  He criticizes those who saw Chinese nationalism as a
relatively recent response to warlordism and did not recognize its long history
among the people dating back to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and
revolts against European powers, as well as those who thought that Chinese
peasants were isolated from politics and had no national or ethnic
consciousness.
107  If the Japanese continue to narrowly reject Chinese
nationalism, “history would teach us a lesson,” Môri warned.
108 Instead the
Japanese people should “affirm the fact that the ethnic pursuit of the Chinese
nation to realize the national unity of China is the motivating force of their
political power,” writes Môri.
109
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However, Japanese and Chinese nationalism should not remain at the
level of “simple ethnic emotion” but should be mutually developed under the
rubric of a higher multi-ethnic East Asian ethnic nationalism that would
cooperatively build the non-capitalist, self-sufficient order in East Asia.
110 In
fact Môri suggests that such East Asian nationalism is an essential part of the
Japanese nation, which he calls a “plural nation.”
111 This multi-ethnic
nationalism would “fertilize” the Chinese national instinct and therefore “make
possible the greater and faster construction of the East Asian nation and
thereby, the “Symbiotic Body of East Asia.”
112 East Asian nationalism therefore
formed the political ideology or “will” for the “liberation from the international
capitalist and communist orders in China,” and the establishment of a “total life
order” in Japan, Manchuria, and China along the lines outlined above.
113
Môri saw world history as moving away from the particular nationalisms
institutionalized by the Versalles treaty system and towards the formation of
large, multi-ethnic nations that incorporate “small and weaker” ones.
114 The
five great plural nations—the Japanese, Slavs, Germans, Chinese, and
Indians—would hereby shape the course of world history, according to Môri.
115
Plurality in terms of ethnicity, culture, lifestyles, and economic activity is not a
sign of weakness but rather, of strength and superiority, he says in a 1939
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speech to the Social Policy Institute.
116 This affirmation of multiplicity and the
need for bureaucrats to understand and synthesize multiplicity instead of
homogenizing it is a recurring theme throughout Môri’s totalitarian philosophy.
As the leading “plural nation” in the world, the Japanese nation would affirm,
synthesize and revitalize the weaker Chinese nation, thereby transforming
both into a higher East Asian nation, as we saw above.  In the process the
Chinese and Japanese peoples would change themselves from “private
citizens” of a liberal capitalist order into “national subjects” within a corporatist
“total life order.” This new East Asian nation would resolve the persistent
questions of ethnic minorities and class conflict, which the nineteenth century
world gave birth to and the twentieth century did not resolve—this was their
“world-historical task,” according to Môri.
 117 Thus for him the “political power”
of the East Asian nation (minzoku) was not to be expressed as
homogenization of the lifestyles and economies of the various colonial
peoples, but rather as a productive synthesis and expression of their multiple
energies and skills.
Production Technology and the Creative Energies of the Japanese
Nation
In the same way that Môri grounds economic technology in the different
social, economic, and political practices of the people, he also roots production
technology in the “energies of the Japanese nation.” With the construction of
the national economy and New Order in East Asia, “technology is liberated
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from a materialist existence as merely an element of production and is directly
linked to the energy of the nation pursuing their development,” Môri writes.
118
Under capitalism technology is subordinate to the principle of profit and
monopolized by individual business rather than shared for the benefit of
society.  In fact businesses have little interest in developing technology if there
is no profit incentive, and they often buy up patents to prevent competition.
119
Technology therefore is merely the material means for profit under capitalism.
For Môri, however, the “new industrial revolution” of the early twentieth
century, which made the development of Japan’s heavy chemical
industries—particularly the development of synthetic energies and
metals—possible, changed the very meaning of technology.  With this
revolution technology was no longer completely reliant on the supply and
demand of natural resources but could directly manufacture them.  Thus:
[T]echnology and chemistry, which made these synthetic raw materials
possible, immediately were something spiritual that formed the basis for
the liberation and welfare of the nation as a whole—not
material—elements, and it was possible for technology to become a
form of the spirit of the nation, or in other words, culture, rather than
civilization.
120
Technology was not merely the instrumental means of labor but the very
expression of national creativity and independence.
“Up to now technology was not thought of as cultural but simply as a
method of commodity production.  Moreover, culture itself was the culture of
the individual.  That is to say, the individual was the locus of culture, and
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cultural production was merely individual production,” Môri writes.
121 Presently,
however, the nation and the state have become “life-like,” and “cultural and
spiritual meanings have become essential for the establishment of the nation
and the state,” he adds.
122 Thus individual cultural production is infused with
national culture, and culture is then elevated to a higher plane.  Technology is
also transformed from “individual technology” into the “technology of the
national community”—the human creativity at the root of technology is given a
“deeper creative pool” (i.e. the nation) to draw from.
123 In short the creativity
inherent in technology is only heightened and intensified when tied to the
creative energies of national culture.
Môri sums up the six ways that production technology has begun to
escape the “materialist” and “individualist” meanings of capitalism, and taken
on more subjective and spiritual significance.
124  First, the creativity of the
technician and technology is becoming the creativity of the community.
Second, the creativity of individual technologies are mutually developing and
sustaining each other, or in other words, are integrating more and more with
the needs of the totality.  Third, since the individual knowledges that construct
technology are unified with national goals, technology has taken on more of a
“planned character.” Fourth, the “dynamic creativity” of the nation at the
foundation of technology is flourishing.  Fifth, the various movements of
technology are being made “uniform” by taking on a larger spiritual meaning.
Finally, by being grounded in all of the above qualities of national creativity,
organization, synergy, planning, uniformity, and spirituality, technology has
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adapted a more concrete character—reality and imagination have become
“harmonized.” The abstract law of profit or “arbitrary” individual creativity would
no longer hinder the development of technology.  In sum production
technology begins to take on all sorts of ethical meanings and subjective
qualities for Môri: “national creativity,” “integration and planning,” coordination,
creative momentum, “uniformity,” and “harmony.” All of these are ways that
production technology escapes the narrow confines of the factory and enters
the realm of national subjectivity and life.
The Transformation of Spatial Consciousness
The development of science and technology is also related to a
necessary revolution in the “spatial consciousness of the Japanese nation,”
Môri says in a speech to university students.
125 While the spatial
consciousness of liberal capitalism viewed the world abstractly and universally
as a flat surface of equivalent economic relations, the “spatial consciousness
of the Japanese nation” should grasp Japanese colonial space concretely,
creatively, and synthetically as a space for living (seikatsu kûkan).
126 The
understanding of space more concretely as a national “space for living” or in
terms of the local conditions of a particular space leads to the development of
new scientific principles and technologies for the “improvement of space”
(kûkan o jûjitsu suru), according to Môri.
127  These developments in turn
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elevate the “cultural power or national energies” of the Japanese peoples.
128
“Up to now, science and technology was merely subordinate to the
economy…However, today science and technology must be determined as
the expression and creation of national energies for the improvement of
national spaces for living,” Môri writes.
129 Under capitalism, science and
technology was tied to a conception of the economy as an abstract space of
free competition—they were merely the objective means of competition.  By
being tied to a national conception of space as “space for living,” however,
science and technology comes to life as a creative force of developing the
“New Order in East Asia.”
Môri further ties his notion of “space for living” or “self-aware space” to
the geopolitics of the Japanese empire and the construction of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
130  The “Pacific Space” was originally a
“threatening space” for Tokugawa Japan and the space of British free trade
and liberal capitalism, according to Môri.
131  With the entry of Japan into the
liberal capitalist order and especially the acquisition of various Pacific Islands
such as the Carolines, the Marianas, and the Marshalls, Japan organized its
own Pacific “space for living” by “integrating” the “lived spaces” of the various
Pacific nations.
132 This space continued to be liberal capitalist, and it laid the
foundations of the Japanese economy.  The “expansion of Japan’s space for
living” into Manchuria and the China, however, signified a change in spatial
consciousness from a space of market relations to a space of concrete
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planning and self-sufficiency as detailed above.
133 Môri calls this developing
“continental character” of space, a “revolution in the character of Pacific
space.”
134 For him the entry of the “Manchurian empire” into “Pacific space”
signifies the incorporation of liberal capitalism into the creation of a self-
sufficient, planned economy in East Asia.
135
In the larger scheme of things, the “revolution of the character of Pacific
space” meant the formation of a “Greater East Asian Space,” according to
Môri.
136 Japan would transform the “centripetal forces” of maritime liberal
capitalism and continental planned economy into “centrifugal forces” for a New
Order incorporating both spatial conceptions, he writes.
137  Like Japan, for a
long time China was never allowed to develop her own “consciousness toward
space” due to the invasion of powerful, competing “cultural spaces.”
138 When
the Chinese began to develop their own nationalist conception of space,
however, it was divided between a liberal democratic view (“maritime
conception”) and a nationalist communist view (“continental conception”),
according to Môri.
139 Japan’s higher mission was to integrate the “maritime
space of the Pacific” and the “continental space of East Asia” into a dynamic,
self-sufficient, and independent “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
140
Thus with the expansion of the Japanese empire to include different spatial
conceptions, an “East Asian” conception of space would ultimately unify the
capitalist and planned economy conceptions of developing and organizing
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space.  In a special issue of Keizai Jôhô [Information on the Economy] on
technology, Môri writes that the “technologies of the nation” (kokumin no
gijutsu) and the “power of science” would unify these two conceptions of
economic space with their very different economic and production
technologies.
141 Moreover the Japanese technocrats, businessmen, engineers,
and skilled workers who were managing the new continental economy needed
to have a “technological conscience” to develop the expensive natural
resources of Manchuria and China into technologically advanced, high-quality
industrial products for the world market.
142 Thus the entire Japanese empire
was viewed as a creative space for Japanese technocrats to develop new
economic and production technologies for the New Order in East Asia.
Society through Quantum Theory
Môri even employs quantum theory, which helped engender the heavy
chemical industrial revolution, as a way to view society.  For him society could
no longer be viewed atomistically in terms of its individual members or units.
Quantum theory, however, sees things in terms of a higher, complicated
synthesis.  “This is similar to totalitarianism and the planned economy, which
is not a logical unification into something uniform and homogenous.  It is the
synthesis into a higher standpoint while affirming the multiple as it is,” he says
in a dialogue with the philosopher, Miki Kiyoshi.
143 He extends this metaphor of
quantum theory to the “multiple ethnicities of the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere” and its “extremely plural life functions.”  These “irrational,
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plural existences” would be “affirmed as they are” and “synthesized into a
higher standpoint.”
144 His view of society through the lens of quantum theory is
significant because it attributes a certain degree of uncertainty, multiplicity,
change, and movement to social forces.  Out of this framework, he formulates
social, political, and economic technologies that would most effectively
produce and manage these indeterminate social forces.  Elsewhere he even
argues for the “vocationalization” of the new technologies and products of
quantum theory into a “technological system” whereby members of the
national life organization would take on various vocations in the heavy
industrial, high precision, technologically advanced economy.
145 Thus for Môri,
quantum theory is not simply an abstract social framework but something that
actually generates technologies and industries that form a social system of
highly skilled, imaginative, and cooperative workers mobilized for national
goals.
IV.  CONCLUSION: TECHNOLOGY AND POWER
In conclusion, Môri’s broad theory of technology signifies a historical
shift in the discourse of power in modern societies such as Japan.  In the
reform bureaucrats’ conceptions and policies, power does not merely structure
social life from above through institutions such as the state but infuses bodies,
consciousnesses, and the totality of social relations in all their multiplicity;
therefore, power is fundamentally restrictive and productive.  Economic
technologies seek to employ local knowledge and socio-economic relations in
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order to fully mobilize the creative powers of the colonial peoples.  They also
try to operate at the level of daily life by proposing a plural “national life
organization” based on specific, high technology vocations or in the colonies
by attempting to incorporate Chinese national feeling.  Production
technologies are not dead instruments for profit but take on spiritual, cultural
meaning as helping to build an advanced East Asian society that would
overcome the contradictions of capitalism and nationalism.  Thus these
discursive “technologies of fascism” were not simply violent, irrational and
repressive but attempted to work at the level of mobilizing the everyday
imaginations and subjectivities of different peoples.  In this sense they bear
much in common with the efforts of post-war Asian technocrats to mobilize
their diverse societies for high-speed growth as well as recent efforts by Japan
to create an Asian economic community.  In all of these cases creativity,
equality, and independence were encouraged to the extent that they were
complicit with their goals of building an empire, strong nation-state, or free-
market economic block.  In wartime Japan, technology served as a powerful
discursive trope to organize the multiplicity of subjects in Japan and East Asia
into an organic “national life system” that would eliminate political antagonism
and therefore, any chance of democratically transforming social relations of
subordination.82
CHAPTER TWO
SUBJECTIVE TECHNOLOGIES OF MOBILIZATION: AIKAWA HARUKI’S
WARTIME THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY
I.  INTRODUCTION
Modernity through Technology
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, debates on “technology” (gijutsu)
raged across the political spectrum, particularly among bureaucrats and
intellectuals.  On the one hand, many right-wing ideologues and politicians
saw technology as something that was steadily eroding Japan’s spiritual and
creative vigor, as well as traditional emperor-centered values of community
and agrarianism.
1  On the other hand, many engineers, scientists,
bureaucrats, and businessmen viewed technology as the solution to all of the
social ills of capitalism, and they campaigned vigorously for the promotion of
science and technology in all areas of life as well as the introduction of rational
techniques of management and administration throughout society.
2  Most,
however, developed theories that were somewhere between these two
extremes of romanticism and technocracy, subjectivism and objectivism, or
simply combined the two.  Along with  “culture” (bunka) and “nation”
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(minzoku), “technology” was an important lens through which Japanese
bureaucrats and intellectuals articulated Japan’s modernity during a period of
increasing hostilities with China, intensified colonization of East and South
East Asia, and full-scale war with the U.S. (1931-1945).  An important
characteristic of this discourse was that for many, technology was not just
accepted as the “value-neutral” machines and productive mechanisms of
society but rather, the very nature of technology was questioned and re-
defined.  In fact, technology was equated with the production of all of society,
not only of its laws, institutions, ideologies, social organization, and economic
structure but of its citizens and subjects as well.  As Victor Koschmann points
out, technology was interpreted more and more “in performative or existential
terms, as signifying certain ways of thinking, acting, or being, or even as
representing certain qualitative virtues, such as rationality, creativity, or an
ethic of responsibility.”
3
While the growing demand for increasing the production of war
materials such as airplanes, engines, steel, and oil motivated much of the
debate over technology, a lot more was at stake than just improving wartime
production and strengthening the economy.
4 Since technology was often
defined in a wider sense of an entire society’s subjective and objective
productive processes, it constituted the concrete architecture and makeup of a
society’s institutions, economic structure, political policies and culture, for
example.  More importantly, various social, cultural, political and economic
“technologies” determined the course a society was taking and how it was
being transformed.  Thus economists, sociologists, philosophers, bureaucrats,
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business leaders, and scientists discussed technology in terms of a more
widespread transformation and mobilization of society.  The enormous
literature on technology in journals, newspapers, and books, and the
predominance of terms such as “technological spirit,” “technological culture,”
“technological science,” and “technological mobilization” in the public
discourse attests to the importance of the term, “technology” and its contested
nature in Japanese society.
5
The Debate over the Theory of Technology
The 1920s Industrial Rationalization Movement (Sangyô gijutsu undô)
to promote Taylorism and the introduction of rational techniques of production
into the factory, as well as the efforts of Miyamoto Takenosuke’s Japan
Technology Association to increase the role of engineers in social planning
helped bring about a re-thinking of technology as more than just the objective
means of production.  However, it was in fact Japanese Marxists who sparked
a major debate over the meaning of technology among intellectuals during the
early 1930s.  Between 1933 and 1935, the “Debate over the Theory of
Technology” (Gijutsuron ronsô) raged in the pages of Studies on Materialism
(Yuibutsuron kenkyû), a journal of Marxist intellectuals from different fields
dedicated to developing historical materialism as the proper way to understand
society and social transformation.
6  Among the people who emerged from this
debate, which included famous Marxists such as Nagata Hiroshi, Tosaka Jun,
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and Oka Kunio, was Aikawa Haruki, a leading “Lectures Faction” (Kôza-ha)
Marxist economist who later became the most prominent theorist of
technology in wartime Japan.
7
What sparked the debate was the Comintern leader, Nikolai Bukharin’s
overly mechanistic and positivistic equating of technology with the forces of
production without giving prominence to proletarian subjectivity and labor
power.  Technology was simply linked to the economic stage of the material
forces of production (i.e. technology), which measured a society’s progress
toward socialism—revolution would somehow naturally arrive with the gradual
development of the forces of production within capitalism, according to
Bukharin.
8  Kôza-ha Marxists within the “Research Group on Materialism” such
as Aikawa took exception with such a positivistic “one size fits all” stage theory
that did not take Japan’s particular conditions into consideration, and
especially with Bukharin’s de-emphasis of worker subjectivity and proletarian
struggle.  While I shall go into a little more detail on the nature of the debate
later on, in sum, it centered on delineating and establishing the roles of
subjectivity and technology in social transformation.  Could “subjectivity” and
“technology” even be clearly separated from each other in today’s heavy
industrial society? What if modern technology incorporated more subjective
processes such as cultural production (e.g. film, mass media), administrative
processes (e.g. techniques of management and organization), and legislative
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production (e.g. policy formation), for example? Aikawa put forth the generally
accepted definition of technology in this debate as the “complex of objective
means of social labor, or in short, the system of the means of labor,” thereby
sticking to an objective definition of technology but combining it in a “dialectical
unity” with praxis or labor power—in the end, it was the “fire of labor” that
helped realize and complete technology’s transformational power, and that
would ultimately bring about socialism.
9 While Aikawa still stuck to a very
orthodox definition of technology as strictly the objective means of labor in
production, he developed the basis for his more encompassing and
comprehensive theories of technology during the war by grounding technology
in the human subject and concrete human activity.  In doing so, he was able to
later develop a theory of technology as not only productive machinery and
tools but as the numerous processes and techniques of producing and
therefore governing all aspects of life and society.
Aikawa Haruki: Technology as Creative Praxis and Mobilization
This chapter will analyze the wartime work of the apostate (tenkô)
Marxist, Aikawa Haruki, the most prolific writer on technology during the
wartime period and a self-proclaimed “technology critic.”
10 His most famous
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work, Modern Theory of Technology (Gendai gijutsuron, 1940), was very well
received, and he went on to publish works such as Introduction to a Theory of
Technology (Gijutsuron nyûmon, 1942), Theory and Policy of Technology
(Gijutsu no riron to seisaku, 1942), Industrial Technology (Sangyô gijutsu,
1942), Technology and Skill Management: The Shift Towards Mass
Production (Gijutsu oyobi ginô kanri: taryô seisan he no tenkan, 1944), and
Technology and the Resources of South-East Asia (Tôna ajia no gijutsu to
shigen, 1944) in the span of two years.  He also wrote many articles in policy
journals such as Technology Review (Gijutsu hyôron), National Industrial
Policy (Kôgyô kokusaku), and Scientific Industry (Kagakushugi kôgyô).  His
writings were also extensive in the cultural realm.  He published a work on the
technological aesthetics of the “culture film” (bunka eiga) or documentary
entitled, Theory of the Culture Film (Bunka eigaron, 1944) and he even helped
in the production of one on the workings of a wartime electric generator plant
entitled, The Present Battle (Konnichi no tatakai, 1942).
11  He wrote
periodically for the film journal, Culture Film (Bunka eiga), published by the film
company Geijutsu eigasha (GES), whose members were primarily former or
closet Marxists, and he actively participated in their roundtables.  In addition,
he wrote a “Comments on Culture” column for Technology Review and even
wrote theater reviews for Theater (Teaturo) and the newspaper, Tokyo
Imperial University News (Teidai shimbun).  Thus his work spanned the whole
range of economic, political, social, and cultural technology.
I analyze Aikawa, not only because he was the most prominent theorist
of technology, but also because his theories represent the discursive
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background to state policy and ideology, as was most clearly exhibited in the
“Outline Plan for the Founding of a New Order for Science and Technology” in
East Asia, which established a Technology Agency (Gijitsuin), and to the
control economy policies of reform bureaucrats (kakushin kanryô) such as
Môri Hideoto, Okumura Kiwao, and Kishi Nobosuke.
12  Bureaucrats and
intellectuals such as Aikawa pushed for the establishment of a technologically
advanced, rationally planned, and fully mobilized “New Order in East Asia” that
would supposedly eliminate social inequality, exploitation, and conflict.  Every
subject had to do their part in life to “construct” (kensetsu) this new order, and
new policies, institutions, and ideas were necessary for its achievement.
13
“Technology” in fact became a way to concretely describe and frame the new
processes of cultural, economic, and social production (or “technologies”) that
were required for different subjects to actively and spontaneously create this
new order.
14  Aikawa was the most prominent intellectual who framed society
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in terms of developing concrete technologies of societal production, and he
even pushed for a new, independent discipline to study these technologies:
Technologie or “technology studies.”
15 His “modern theory of technology,”
which ontologically grounds technology in praxis and everyday human activity,
formed the broader discursive background to many of the concrete
technologies then being formulated to bring about the New Order.  Aikawa’s
re-signification of technology as praxis made the people the focus of social
transformation, not some impersonal force such as “technological progress” or
“the objective conditions of the means of production.”  Yet in making the
people the agent of social change, Aikawa actually helped create and maintain
new forms of mobilization and control that worked at a more subjective and
practical level.
Thus in this chapter I first examine Aikawa’s broad theory of technology
as presented in his seminal work, Modern Theory of Technology.  I then detail
how he envisions his theory at work in various realms such as the economy,
government policy, and social organization by looking at some of his other,
more specific wartime books and articles on the state’s “Outline for a New
Order of Science in Technology” adopted in 1941.  My argument is that
Aikawa’s works were instrumental in highlighting the practical, everyday,
creative nature of technology, however, in a way that furthered Japan’s
imperial aims and control over its people.  As in my previous chapter on Môri
Hideoto, I seek to demonstrate how Japanese fascist ideology was more than
simply irrational, violent, and repressive but worked in rational, creative, and
incorporative ways as well, which were more insidious.  In fact, as I will show,
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Aikawa’s appropriation and incorporation of a Marxist theory of praxis and
mass proletarian revolution, which sought to understand the primary forces
behind social transformation, made his all-encompassing theories of
technology all the more problematic.  Rather than trying to understand and
incite the multiple forces of radical democratic or socialist critique and change,
Aikawa in fact helped incorporate and contain them through the promise of a
modern, technologically organized utopia.  Thus in this chapter I would like to
give an example of how fascism appropriates leftist thought and popular
critical energy in order to perpetuate itself.
Technology as Power: Re-conceptualizing Japanese Fascism
By examining Aikawa’s influential theories of technology and
technocracy during the wartime period, I seek to highlight an important form of
social power that aimed at not only controlling but also producing all aspects of
life and society.  Instead of solely focusing on the brute violence and
fanaticism of Japanese fascism, it is necessary to also look at the productive
aspects or technologies of fascist power, which attempt to work at the
subjective, creative level.  Technology in Japanese modern history has always
been seen as a progressive force—the wartime being seen as a skewed
employment of advanced technology later to be rectified in Japan’s post-war
economic miracle.
16 I will show, however, that for many of the leading
bureaucrats and intellectuals, technology meant much more than advanced
machinery and infrastructure, but included technologies of subjective control
and mobilization towards organizing an organic, rapidly developing social
system.  Many of these technologies, along with the leaders who advocated
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them, were to continue on into post-war Japanese developmentalism.  Thus it
is important to shed light on the wartime origins of the supposedly progressive
forces that often serve to increase state control and mobilization so that they
may then be opened up to democratic critique and change.
II.  HISTORICAL PROFILE
17
Aikawa’s Early Encounters with Marxism
Aikawa, whose real name was Yanami Hisao, grew up in rural towns in
Niigata and Toyama Prefectures during the period known as “Taishô
Democracy” (1912-1926). The growth of more assertive tenant farmers
associations, labor unions, and mass political parties; the spread of socialism
and communism as an intellectual and cultural force; the frequent outbreak of
economic crises; and a rise in state repression were some of the
characteristics of this era.  Northern Japan did not escape the social turmoil of
Taishô.  Aikawa’s radical activity began quite early while he was a student in
the literary course of the elite Fourth Higher Secondary School in Kanazawa
from 1926 to 1929.
18 Like many elite higher schools, it was a center of political
activity against militarism, imperialism and capitalism.  In the spirit of the
numerous leftist literary circles and associations that sprung up during the
Taishô periods (such as the Proletarian Arts League), Aikawa helped found
the Fourth Secondary School Social Sciences Research Group (SS-ken),
which became a focal point for leftist students at the school.  Aikawa was the
                                                   
17 Much of the biographical information is from Aikawa Haruki shôden [A Short Biography of
Aikawa Haruki] ed. Utsumi Kôichirô, Yamazaki Toshio, and Kobayashi Tango (Tokyo: Yanami
sada, 1979).
18 The famous Marxist poet-activist, Nakano Shigeharu, attended this school as well.92
theoretical leader of the group.  Clashes with right-wing students were fierce,
and in one incident when a right-winger attacked the popular head of the
literary students alumni association, Aikawa organized a large student strike.
In addition he and several students published the independent literary
magazine, Hiroba (Public Square), outside school, which became popular
among students.
19  The school used the arrest of some of SS-ken’s leaders by
local police as an excuse to expel many of its other members from school,
including Aikawa, who was expelled and had his graduation revoked for being
the editor of Hiroba.
20
Aikawa left for Tokyo, where he enrolled at the Waseda Academy in
1929.  He soon became heavily involved in the growing Proletarian Cultural
Movement.  This nationwide literary and artistic movement began in the early
1920s with literary journals such as The Sower (Tane maku hito) and Literary
Battlefront (Bungei sensen), and it sought to engender a proletarian cultural
renaissance that reflected the surge of labor struggle during the Taishô Period.
Prominent participants included the novelist Kobayashi Takiji,
21 the poet
Nakano Shigeharu,
22 and the playwright Murayama Tomoyoshi.
23  The
                                                   
19 According to Aikawa’s bio, SS-ken had the active support of eighty percent of the student
body. Utsumi, et. al., 8.
20 For more on the student movement in Toyama, see Kyûsei Toyama kôtô gakkô shisô bunka
undôshi [History of the Thought Culture Movement at Toyama Higher Secondary Schools], ed.
Kyûsei Toyama kôtô gakkô shisô bunka undôshi iinkai (Tokyo: Shinkô shuppansha, 1983).
21 Kobayashi was one of the most popular writers of proletarian literature.  His most famous
work is The Cannery Boat, which describes working conditions on a crab trawler in Hokkaido.
He was general secretary of the Japan League of Proletarian Writers.  He died in a much-
publicized incident of police torture in 1932.
22 Nakano was one of the leading writer-poets of the proletarian cultural movement.  His works
dealt with militarism, the emperor system, and minorities in Japan, among other things.  As
one of the leaders of the Japan Federation of Proletarian Artists (NAPF), an umbrella
organization for various Marxist artists federations, he insisted that art should never be
subordinated and instrumentalized into politics.  Arrested in the early 1930s, he renounced
ties with the Japan Communist Party in 1934, but continued to write indirectly about popular
struggles during the war.93
movement gave birth to many organizations such as the Japan Proletarian
Science Center (Puroka), the Japan Proletarian Film League, and the Japan
Federation of Proletarian Artists (NAPF), which all served as fronts for the
banned Japanese Communist Party.  Cultural schools that offered everything
from classes in Esperanto and German to reading groups on Marxist works
sprung up around the country, and Aikawa attended classes in German and
Chinese at one of them, the International Culture Center at Surugadai.  Openly
espousing Marxism by this point, he continued his political activity while at
Waseda.  In the aftermath of the April 16
th Incident in 1929, a wave of arrests
of suspected communists that forced the closure of the center, Aikawa was
also arrested at Surugadai and subsequently expelled from Waseda.  This
was the beginning of many arrests for him.
After a short stint at an electrical engineering school, Aikawa returned
briefly to Toyama in 1930 where he participated in the First Ramie Cotton
strike, upon which he was arrested again.  He returned to Tokyo, obtaining a
minor researcher position at the Industrial Labor Research Association
(Sanrô), a large research institute established by the General Labor
Federation (Sôdômei), but later associated with the Japan Communist Party,
which documented labor conditions, labor struggles, and youth problems.
Continuing his self-education in Marxism and active participation in communist
study groups and political activity, he was arrested again in 1931.  In 1932 he
joined the Association for Research in Proletarian Science (Puro-ka), the
                                                                                                                                                     
23 Murayama was one of the leading avant-garde playwrights of the 1920s and 1930s.  His
theater group, Gekijô no sanka, represented the peak of Dadaism in Japan.  After spending
some time in Germany, he introduced constructivism to the avant-garde theater movement,
but later moved closer to Marxism, becoming a member of the Japan Proletarian Arts League
in 1926 and founding the Left-wing Theater Company in Tokyo.  With state repression, his
theater became part of the “New Theater” (shingeki) movement.94
largest communist think-tank dedicated to spreading Marxist thought among
the people and to deepening Marxist research in all the disciplines, and he
was soon selected to its Central Committee.  Norô Eitarô,
24 Hani Gorô,
25 and
Miki Kiyoshi
26 were other famous members of this association.  Here Aikawa
threw himself into the famous “Debates on Japanese Capitalism,” which
fiercely divided Japanese Marxists until their complete repression in 1937.
Aikawa as Kôza-ha Marxist
These debates concerned the stage, structure, and characteristics of
Japanese capitalism, which in turn was supposed to determine how ready
Japan was for socialist revolution according to the orthodox Marxist theory of
the Comintern.  Begun in the late 1920s through the writings of the Marxist
                                                   
24 Norô was one of the theoretical leaders of the Japanese Communist Party.  He was most
famous for being one of the founders of the Kôza Faction of Japanese Marxism, which
asserted the feudal nature of Japanese capitalism.  He wrote mostly on the feudal relations
between landlord and tenant in the countryside.  He died in 1934 when his tuberculosis
worsened after an incident of police torture.
25 Hani was a prominent Marxist historian and philosopher of history.  He studied philosophy at
Heidelberg University for three years together with other Japanese intellectuals such as Miki
Kiyoshi and Ouchi Hyôei during the tumultuous 1920s.  Together with Miki, he founded the
Marxist journal, Under the Flag of New Science (Shinkô kagaku no hata no shita ni), which
became the foundation for the large Marxist think tank, the Association for Research in
Proletarian Science (Puro-ka).  He contributed to the history section of Norô’s Lectures on the
History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism.
26 Miki is associated with the Kyoto School of Philosophy.  He studied neo-Kantianism under
Heinrich Rickert and phenomenology under Martin Heidegger between 1922 and 1925 in
Germany.  Upon his return, he became devoted to Marxist thought, particularly Marx’s
philosophy of praxis and subjectivity.  He was one of the founding members of the think tank,
Puro-ka.  However, he was soon labeled an “idealist” by other Marxist intellectuals, and
eventually left the organization.  After several arrests, he “converted” to the state project of
imperialism in Asia, chairing the Cultural Section of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimarô’s policy
think tank, the Shôwa Research Group.  He was one of the most prominent articulators of a
cosmopolitan “pan-Asianism” and “cooperativism,” writing a government pamphlet on the
topic.  During the war, he was a member of the army’s propaganda bureau and was sent to
Manila.  He was arrested in 1945 as a communist sympathizer and subsequently died in
prison.95
theorists, Norô Eitarô and Inomata Tsunao,
27 the key point in the debate was
the publication in 1932 of the multi-volume Lectures on the History of the
Development of Japanese Capitalism (Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu shi kôza),
which announced the birth of the “Lectures” faction (Kôza-ha) of Marxism.
These Marxists emphasized the semi-feudal nature of Japanese capitalism,
which was characterized by “a highly industrial, militarist-monopolist
sector…atop an economic foundation consisting of semi-feudal land
ownership and a semi-serflike pattern of petty farming.”
28 Thus for them a
bourgeois democratic revolution, as well as struggles against feudal
structures, were the necessary first steps before advancing towards socialist
revolution.  Their opponents, the “Labor-Farmer” faction (Rônô-ha), asserted
that Japan had all the trappings of a modern capitalist state—a modern land
rent system, powerful finance capital, imperialism, and parliamentary
democracy.  They in turn advocated organizing for immediate socialist
revolution.
Along with Norô, Yamada Moritarô,
29 and Hirano Yoshitarô,
30 Aikawa
was a leading member of the Kôza-ha, publishing as many as fifty essays
                                                   
27 Inomata was the founder of the Labor-Farmer (Rônô) Faction of Japanese Marxism, which
believed that Japan had all the characteristics of a bourgeois-capitalist society and was ready
for socialist revolution.  Their opponents were Noro’s Kôza Faction.  He became influenced by
Marxism as a student in the U.S. between 1915 and 1921 through his interactions with East
European immigrants.  His view of Marxism was gradually sidelined and expelled from the rest
of Japanese Marxist thought.  He died in 1942 after being imprisoned for about five years.
28 Sugiyama, 209.
29 Yamada’s works were most representative of Kôza-ha Marxism.  In An Analysis of
Japanese Capitalism, he systematically diagrammed the militaristic and half-feudal nature of
Japanese capitalism, particularly its mode of reproduction.  He was arrested in 1937 and like
many Marxist intellectuals, became part of the East Asian Institute, one of the leading state
sponsored think tanks on Japan’s empire in East Asia.
30 Along with Norô, Hirano was the other primary editor of the Lectures on the History of the
Development of Japanese Capitalism series, focusing primarily on the legal institutions of
Japanese capitalism.  During the war, he was a researcher for the East Asia Institute and the
South Manchurian Railway.  He was also head of the Ethnicities Section for the pan-Asianist96
against the Labor-Farmer faction in leftist journals such as Proletarian Science
(Puroretaria kagaku), Historical Science (Rekishi kagaku), Studies on
Materialism (Yuibutsuron kenkyû), and Economic Review (Keizai hyôron)
between 1932 and 1935.  Aikawa mostly focused on detailed research into the
peculiarities of Japanese agriculture, authoring the third volume of the
Lectures series, The Agrarian Economy and Agricultural Recession (Nôson
keizai to nôgyô kyôko) in 1933.  Here he mainly argued that Japan did not
have a modern agricultural system based on capitalist land ownership and
profit agriculture but rather, a system characterized by small-scale subsistence
farming and a semi-feudal system of tenants paying exorbitant rents in
produce.
31  Aikawa also published articles on the feudal nature of the
Tokugawa period, refuting Rônô-ha arguments that the Tokugawa period
achieved a pre-capitalist manufacturing stage of development.  Articles such
as “The Japanese System of Household Forced Labor,” “Tôhoku Villages—An
Analysis of their Area and Character,” and “The Establishment of the Village
System and their Structural Character” are examples of some of the various
case studies he performed in order to explore the feudal origins and remnants
of the contemporary agrarian economy.  Aikawa also actively participated in
the debate over the “Asiatic Mode of Production,” refuting the Orientalism of
Soviet theorists, who ignored the peculiar aspects of feudalism and capitalism
in different Asian countries through their blanket use of the category, as well
as the Rônô-ha view that Japan had fully overcome the “Asiatic Mode.”
Through his prolific writings and argumentative style, he asserted himself early
on as a young star among Marxist intellectuals.  His insistence on analyzing
                                                                                                                                                     
Pacific Association, where he fiercely wrote against “White Imperialism” and for the “Liberation
of Asia.”
31 Aikawa, Nôson keizai to nôgyô kyôko (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1933).97
the historical peculiarities and vicissitudes of a society rather than succumb to
abstract theories or so-called “scientific laws” characterized his methodology
throughout his career, especially in his writings on technology.  His well-
received but subsequently banned work, Theory of Methodology of History
(1935), clearly laid out this historical methodology, as well as his theory of the
“Asiatic Mode of Production” as a historical stage rather than a static, cultural
one.
32
Aikawa’s Early Theory of Technology
Aikawa began his research and writing on theories of technology while
he was vice-head of research between 1932 and 1936 for the Research Group
on Materialism (Yuiken), a large group of leftist academics from varying
disciplines dedicated to developing historical materialism as a method of
analyzing society.  As mentioned above, the famous “Debate over the Theory
of Technology” erupted in the pages of their journal during this period.
Sparked by Bukharin’s mechanistic and formulaic theory of technology as the
productive forces that determined a society’s historical progress toward
socialism, the debate concerned itself with analyzing the nature of technology,
and the role it had in the constitution and transformation of society.  Aikawa
defined technology as the “complex of objective means of social labor, or in
short, the system of the means of labor,” and in a typical Kôza-ha manner, he
tried to delineate the precise structure and character of technology in this
narrow sense within Japanese capitalism.  Against Bukharin’s mechanistic
theory, Aikawa asserted the importance of technology’s “living unity” with labor
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debates within Japanese Marxism, see Germaine Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of
Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).98
power.
33  Thus for Aikawa, while technology meant the objective means of
production, it did so only in relation to the privileged subjective engine of social
transformation—the proletariat.
The debate within Yuiken focused precisely on the status of this
subjective moment of technology.  In his provocative work, Philosophy of
Technology (1933), Tosaka Jun defined technology as more than just the
“system of the means of labor,” but as also including subjective “modes of
existence” or techniques of interacting with the material world.
34 He delineated
two concrete “modes” of subjective technology: “technology as the subjective
mode of existence of material technology” (e.g. the activities of technicians
operating a machine or musicians performing an instrument) and “ideational
technology” (e.g. complex calculations by mathematicians, use of categories
or structures by logicians).  Tosaka was lambasted as an idealist by several
members of Yuiken, including Aikawa, for defining technology as specific
“modes of existence.”  How could subjective techniques and skills be
technologies in the material sense? For many, such as Aikawa and Nagata,
this denied proletarian subjectivity by objectifying their labor power as
“subjective modes” in a similar way that capitalists treated labor as quantities
for profit.
35  However, Tosaka countered this argument by accusing his critics
themselves of idealism for elevating some abstract labor power as the primary
force for social transformation without exploring the specific ways that people
                                                   
33 Aikawa, “Gijutsu oyobi tekunorogî no gainen” (The Concepts of Technology and Technology
Studies), Yuibutsuron kenkyû, (June 1933):64.
34 Tosaka Jun, “Gijutsu tetsugaku” (Philosophy of Technology) in Tosaka Jun, Tosaka Jun
zenshû 3 [The Collected Works of Tosaka Jun], (Tokyo: Keisô shobô, 1966-1979), 236.
35 See Nagata Hiroshi, “Seisanryoku no yôsô toshite no rôdôryoku ni tsuite” (On Labor Power
as an Element of Productivity), Yuibutsuron kenkyû [Studies on Materialism], (Jan. 1933):46-
49 and Aikawa, “Gijutsu oyobi tekunorogî no gainen,” 58-74.99
in fact change and interact with the world.
36  Moreover, for Tosaka, technology
was also a question of ideology and class—material technology was not just
objective but also fundamentally structured by a skilled technocratic class that
sustained the capitalist economic order.
37
Much of this debate over the role of subjectivity in technology hinged
around one footnote in Karl Marx’s Capital.  Marx first describes technology as
“the productive organs of man [sic],…organs that are the material basis of all
social organization,” and then writes as follows: “Technology discloses man’s
mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which, he sustains
his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social
relations, and of his mental conceptions that flow from them.”
38 Strict
materialists like Aikawa interpreted Marx as clearly establishing a “material”
base of technology that determines a superstructure of “social relations and
mental conceptions.” Aikawa elaborates on this definition of technology as the
material “system of the means of labor” in his first work on technology,
Gijutsuron (Theory of Technology, 1935), providing ample quotations from
Marx’s works.
39  Tosaka, however, interpreted Marx as including “modes” or
ways of forming social relations and mental conceptions within his definition of
technology, or in short, various techniques of creating things that were not
commonly regarded as “material.” In the end the more orthodox definition of
technology as the material base that determines a social superstructure won
the day; however, during the war, Aikawa was to later change his position on
                                                   
36 Tosaka, “Gijutsu to ideorogî” (Technology and Ideology) in Tosaka, 255.
37 Tosaka, “Gijutsu no shakai-teki chii” (The Social Knowledge of Technology), in Tosaka, 268-
288.
38 Marx, “Capital,” 375.
39 Aikawa, Gijutsuron [Theory of Technology] (Tokyo: Mikasa shobô, 1935).100
technology to include the subjective techniques and structures of everyday life,
crediting Tosaka as one of his main influences.
40
Aikawa’s Later Theory of Technology and Conversion to Japan’s
Imperial Project
On the day of the attempted coup by right-wing military officers on
February 26, 1936 (2.26 Incident), Aikawa was arrested for tutoring students
on Yamada Moritarô’s Analysis of Japanese Capitalism (Nihon shihonshugi
bunseki), an influential work that analyzed the particular ways that Japanese
capitalism reproduced itself.
41  Four months later, he was arrested along with
Yamada, Hirano, and Tosaka in a massive roundup of Kôza-ha Marxists (the
“Communist Academy Incident”), which effectively ended any type of open
Marxist dissent.  Aikawa was held for nine months and finally released in early
1937, and he was then placed under police observation.  Before being
released, he wrote a statement saying that he would cease all Marxist activity,
but he would not reject Marxist economics.
42  He stopped writing for a while,
obtaining a position in the Editing Department of Iwanami, one of the largest
publishers in Japan.  Here he continued his research on technology while
being in charge of corrections for the journal, Science (Kagaku).  In 1938
Aikawa agreed to participate in a government sponsored “research tour” to
China.  This was part of the state’s attempt to co-opt leftists into directly taking
part in Japan’s imperial enterprise as researchers or propagandists.  Aikawa
accompanied a mission to Beijing, Shanghai, Nanking, and Wuhu led by
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Rôyama Masamichi,
43 himself a prolific writer on technology, especially on the
“technologization” (gijutsuka) of administrative structures throughout society.
44
This so-called “cultural mission” was the occasion for Aikawa’s conversion to
the state’s project of constructing the “New Order for East Asia.” In the preface
to his popular work, Modern Theory of Technology, he explicitly credits this trip
for confirming his belief in the importance of a comprehensive and practical
theory of technology for the “cultural, intellectual, and scientific construction” of
East Asia.
45 This signaled a shift from his purely materialistic definition of
technology as the “system of the means of labor” to one that incorporated
more subjective and practical modes of existence.  While Aikawa refused to
follow other Marxist intellectuals who stayed in China or Manchuria to become
researchers for state think tanks or government employees, he still became a
leading propagandist for Japan’s imperial project.
The height of the war served as the occasion for Aikawa to publish six
books and numerous articles on technology.  His first major work, Modern
Theory of Technology  (1940), laid out his basic conceptual framework for
technology and Technology Studies and formally renounced his old definition
of “system of the means of labor.” Instead, Aikawa grounded technology in
human praxis and activity, thereby making human objectives, ideas, and
interests central to its makeup, and he included the realms of culture, art, and
                                                   
43 Rôyama was the leading figure in the study of administration, inaugurating that line at Tokyo
Imperial University.  He applied modern techniques of administration not only to government
but also to all types of social activity.  He was an early member of the Shôwa Research
Association, the influential policy think tank, where he was one of the principal visionaries of
the totalitarian New Order movements in the economy and government.  In 1942 he was
elected to the Lower House of Parliament as a candidate for the Imperial Rule Assistance
Association.
44 Rôyama Masamichi “Gijutsu to gyôsei” (Technology and Administration), Kagakushugi
kôgyô [Scientific Industry], (May 1938).
45 Aikawa, “Gendai Gijutsuron,” 3.102
ethics, for instance, as spheres of technology as well (not just the economic).
Borrowing from the philosopher/historian of technology, Saigusa Hiroto, he
now defined technology as “means in process,” or in other words, the concrete
cultural, economic, scientific, and political mechanisms and structures of
society that were constantly being shaped through human practice and state
objectives.
46  Technology Studies was the study of the development of these
mechanisms and structures, a “border” discipline that incorporated the
methodologies of economics, political science, philosophy, sociology,
engineering, and natural sciences.  Modern Theory of Technology formed the
theoretical foundation to Aikawa’s notion of technology as the concrete,
practical techniques and mechanisms that produce all aspects of life, or in this
case, the “New Order in East Asia.”  This basic theory manifests itself in his
more specific works on different aspects of technology.
Aikawa joined the editorial staff of the Japan Technology Association’s
journal, Technology Review, in 1941.  As mentioned above, the Japan
Technology Association was established in the 1920s by the Asian
Development Board and Cabinet Planning Board bureaucrat, Miyamoto
Takenosuke, one of the designers of the “New Order for Science and
Technology,” and it was the most powerful political interest group for
engineers and technology bureaucrats.  They lobbied for aggressive
expansion and development of East Asia, the establishment of a Technology
Board, increased technical training of workers and youth, and expanding the
role and status of technically trained bureaucrats in policy planning, among
other things.  Aikawa wrote frequently for the journal, publishing a “Notes on
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Culture” column almost every month.  He wrote on topics ranging from the
“culture of technology in the US” to the reorganization of technology under the
“New Order” to the status of technology in bunka eiga (culture films).  At the
Association, he had access to top-secret documents and interacted frequently
with technology officials in the government, military, and private sector;
however, he was sometimes viewed with suspicion because of his police
record and communist past.
47 He was also a member of the National Policy
Research Group (Kokusaku kenkyûkai), one of the leading advisory think
tanks on national policy whose members included top figures from the
government, academia, the military, and business (including Môri).  He helped
write the top-secret report, Theory of the Order of Technology for the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a report that suggested policies such as
advanced technical training for non-Japanese workers, more investment in
technical schools and increased science education for children in the colonies,
and more intensive public hygiene programs to eliminate epidemics.
48
Aikawa continued to maintain contact with his leftist colleagues, many
of whom also “converted” (tenkô) to cooperating with the Japanese war effort.
He published his next book, Introduction to a Theory of Technology, in 1941,
which reaffirmed his theory of technology developed in the earlier work, and
he defined its conceptual essence as a unity of three concepts: “the concept of
employing natural scientific principles, the concept of the economic means of
production, and the philosophical concept of formation through action.”
49 He
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48 See in particular Chapter Five, “Dai tôa kyôeiken minzoku kôsaku to gjutsu taisei” (Ethnic
Construction in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Order for Technology) in
Kokusaku kenkyûkai, Dai tôa kyôeiken gijutsu taiseiron [The Theory of the System of
Technology for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere] (Tokyo: Nihon hyôronsha,
1945), 30-40.
49 Aikawa, Gijutsuron nyûmon (Tokyo: Mikasa shobô, 1942), 155-156.104
also developed various historical principles of technology.  The following year
he published Technology Theory and Policy, which analyzed Japan’s
technological structure and the specific policies and conceptual framework
necessary to develop it.
50 Industrial Technology, the product of two and a half
years of research, was published in 1942.  It was a Kôza-ha type analysis of
the particular character and structure of Japanese industrial and agricultural
technology and their necessary path of development within the wartime
order.
51  His research also extended to the question of technology, natural
resource development, and industrialization in Southeast Asia in Natural
Resources of South East Asia and Technology (1943).   This originally
appeared between 1941 and 1943 in the South Manchurian Railway East
Asian Economy Research Institute (Mantetsu tôa keizai chôsajo) journal, Shin
Ajia (New Asia), which primarily covered Southeast and Southwest Asia.  As
with his past analyses of the semi-feudal nature of Japanese capitalism, he
examined the particular obstacles to heavy industrialization and modernization
in Southeast Asia caused by Western imperialism and local feudalism, as well
as the necessary steps to overcome them.
52  His final book on technology,
Technology and Skill Management (1943), analyzed the changes in labor that
accompanied mass war production and the new techniques of management
that were necessary with these changes.
53
Thus Aikawa analyzed a wide range of areas within technology: state
policy, industrial technology, agricultural technology, colonial policy and
development, and labor management.  Central to these specific studies was
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52 Aikawa, “Tôna ajia no gijutsu to shigen.”
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his grounding of technology in sensuous praxis and historical transformation.
Aikawa also extended his studies of technology to the realm of art and film.
He was an avid theater and moviegoer, and published play and film reviews
for the left-leaning newspaper, Imperial University News and the theater
magazine, Theater.  Aikawa was primarily interested in the blurring of the
boundaries between human subjectivity and objectivity that accompanied the
spread of film technology and culture.  The camera and film negative signified
more than just new instruments to create art but a mass transformation of
human sensation and subjectivity itself.  Theater signified an age of
individualism and romanticism, while the film represented the new era of mass
sensation and what he called the “culture of electricity.”
54 Aikawa was
particularly interested in the documentary film (bunka eiga) genre, which
became more and more prevalent during the war.  For him the bunka eiga
brought out the full potential of film technology since it combined scientific
precision and capability with new aesthetic techniques.  He advised GES, one
of the most prolific producers of large-scale documentaries, and he published
regularly in their research journal, Culture Film, a focal point for much of the
theoretical discourse on documentary film.  GES was a haven for former
leftists who struggled to produce critical, aesthetically innovative films while
formally supporting the war effort.  Ishimoto Tôkichi’s Snow Country (Yukiguni,
1939), on the hardships of rural life, and Atsugi Taka’s Record of a Nursery
(Aru hobo no kiroku, 1942), on child rearing and education during the war,
represented some of their highest achievements.  Aikawa not only took part in
the theoretical debates, however, but he was actively involved in documentary
production as well, most notably the making of The Present Battle, a film on an
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electric generator plant and worker relations there.  He collected his theoretical
articles and recorded his experience of making this film in his final wartime
work, Theory of the Culture Film (1944).
55
Through the intercession of his former leftist colleagues, Aikawa
obtained a position with the news service, Dômei Tsûshinsha, and a part-time
lectureship at Meiji University.  He also established and headed the Institute of
Technological Culture in Japan (Nihon Gijutsu Bunka Kenkyûjo) in 1944 with
the help of other intellectuals such as Saigusa Hiroto
56 and Taketani Mitsuo
57,
and the funding of Kamei Kanichirô, one of the intellectual mentors of the New
Order movement for Science and Technology.  The research institute realized
Aikawa’s dream of creating a central center for Technology Studies.  However,
he was conscripted a few months after the Yokohama Incident in January
1944, which shut down the two leading critical journals, Central Review (Chuô
Kôron) and Reform (Kaizô).  He was sent to the Soviet border in Manchuria
and served as a cook for one year until the end of the war.  Meanwhile, his
institute was bombed, destroying its entire collections.
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Aikawa after the War: POW Democratization Movement in the USSR
After Japan surrendered, Aikawa fled to the USSR and surrendered to
the Soviet authorities.  He was interned in Birobijan in the Khabarovsk region
of the Soviet Far East and forced into hard labor under horrific conditions.
Since the Soviets usually kept the leadership structures intact within the
Japanese military, soldiers continued to suffer under authoritarian officers who
propagated the same emperor-centric, ultra-nationalist ideology.  Encouraged
by the Soviet message of anti-fascism, socialism, and national self-
determination, and their efforts to “re-educate” Japanese soldiers, he helped
lead what became known as the “Prisoners of War Democratization
Movement.” From 1945 to 1947, this took the form of fighting corrupt officers
who cheated soldiers from fair rations and better labor conditions, and who
reported uncooperative soldiers to Soviet authorities as “anti-Soviet” or
“obstructionists.” Aikawa became editor of the Khabarovsk Japanese News, a
focal point for the democratization movement.  The newspaper pushed a
strong anti-emperor system, anti-militarist line, and they called for improved
living conditions, prosecution and re-education of officers, and more control
over their own working conditions.  They also sponsored study groups and
cultural events such as plays, lectures, and readings for Japanese soldiers
with the blessing of the Soviet authorities.
58
Aikawa whole-heartedly threw himself into strengthening the Soviet
communist movement among Japanese soldiers during the next two years,
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1947 to 1948.  “Democracy groups” sprung up everywhere and many
meetings and congresses were held to unify and strengthen the
democratization movement.  Efforts to purge the leadership of “class
enemies,” develop a strong proletarian consciousness, and train committed
cadres were undertaken through frequent classes and lecture tours, which
Aikawa often led.  The movement united around the slogans of anti-fascism,
anti-imperialism, and establishing a “people’s government” in Japan.  It was
also committed to Soviet internationalism and to achieving Stalin’s five-year
plan of industrialization through collective labor.
During the years 1948 to 1949, the movement fully took on the
character of the international socialist movement led by the Soviet Union.
“Anti-fascist Committees” were formed and centered around the workplace;
courses were offered on Marxism-Leninism, international events, and the
political situation in Japan; and productivity competitions were held to
celebrate occasions such as May Day.  Ties with the Japanese Communist
Party were strengthened, and it was hoped that former Japanese soldiers
would be at the forefront of democratization and socialist revolution in Japan.
Most of the soldiers, including Aikawa, were finally repatriated in 1949;
however, they faced much suspicion from a now “democratic” Japan and
accusations of being brainwashed by the Soviets.
Aikawa’s Return to Japan
After a short period at a U.S. detention facility, he immediately
continued his political activity as a member of the Central Committee of the
Japan Communist Party, joining its propaganda bureau and heading its
committee on repatriated soldiers from the Soviet Union.  In an article on his109
four years of heading the prisoner of war democratization movement, Aikawa
admitted the problem of low party participation by returnees, and he criticized
the movement for sometimes being dogmatic, unresponsive to individual
interest and initiative, and subject to violent, vengeful tendencies suggestive of
the fascism they were trying to overcome.
59  In 1950 he was expelled from the
Central Committee and the editorial board of the party’s newspaper, Red Flag
(Akahata), during the fierce split in the party over the Cominform policy that
instructed Japanese communists to focus on the “anti-imperialist struggle” or
overthrowing the U.S. occupation rather than on peaceful revolution through
parliamentary politics under the occupation (Aikawa supported Cominform).
While recovering from tuberculosis and kidney problems he suffered from as a
prisoner of war, he contributed to an illustrated history of technology,
Illustrated Inventions and Discoveries (Hatsumei hakken zusetsu).  Aikawa
wrote primarily on industrial machinery, transportation and communications,
and metallurgy.
60
While he was in the Soviet Union, the second “Debate over the Theory
of Technology” broke out in Japan, and Aikawa’s theory of technology was
dismissed as fascist without any serious examination.
61  The debate pitted
Taketani Mitsuo and Hoshino Yoshirô, who defined technology subjectively as
the “conscious application of objective laws,” against Aikawa’s former
colleagues at Yuiken, Oka Kunio and Yamada Sakaji, who stuck to the
objective definition of technology as the “system of the means of labor.”
62 The
debate lacked the sophistication of the wartime debate on technology, which
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often explored the ways in which technology and subjectivity were mutually
intertwined to generate an immense potential for societal transformation and
mobilization.  The post-war debate narrowly reduced technology to the status
of mere instrument of rational goals without seriously exploring technology as
the very process of social construction and mobilization itself.  For them
technology was merely the rationally used instruments for Japan’s economic
and democratic development.  Ironically it was the wartime period that enabled
intellectuals to explore the dynamics of subjectivity and technology in a way
that was completely occluded after the war.  However, it was precisely these
wartime dynamics of technology as a powerful method of social mobilization
and transformation that Aikawa focused on, which subsequently drove Japan’s
post-war development.
Aikawa heard about the debate and criticism upon his return, and he
promised to write a new theory of technology, admitting his complicity with
Japanese imperialism and militarism.
63  However, his renewed involvement in
politics delayed these plans.  In 1953 he became chairman of the Repatriation
of Our Brethren in China Society (Zaika Dôhô Kikoku Kyôkai), and he threw
himself into repatriating and rehabilitating the enormous number of colonial
returnees.  He also renewed his communist party activity, campaigning in
Kansai and Shikoku for party candidates in national elections.  He led a
national signature campaign to mourn the death of Joseph Stalin, replicating a
movement he led among Japanese soldiers in the Soviet Union to express
gratitude to the leader.  He died in dramatic fashion on April 29, 1953,
collapsing while giving a speech to a campaign strategy meeting at
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Communist Party headquarters.  He was never able to write the new theory of
technology that he had promised.
III.  AIKAWA’S “MODERN THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY”
Technology as Ethos
With the outbreak of the war with China in 1937 and the 1938
proclamation by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro of the construction of a “New
Order for East Asia,” Aikawa began to develop a “practical” theory of
technology suitable for Japan’s mission of creating a modern, prosperous,
multi-ethnic sphere and “control economy” (tôsei keizai) in East Asia.  In the
preface to Modern Theory of Technology, Aikawa writes about how his
participation in the Rôyama-led “inspection tour for cultural work in Central
China” in 1938 encouraged him to write a new theory of technology.
64   “I
discovered that cultural, intellectual, and scientific construction were central to
building a New Order in East Asia, and I became firmly convinced that these
must be carried out in Tokyo as well, based on interactions with Shanghai and
Peking,” he writes.
65 Previously, Aikawa defined technology narrowly as “the
complex of objective means of social labor, or in short, the system of the
means of labor;” however, in his new work, he rejects this “materialist
perspective,” and proceeds to include all kinds of social production—including
economic, cultural, political, and intellectual production—beneath the rubric of
technology.
66  Filled with a “national awareness” and “strong sense of
practice,” Aikawa also emphasizes the spiritual, creative, and transformative
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aspects of technology.  Technology is not just the instrumental means of
production that dutifully realizes human objectives and ideals.  Rather, it
includes a society’s physical machinery, processes of social reproduction,
institutional makeup, and methods of administration, organization, and
management, for example, all of which are fundamentally infused with a social
ethos or human objective.  Ethos or “spirit” are not external to technology but
form an integral part of it.  Thus the very design of a society’s productive
processes or technologies are infused with the predominant ethos—in
Aikawa’s case, the Japanese state’s goal of building a “New Order in East
Asia” that would eliminate the ills of monopoly capitalism, violent nationalism,
and social conflict characteristic of the early twentieth century.
Aikawa’s project can be seen as part of the larger project on the part of
Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats to “overcome modernity.”
67 According
to him, technology was usually seen as an impersonal, objective force
opposed to or even suppressive of the human “spirit.”
68 The question of the
conflict between “spirit” and “technology,” and how they were to be unified was
a pressing concern among intellectuals in Europe and Japan.
69  The
prevalence of hybrid terms such as “technological spirit,” “technological
culture, “technological science,” and “technological mobilization” in Japan at
the time illustrates some of the ways that intellectuals and bureaucrats
ambiguously dealt with the conflict.
70  Under modern capitalism, the
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metaphysical conflict took the form of a social division of labor between
manual “technical labor” and the “dictatorial entrepreneurial spirit” of
management.
71 According to Aikawa, however, this metaphysical split was
becoming less and less relevant with the permeation of technology and
technological rationality throughout daily life and culture.  Also, with the
ongoing efforts to establish a “New Order in East Asia” that would overcome
the contradictions of capitalism and modernity, the meaning of technology
would also change such that the split between “subjective spirit” and “objective
technology” would finally be overcome.
72  For Aikawa, “the standpoint of the
unity of praxis” was the basis for a new theory of technology, and it would
dissolve the artificial split between spirit and technology.
73
In the epigraph to his preface, “The Modern Meaning of a Theory of
Technology,” Aikawa quotes an old Greek proverb: “Techne that is not unified
with alethe does not exist, and it can not even arise.”
74 In ancient Greece,
techne meant any type of art, craft, skill, or handiwork, ranging from music to
sculpture to rhetoric.
75  Alethe meant truth or what is genuine, valid, or real
(Aikawa translates it as “moral principle”).
76 With this epigraph, Aikawa sets
the tone for his modern theory of technology, which argues that technology is
fundamentally unified with the goals and principles of the human subject.  He
is not, however, trying to restore the ancient Greek notion of technology or
techne, which he says was specific to the Greek historical context but rather,
he was trying to bring about a fundamental unity between “technology and
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spirit” in a way more suitable to Japan’s mission of creating a “New Order” in
East Asia.
77  Aikawa first conceptually defines the unified nature of technology:
“[I]n the practical activity of production, there is technology wherever goal-
oriented activity unites with its means, which are the tools.”
78 Technology
unites two kinds of human activity: the activity of devising and realizing goals,
and the activity of interacting and experimenting with the material world.
79
According to Aikawa, there are all kinds of technologies in the world: political
technology, legislative technology, management technology, military
technology, scientific experimental technology, artistic technology, religious
technology, medical technology, sports technology, and even “technologies of
love” (renai gijutsu).
80 All of these social technologies of production are
technologies that realize specific human goals to the extent that interaction
with the material world allowed.  In Hegel’s terms, a philosopher Aikawa often
quotes, these technologies of social production represent the realization of the
rational or the concrete manifestations of “practical ideas.”
81
The Practical Conception of Technology
The “standpoint of praxis and production” constitutes the philosophical
foundation to Aikawa’s theory of technology, and it reveals the fundamental
unity of technology, which was previously seen as always in conflict with
“spirit.” Technology is not just objectively external to spirit but itself contains a
subjective, practical moment.  Like most of his contemporaries, Aikawa does
not work with a simplistic notion of subjectivity as a subject divorced from an
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external world, but as practical subjectivity (shutai), self-creation, and concrete
involvement in the world and with other subjects.  His notion of subjectivity is
largely indebted to Marx, particularly his first thesis on Feuerbach:
The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach’s) is
that the object, actuality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of
the object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, practice,
nor subjectively.  Hence, in opposition to materialism, the active side
was developed by idealism – but only abstractly since idealism does not
know actual, sensuous activity as such.  Feuerbach wants sensuous
objects actually different from thought objects: but he does not
comprehend human activity itself as objective.  Hence, in The Essence
of Christianity he regards only the theoretical attitude as the truly
human attitude, while practice is understood and fixed only in its dirtily
Jewish form of appearance.  Consequently he does not comprehend
the significance of "revolutionary", of "practical-critical" activity.
82
In his earlier work, Theory of Technology, Aikawa emphasizes the historicity of
the assumed split between “spiritual life processes” and “material productive
processes,” directly quoting from the second thesis on Feuerbach, which
emphasizes the practical, historical nature of truth.
83 In Modern Theory of
Technology, all direct references to Marx’s theory of subjectivity as “sensuous
human activity” and praxis disappear yet remain strongly implicit throughout.
For example, he dedicates a section to how human beings actively developed
their physical and social attributes through interaction with each other and the
material world, again emphasizing the historicity and practical origins of
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“consciousness” and “thought.”
84 By understanding technology as all types of
subjective, transformative action within the world, Aikawa was most likely
borrowing from the Marxist tradition.  For him technology is not some
impersonal external force, but imbues all practical “life activity.” This is best
captured in the term, “life technologies” (seikatsu gijutsu), which he uses
throughout his subsequent work, Introduction to a Theory of Technology.
85
Aikawa was also in conversation with many other intellectuals and
bureaucrats who were also developing their own practical conceptions of
technology, particularly those who wrote in Ôkochi Masatoshi’s journal,
Scientific Management, and those who were members of the Industrial
Technology Association (Sangyô Gijutsu Renmei).
86  Scientific Management in
fact served as a site for developing new theories of technology during the
wartime.  In particular, Aikawa analyzes the thought of the philosophers,
Funayama Shinichi,
87 Kôyama Iwao,
88 Miki Kiyoshi, and Saigusa Hiroto, all of
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who wrote articles for the journal.  For example, he notes how Kôyama viewed
technology as the “point of unity or bridge between the world of objective
things that human beings are always changing and the world of practically
subjective (shutaiteki) ideas that human beings are always creating.” For
Kôyama the specific “experience of labor” in the world was the essence of
technology.
89 Aikawa also borrows from Saigusa’s “new cultural conception of
technology.”
90 Saigusa defined technology in its broadest, most general sense
as “means in process for human desire, which are conditioned by natural
material.”
91 For Aikawa, Saigusa’s definition of technology as “means in
process” captured the “dynamic, variable direction” of technology not present
in Aikawa’s previous definition of technology as “the system of the means of
labor.”
92 The “means” in Saigusa’s definition captures the objective sense of
technology, while the “in process for human desire” captures the practical
subjective sense—the technologies of life activity are always “in process”
because they are inextricably tied to self-creation and the formation of the
world.  “Conditioned by natural material” captures the element of resistance by
the natural world, which in turn stimulates the need for new technologies to
overcome such resistance.
Aikawa was also influenced by the Sangyô Gijutsu Renmei’s (Industrial
Technology Association or Sangiren) notion of “integrated technology,”
originally developed by its leader, Miyamoto Takenosuke.
93  In its founding
prospectus, Sangiren, an organization consisting of over one thousand five
                                                   
89 Aikawa, “Gendai gijutsuron,” 18.
90 Ibid., 32.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 33.
93 See the essays in Miyamoto Takenosuke, Tairiku kensetsu no kadai [Problems of
Constructing the Continent] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1941).118
hundred bureaucrats, engineers, and businessmen, pledged to mobilize
“integrated technologies across the natural and social sciences” in order to
increase productivity and construct the “New Order in East Asia.”
94   By the
term, “integrated technology,” Miyamoto attempted to broaden the meaning of
technology to include political, management, economic, and legislative
technologies, rather than just specialized scientific technologies.
95  For
Miyamoto, technology had to do with the very formation of an entire society—it
was imbued with a fundamental “sociality.” Moreover “technology itself is a
body of possibility, and not a means,” he writes.
96 Thus not just innovative
machinery and techniques, but new laws, policies, institutions, ideological
campaigns, and academic research, for example, needed to be established in
order to realize the New Order in East Asia.  For Miyamoto and Sangiren,
these specific technologies were indeed the dynamic “bodies of possibility”
that produced an entire society.
The Sociality and Historicity of Technology
The first principle of Aikawa’s modern theory of technology then is the
“practical unity” of technology, its basis in subjective practice, creation, and
transformation.  However, Aikawa is also quick to add that technology is
fundamentally socio-historical as well.  He writes:
However, this standpoint of human praxis does not stand by itself but
rather, it must also be a socio-historical standpoint that opposes and
sublates the standpoint of praxis.  This is nothing but the standpoint of
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socio-historical production.  Only in production are all things socio-
historical practically unified, and spirit and technology, consciousness
and matter become sublated, united, and made into one.  Under the
name of productive praxis, we must return to the standpoint of such
dialectical unity and begin from there.
97
Continuing to employ a Marxist-Hegelian methodology, Aikawa insists on a
concrete socio-historical analysis of technology, rather than on mere abstract
speculations of it as, for example, being practical by nature or as the unifier of
consciousness and matter, technology and spirit.  For Aikawa, the very
meaning of technology changes historically with each stage or mode of
production that human beings create.  For example, the popular meaning of
technology as the “objective means of production” itself arose with the
Industrial Revolution and the development of industrial capitalism based on
machinery and the technical organization of labor, destroying the older sense
of technology as skill, handicraft, or technique.
98 Under the heavy industrial
monopoly capitalism of the twentieth century, however, technology began to
take on wider, cultural meanings.  He writes:
Since technology, which is the object of a theory of technology,
originally constituted the physical, objective base of human socio-
historical life and action, it has undoubtedly permeated itself from below
throughout every aspect of the human socio-historical world.
Therefore, the theory of technology has probably now realized itself
throughout every realm of thought, science, and culture
99
The spread of electricity and the heavy chemical industries, for example, has
fundamentally challenged the meaning of technology as merely the material
means of production.  Electricity has enabled the spread of the mass media
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and more “immaterial” cultural technologies that blur the gap between subject
and object.
100  The heavy chemical industry has created synthetic, artificial
resources, which point to a future where human beings could create their own
world and be less limited by natural resources.  Technology has openly
revealed its self-formative, creative essence, and it is no longer merely the
objective, instrumental means of processing the natural world.
101 Thus “the
practical nature of technology” means that the very meaning of technology
itself changes over time as well—it is always historically specific, and it can
only be fully grasped through a concrete socio-historical analysis in addition to
a philosophical one.
Society as Integrated Complex of Technologies
In sum Aikawa views technology as (1) having a practical, creative
essence that permeates every productive mechanism of society, and (2)
having a socio-historical essence that makes its very meaning always open to
change.  After analyzing many other conceptions of technology, Aikawa finally
arrives at his own general concept: “Technology is the external means or
complex, organization, and system of those means amidst processes of
activity that are conscious of human socio-historical goals.”
102 Technology in
general is the “complex” of cultural, political, economic, scientific, and
intellectual technologies specific to a historical period that are always imbued
with specific, practically determined objectives.
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Aikawa provides a detailed diagram of the particular complex of
technologies that constituted 1930s imperial society.  He writes, “The social
organization itself is specifically constituted by the total process of goal-
oriented practices of social human beings, and throughout all areas of society,
these practical processes each have their very own technologies.”
103 Different
technologies or “practical processes” constitute the society—society is never
something general or abstract.  Aikawa offers the following diagram of
technologies that make up the specific social structure of imperial wartime
Japan (see following page).  He presents his technological diagram of society
as a counter to three prominent works on technology of the time: Friedrich
Gottl-Ottlilienfeld’s Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Technik, 1923),
Baba Keiji’s Technology and Society (Gijutsu to shakai, 1936), and Tosaka
Jun’s Philosophy of Technology (Gijutsu no tetsugaku, 1933).
104  Each author
offers his own diagram of society illustrating the different technologies that
constitute it.  According to Aikawa, Baba and Gottl merely list the different
technologies of society as if they were instrumental objects without providing a
dynamic principle to unify and motivate them.
105 Tosaka correctly challenges
the view of technology as simply the “system of the means of production” in
society by establishing the importance of the practical “subjective
technologies” (shukanteki/kojin shutaiteki gijutsu) of workers in the labor
process. However, according to Aikawa, his view is too narrow because he
never extends this subjective, practical moment outside of the workplace to
the technological processes that constitute an entire society.
106 Aikawa instead
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Figure 2.1 The Technologies of Society
107
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presents us with a complicated “three-dimensional pyramid organization of
society” in which “practical processes” or technologies are independent of
each other yet organically unified at the same time.
108
While at first glance, the diagram seems to portray an orthodox Marxist
base-superstructure organization of society in which the economic-productive
base determines the ideal superstructure, it is in fact much more complicated
than this.  “Economic processes” indeed form the material base of society.
These consist of the following (see (a) on Figure 2.1, from right to left):
1.  Production Technology (Management Technology), Transportation
Technology, Communications Technology
2.  Distributive (Commercial) Technology, Circulatory (Financial)
Technology
3.  Consumer Technology (Food, Clothing, Housing, Leisure)
4.  Family Technology (Form of Reproduction)
Above the economic base are “political processes” consisting of the following
(see (b) in Figure 2.1, from right to left):
1.  Political Technology: Administrative Technology (Law-making,
Administration of Justice), National Organization Technology (Political
Parties)
2.  Military Technology (Strategy, Tactics, Scientific War), Hygienic
Technology (Medicine), Health Technology (Sports)
Parallel to political processes in the superstructure are “cultural processes”
consisting of (see (c) in Figure 2.1, from right to left):
1.  Cultural Technology, Intellectual Technology
2.  Scientific Technology, Artistic Technology
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3.  Moral Technology, Religious Technology
4.  Educational Technology
“While the various processes relate to each other in a complicated manner, we
can also see that each process has an independent position and
development,” Aikawa writes.
109 While economic processes are privileged in
that “production” constitutes the general meaning and goal of each
technology, they are not the primordial instance that mechanically determines
the entire social structure.  Political and cultural processes can also affect
economic ones, as well as one another.  For example, Aikawa writes, “In the
modern advanced national defense state, we cannot think of political
processes in isolation from the guidance of economic processes, nor can we
think of productive technology in isolation from science.”
110 Later Aikawa
analyzes how the laws of economics determine the organization of technology
(e.g. industrial planning) and the dictates of technology in turn determine the
organization of the economy (e.g. machinery determining the division of
labor).
111 He seems to be developing a similar concept to Louis Althusser’s
“overdetermination” where different processes mutually determine one another
in a complicated, unpredictable fashion, rather than all being determined by
one instance.
112 However, for Althusser, these overdeterminations lead to the
creation of a “ruptural unity” that ushers in the revolutionary moment.
113  For
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Aikawa, on the other hand, the overdeterminations of different technologies
form an organic, integrated totality of distinct processes that would produce
the all aspects of society.  All social contradictions and antagonisms would be
quickly resolved through the operation of these different technologies.
While at face value, the social formation is divided into “ideational life
processes” (kannenteki seikatsu katei) such as political and cultural processes
and “material life processes” (busshitsu seikatsu katei) such as economic
processes, Aikawa emphasizes that this division is only relative.  Ideational
processes are ideational only relative to the fact that they are material as well.
Material processes are material only relative to the fact that they are ideational
as well.  Both constitute and interpenetrate (overdetermine) one another.  For
example, “family technologies” are not independent from “political processes”
such as health and hygiene technologies or “cultural processes” such as
“educational technologies.
114 “Within each process, elements of other
processes may be found,” Aikawa writes.  What makes “educational
technologies,” for example, “ideational” is the fact that the “central component”
of that technology consists of a specific type of ideational production,
according to Aikawa.
115 Moreover, all of the “life processes” form a “social
organic totality,” making any artificial separation into “ideational processes”
and “material processes” ultimately irrelevant.
116 Indeed, the “standpoint of
totality” permeates every technology.  At the same time, each technology
maintains its distinctiveness and independence within the totality.
The animating principle of the totality, which permeates each and every
technology is the principle of production and praxis—in other words, what
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Aikawa sees as the essence of technology, as we saw above.  In fact the war
and the Japanese state’s efforts to expand wartime production helped bring
out this practical sense of technology.
117  More specifically, every life process
or technology operates not only for the short-term goal of increasing wartime
production for victory, but to mobilize all areas of life to produce the New Order
in East Asia.  New national organizations, laws, management techniques,
educational systems, ethical ideals, artistic forms, communications networks,
forms of consumption, and methods of mobilizing the family are all necessary
to build the New Order.  Technologies produce life in its entirety, not just
material goods.  In short Aikawa presents us with a totalitarian vision of
imperial society where different technologies operate and govern every aspect
of life.  Yet this is not a simplistic totalitarian vision of repression and
enforcement of homogeneity but rather one that tries to maintain the distinct
nature of different life activities at the same time.  In fact the “organic totality”
can only function through the simultaneous operation of different technologies
dispersed throughout life.  Aikawa envisions a totalitarian society fully
mobilized for the construction of the New Order, a society that would preserve
and employ the different life processes of modern society rather than flatten
them out.  In such a technological society, science and technology are no
longer opposed to humanity but “personalized” (jinkakuka) or made consistent
with everyday human activity and subjectivity, according to Aikawa.
118  Yet at
the same time, those who are technologically incorporated into the “organic
totality” can no longer articulate democratic demands that would fundamentally
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transform the relations of subordination—those who did were violently
suppressed or intimidated.
This “New Order” that mobilizes all areas of life into an organic system
constitutes what Aikawa calls an “internal critique of modernity.”
119 He is not
interested in propagating some “Eastern” counterpart to so-called Western
modernity.
120  Rather his vision of society is to internalize modernity while in
the process “internally critiquing” it.  His theory of technology as the various
processes of human life that go into the production of an “organic totality”
where social conflict would be eliminated constitutes the “alternate modernity”
that Japan was destined to forge.
121  For Aikawa and many others, Japan’s
“world-historical mission” was to create this modernity that would supplant
Soviet socialist and U.S.-British capitalist modernity.
The Integrated Discipline of Technology Studies
Accompanying this new stage of modernity would be the newly
independent discipline of Technology Studies, which would analyze the
different political, cultural, and economic technologies from their unifying
standpoint of praxis.  As we saw above, technology for Aikawa is not just the
objective mechanisms of a society; they are mechanisms and processes
animated with subjective ideals, ethics, and creativity.  As such, Technology
Studies cannot be subsumed under the disciplines of economics, sociology,
natural science, and engineering since these subordinate technology to their
own particular disciplinary logics, according to Aikawa.  For example, the
natural sciences traditionally viewed technology as merely the instrumental
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application of scientific principles.  Yet Aikawa shows how technology in fact
helped shape the natural sciences.  For example, the invention of time-
keeping mechanisms, metallurgical technology, and the optical lens were
important events for the establishment of the natural sciences.
122 Another
example was economics, which often treated technology as a manipulable
component of the economy.  But again, Aikawa shows how technology often
has a “progressive character” of proliferating uncontrollably throughout society
and engendering even newer technologies in the process.
123 As a result, under
capitalism technology has to be restricted and protected by the enterprise so
as to not threaten its profits, as well as by the state so that the direction of
technology might be controlled.  In short technology has an uncontrollable
element that cannot be reduced to the disciplinary logics of natural science
and economics, for instance.  This element is technology’s foundation in
human practice and subjectivity in the world, which lends it an unpredictable,
socio-historical character.
For Aikawa Technology Studies is a synthetic discipline that examines
both the objective/mechanical and the subjective/social aspects of technology,
its natural scientific and social scientific characteristics.  It is a “border science”
that incorporates all of the insight and techniques of both the natural and
social sciences.
124  Its objects of study are the many political, cultural, and
economic technologies that go into the construction of the “organic totality” or
in Japan’s case, “the New Order.” One might argue that Aikawa’s
technological vision of society actually requires the creation of a new discipline
whose object of study was this very technological society in the same way that
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Aikawa points out how the establishment of capitalism laid the conditions for
the formation of the social sciences whose object was the “social.”
125
Technology as Creativity and Imagination
While the predominant ethic of Aikawa’s technological vision of society
is one of productivity in all areas of life, he also emphasizes creativity,
imagination, and transformation as well.  Technology is not at odds with
cultural and artistic activity, as was commonly assumed, but is a cultural,
creative force in itself.
126 He writes
Transformation is imagination, and is a practice that can be carried out
through intense human will and large-scale collective action.  However,
transformative practice is only first realized through technology.
Although technology is originally practical and unthinkable without
practice, practice is an empty word without technology.
127
As we saw before, Aikawa always views “practice” as the specific technologies
operating throughout all areas of life, which include cultural processes such as
“artistic technology” and “intellectual technology.”  Practice is not an
ambiguous, general concept of “creative activity,” for instance.  His insistence
on the specificity and concreteness of practical activity leads him to criticize
Miki Kiyoshi’s very vague definition of technology as any act of “making
form.”
128 Technology as the many technologies of production throughout
society is to him the most concrete way of viewing technology and society.
Moreover, for Aikawa, there is no contradiction between technology and
culture.  The word, “culture,” originates from the term, “cultivate,” or in other
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words, agricultural activity.
129 Thus “culture” is not something vague like
“spiritual activity” either, but actually has its origins in practice and production
in a similar way that technology has its origins in techne, “text,” and
“textiles.”
130   Furthermore, in modern times when technology began to
permeate an entire society, it “was pushed to the forefront as something that
regulates culture from its very foundation”—in short, an interpenetrating
“technological culture” that complicated the assumed split between technology
and culture began to appear.
131 He adds:
We can say that technology is a cultural force, and that it provides the
most objective beacon of all the driving forces of culture.  As such,
modern culture was always ‘technological culture,’ and moreover, the
technological character of modern culture appears more clearly in the
present period of transformation.  Since the period of transformation is
the most active, dynamic period for social beings, it is also an epoch-
making period of technological practice.
132
Technology is not merely the material means of production but a dynamic
cultural force of transformation imbuing all of human practice.  The wartime
period that would usher in the “New Order” was this period of transformation.
Yet Aikawa also asserts that this period of transformation would not just be
one of hyper-mobilized production throughout society, but also the formation of
a “technological culture” of immense creative possibility.
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The Transformative Nature of the “Culture of Electricity”
Aikawa proceeds to explore the transformative potential of mass media
technologies and “electric culture” in opposition to those cultural pessimists
who viewed technology as anathema to so-called authentic culture and art.  In
order to emphasize the transformative rather than merely productive nature of
technology, he first analyzes the effects of electricity on economic production,
which then immediately made itself felt throughout society.  He lists four “forms
of transformation” brought about by electrification, forms that “fundamentally
reorganized the veins and nerves of private and state monopoly,” producing
unexpected effects throughout culture.
133 First, electrification enabled factories
to become mobile and no longer concentrated in large cities.  Electrification
made possible the diffusion of heavy industry into the countryside and villages,
as well as the growth of agricultural industries.
134  This in turn facilitated the
further incorporation of the people into the different technological mechanisms
of society (e.g. the political, cultural, and economic processes outlined in
Aikawa’s chart).  Second, electrification helped bring about the “chemical
revolution” in industry, enabling the creation of synthetic materials and the
growth of the energy-intensive chemical industry.  Synthetic ammonium
sulfate, for example, eliminated dependence on natural fertilizers, which in turn
increased food and livestock production.  “From synthetic ammonium sulfate
and synthetic fuel, cellulose pulp, cement building materials and synthetic
stone…to synthetic rubber, fake leather, synthetic camphor, synthetic fats,
synthetic butter, and so on, chemical technology shows us the way to make
organic natural resources inorganic,” Aikawa writes.
135 For him the ability to
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manufacture synthetic materials most clearly illustrates the creative,
transformative nature of technology.  Aikawa sees the production of synthetic
materials as the realization of an old Greek adage about technology: “Lack
calls forth technology.”
136 Technology is not merely the instrumental
employment of tools and machines on the natural world but the very creation
of the “natural world” itself.  Thus technology signifies creativity at its highest,
and the spread of technology throughout life would only encourage human
creativity.
The third “form of transformation” created by electricity was the
revolution in transportation, in particular, the electrification of the railway.
137
This speeded up the transportation of goods and extended the reach of the
state and capital.  The development of the internal combustible engine was
also important, facilitating the improvement of transportation technologies such
as the airplane, automobile, and ships.  The improvement of transportation
technology brought people into more frequent contact than ever before, and
formed the “nerves and veins” to create and incorporate the “New Order” that
was to be the Japanese empire.  Electricity’s fourth “form of transformation”
was the development of wired and wireless communications technology.
Telegraph and telephone technology was extended throughout the empire
with the construction of cables.  Aikawa was most hopeful about the spread of
wireless technology such as “long-distance wireless telephones, radiophoto
transmission, television, radio beacons, and so on.”
138 As we shall see in
Chapter Three, he was most interested in the tremendous effect
communications and mass media technologies had on human sensation.  The
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“culture of electricity” formed the material basis of the new forms of mass-
media culture.
Conclusions on Aikawa’s Modern Theory of Technology
Aikawa extends the meaning of technology to signify much more than
the instrumental means for human beings to operate on the natural world.  By
infusing technology with a “practical nature,” he inextricably ties it to all types
of social practice ranging from cultural production to policy formation to
consumption.  The social structure he and other intellectuals and bureaucrats
envision consists of legislative technologies, cultural technologies, ethical
technologies, economic technologies, and so on.  All of these received their
animating logic from production.  Every technology plays a role in producing
what was necessary to achieve the “New Order for East Asia.” This “order”
would mobilize the resources and skills of a variety of people to solve the
contradictions of capitalist modernity—colonial exploitation, class conflict,
unemployment, lack of education, underdevelopment, alienation, and so on.
Moreover, according to Aikawa, this technological community of production
would stimulate tremendous cultural innovation and creativity through the
beneficial effects of the “culture of electricity” and as we shall see, the
proliferation of mass media technologies in everyday life.  Thus not only would
the technological society mobilize the plethora of skills of the people for
production, it would maintain and encourage their creativity rather than
suppress it.
In short, Aikawa provides the theoretical groundwork for a technocratic
order of experts who would devise policies to incorporate and govern all
aspects of life.  He envisions Technology Studies as a synthetic discipline134
incorporating the methodology of the social and natural sciences, whose
objects of study were the different technologies constituting society.  The new
technocrat would not only be a specialist in a certain area such as engineering
or economics, but would also take a holistic view of the society as well.
Educational policy, financial policy, spiritual mobilization campaigns, natural
resource forecasts, and so on would all be within the purview of the new
technological expert.  The people too would have their place in the order in
accordance with their various skills, and in their capacity as active members of
various institutions such as the factory, the party, the consumer cooperative,
and so on.  The proliferation of mass media technologies and new aesthetic
forms would spread culture throughout the masses, and encourage popular
imagination and creativity.  Mass media technologies would also provide a
way for the state to mobilize the popular imagination (more on these “cultural
technologies” in Chapter Three).  In sum technology served as a schema for
envisioning all of the life processes of society, thereby creating it as an object
of study, discipline, and expert intervention.  Moreover, this idea of technology
laid the groundwork for widespread state efforts to incorporate popular
energies into the war effort and the long-term goal of constructing the “New
Order.” By determining people’s positions within a dynamic system, absorbing
some of the popular demands for expression and freedom, and promising an
end to the contradictions of modern capitalist life, the “technological imaginary”
sought to eliminate “the political” as the expansion of egalitarian demands by
multiple politicized subjects, which threatened to transform the existing power
relations.135
IV.  AIKAWA’S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AT WORK: THE NEW
ORDER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Outline for a New Order of Science and Technology
As mentioned before, Aikawa applied his broad theory of technology to
all areas of life—to culture, to the economy, to administration, and to social
organization, for example.  In order to obtain a sense of these applications
then, let us look at some of his writings on the Outline for a New Order of
Science and Technology (hereafter referred to as the Outline), of which he
was a fierce proponent.
139  Adopted by the Cabinet in May 1941, the Outline
called for the “establishment of a Japanese type of science and technology
based on the autonomous resources of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere” by means of “activating the scientific spirit of the nation.”
140 It
established the Technology Board (Gijutsuin), which had direct control over
the funding and development plans of all of Japan’s research laboratories.
141 It
nationalized patents to share technical knowledge among industry and
controlled the allocation of engineers to essential state industries.
142  The
Technology Board was also in charge of changing the education system to
incorporate more technical education and practical training, as well as the
establishment of social facilities to promote science and technology.
143 A
Technology Deliberation Committee was established to set national policy on
all matters related to science and technology.
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The Three Stages of the New Order for Science and Technology
While the Outline mostly emphasizes promoting technology as the
material means to increase production for the war effort and to overcome the
technology blockade, it nevertheless represented a concrete manifestation of
the integrated view of technology as all of the creative forces and mechanisms
that went into the formation of a new organic system.
144  For Aikawa, the
Outline was only the first step to establish the society where technology
permeates all of life in the form of rationality, creativity, and praxis.  In his work
linking his theory of technology to state policy on technology, Theory and
Policy of Technology, Aikawa notes that while the Outline was strong on state
centralization and control of technical research, it was weak on mobilizing the
people and promoting technological values in everyday life.
145 As we saw
before, Aikawa views technology as more than machines and tools, but as
incorporating a social and practical/spiritual element as well.  For him the
Outline had taken the first step of imposing unified control over technology by
establishing the Technology Board as “the nerve center of the entire system of
science and technology;” however, it needed to advance to the “second stage”
of organizing scientists, engineers, and skilled workers into smaller “vocational
organizations of science and technology” (kagaku gijutsu no shokunô
dantai).
146 These organizations would encourage efficiency, promote creativity
and invention, increase cooperative participation, and instill a sense of mission
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and responsibility among technical workers.
147  Only through such
organizations would technology become more than dead machines and realize
its true “Japanese” essence of rationality, praxis, and creativity.
148  These
smaller organizations would form the “practical subjective conditions” and the
“muscle and bones” of the New Order for Science and Technology.
149  In sum
the first stage would establish a central state institution that oversees and
plans the entire new order, while the second stage would form technical
organizations that “operationalize” state directives on the ground in a way that
would still preserve creativity, spontaneity, and innovation.  Mobilization
through such corporatist organizations would finally lead to the “third stage,”
which he calls, “making national life scientific” (kokumin seikatsu no
kagakuka).
150 This stage does not just entail general campaigns to eliminate
superstition in everyday life, but also introducing more scientific and technical
training in secondary schools and community centers, and more skills training
for workers, for example.
151 Only then would “technological practice” really
take root among the people by bringing them closer to advanced technology.
The ultimate goal for Aikawa was to spread this integrated system of
“Japanese technology” not just among the Japanese but also to all members
of the “East Asian League” (Tôa renmei), an envisioned equal alliance
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consisting of China, Manchuria and Japan, which included Taiwan and
Korea.
152
Hitachi Manufacturing as Model
For Aikawa the workplace organizations at several Hitachi
Manufacturing factories in Ibaraki Prefecture served as concrete models of
“vocational organizations of science and technology” that would become the
mobilized units on the ground for the New Order of Science and
Technology.
153 He spent one month visiting Hitachi plants in the Taga-Hitachi
area in1941 to help write the film scenario for The Present Battle.
154 He
published a report of his visit in the Japan Technology Association’s journal,
Technology Review, in September 1941.  The factories provided a concrete
model of the type of mobilization that the New Order should strive for,
according to Aikawa—management emphasized the importance of technology
and technical methods of administration; innovation was promoted from top to
bottom; worker creativity was respected and encouraged; and significant
investment was put into research, training, and welfare facilities for the
workers.
155 Apparently Morikawa Kakuzô, head of the Cabinet Planning
Board’s Technology Section and principal drafter of the Outline, visited the
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plants several times and viewed them a models for the New Order as well.
156
For Aikaw only the type of mobilization on the ground that he saw at Hitachi
could truly bring out the practical, creative nature of technology.
Hitachi was Japan’s response to the global monopolization of heavy
electric machinery technology by Siemens and General Electric.
157  Its fortunes
turned for the better with the beginning of intensive colonization of Manchuria
and China in 1931.  By 1941 it was a “living model of the New Order for
Science and Technology,” ballooning into a huge heavy industrial concern
capitalized at 350 million yen.
158  Hitachi was renowned for stressing
“production over profit” and for being “worksite oriented” rather than “office
oriented.”
159  It was an interconnected complex of manufacturing sites,
research facilities, test and training factories, schools, worker housing, and
amusement facilities.
160  From its production of high technology to its
integrated technical organization, Hitachi represented the cutting edge of
technology in all of its senses in Japan.
The central component of the “Hitachi spirit” of technology was the
invention incentive system that resulted in the creation of 838 patents, 3239
“applied ideas,” and numerous world-class water turbines and engines.
161
According to Aikawa, the upper management and engineers at Hitachi had a
systematic policy of guiding, encouraging, and crediting workers for their ideas
and inventions.
162  Over thirty ideas and designs per month were announced
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on the factory bulletin board, and three hundred invention prizes and ten
thousand letters of recognition were awarded each year.
163  Cash bonuses
were given to male and female workers for inventions, with further bonuses
awarded after three years, if the invention was still profitable.
164 Inventions
were not necessarily the product of education and genius, according to
Aikawa, but arose through praxis and everyday interaction with technology, as
well as cooperation with other workers on the factory floor.
165  Examples of
inventions included an automatic hammer installed from the ceiling for
hammering hundreds of thin sheets together or a special device for the planer
to finish the precise wings of a turbine’s water wheel.
166 Creativity and
innovation also extended to finding ways to save materials and eliminate
waste.  The introduction of an invention incentive system encouraged the
creation of a “progressive,” cooperative culture of technology that respected
and appreciated worker creativity and action.
167 In fact such a system helped
bring out the true spirit of technology as practical, imaginative, and social.  The
technological division of labor would no longer determine the organization of
workers as in capitalism but rather, worker mobilization would bring out a more
dynamic, non-alienating sense of technology as creativity and praxis.
168  Such
a technical organization of work was more effective than “bureaucratism” and
a “system of policing” from above, argues Aikawa.
169
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Workplace Associations as the Nucleus of the New Order
Aikawa visited the Hitachi factories once more in 1942 to do more
research for the filming of The Present Battle.  He published his observations
in March 1942, again in Technology Review.
170  This time he analyzed the
workplace assemblies (shokuba jôkai) that were the nucleus of Hitachi’s
organizational system and the inculcation of the “technological spirit” of
rationality, creativity, and praxis.
171  He studied the assembly newspapers and
introduced the reader to many worker initiatives to improve efficiency,
productivity, and factory life in general.  After several months of these
meetings, workers apparently began to spontaneously look for waste of
materials, time, and work.  They set targets to eliminate waste each month.
They also set objectives for reducing the number of defective products and
rewarded people for attaining them.  All kinds of innovations such as new
machine tools, methods of work, or designs; transfer of technology from one
section to another; and discovery of mistakes would receive an award and
bonus, and the person’s name would be announced.
172  In sum the
management technique of introducing worker assemblies seemed to have the
desired effect of increasing worker responsibility and cooperation without
primarily resorting to top-down, autocratic measures.
173
Aikawa also re-introduces the readers to a certain Mr. Shidama, head
of worker education for Hitachi, and one of the people who came up with the
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invention inventive system.
174  Aikawa was very impressed by Shidama’s
“humanistic view of technology.”
175 For Shidama technology was not “great
inventions” that arose through genius but rather the small improvements on
the factory floor that made work life better and easier.
176  New technologies
such as work techniques, organizational methods, and machine tools arose
through collective work and practice, not individual genius.
177  They were
produced in the messy world of the technician whose “life stage” was tangled
electric wires with thousands of volts coursing through them, unstable cranes
swinging inches from people’s heads, the sound of riveting, bursts of dust and
sparks, and the smell of burnt lubricant (as opposed to the refined “life stage”
of intellectuals such as Aikawa).
178 In short technical creativity and invention
arose in messy everyday praxis with other people and things.  A “humanistic
view of technology,” in other words, viewed technology as always embedded
in everyday activity and work where there is usually no clear-cut distinction
between subject and object, spirit and matter.  This dynamic and unpredictable
“life stage” was the foundation of technology’s creative nature.
For Aikawa the New Order for Science and Technology was not simply
about increasing production of war materials or inventing better military
technology.  Rather it was more about developing a “Japanese” and “Asian”
sense of technology as creative activity, transformative praxis, spiritual
mobilization, cooperation, and rational planning.  This sense of technology
would be different from the so-called Western capitalist sense of technology as
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simply the material means of production for profit.  The sense of Japanese
technology would instead take root at the level of everyday work and life.
Technical imagination, for example, would be promoted in workplace
associations and the smallest innovation would be recognized and rewarded.
Responsibility and cooperation would be encouraged through regular
meetings, setting of competitive targets, and rewards.  In short the very
meaning of technology would change from being the oppressive, alien means
of production owned by the capitalist to a creative, progressive force that was
firmly rooted in the lives of the workers and people.  Only then would the New
Order for Science and Technology be truly realized.
The New Economic Order
The New Order for Science and Technology was closely related to the
New Order for Industry, which aimed to reorganize industry and particularly
management.  The core part of the reform was the establishment of “Control
Associations” (tôseikai) for each industrial area.  On September 28, 1940, the
Cabinet Planning Board announced the “Outline Summary for the
Establishment of an Economic New Order,” which officially extricated firms
from the control of capital and made them members of a “National Production
Cooperative Body.” In this way production would become more in line with
state goals rather than the goals of capital.  Reforms included “restrictions on
the establishment, reorganization, and liquidation of firms, the granting of
public status to managers, control of dividends, reform of the compensation
system to encourage production and the establishment of a performance-
based rewards system, and reorganization of small and medium-sized144
companies to improve overall efficiency of production.”
179 These “production
cooperative bodies” (later called “control associations”) were organized
according to business type, and they exerted considerable control over
member firms.  They were “in charge of executing state plans by determining
allocation of production to member firms and ensuring that production targets
were met.”
180 They could rationalize management, determine prices, and
approve leadership appointments as well.
181 This law was the key component
of a series of laws and “New Orders” that sought to reign in the capitalist
market economy in Japan and establish a planned economy based on
corporatism and vocation.
Aikawa supported the above arrangement of industry by business type;
however, he urged for a more integrated organization of industry by
technological process.  Instead of merely arranging industries by product or
material, they should be organized by the type of technological process of
production in use (e.g. chemical or mechanical process).  He presents his
integrated technological map of the economy in Theory and Policy of
Technology.
182 In this map there are control associations for all aspects of the
economy: distribution, commerce, communications, transport, finance, and
industry.  Industries are classified based on type of chemical technological
process (e.g. heavy machinery, oil refining, synthetic fibers, and fertilizer
industries) and mechanical technological process (e.g. consumer goods,
textile industries).  He calls the particular makeup of this integrated system of
technology, the “technological constitution” of a society.
183 Arranging the
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economy according to technological process would make the economy more
dynamic, according to Aikawa, since industries would be organized more in
terms of how they realize certain objectives such as efficiency and increased
production.
184 Liberal capitalism merely focuses on what is produced, thereby
de-emphasizing other factors such as management, research, workplace
organization, and training.  By emphasizing the how of production, not only
would wartime production goals be met but technical values of rationality,
creativity, and praxis would spread as well, resulting in a more dynamic
transformation of society.
While control associations would allocate production goals and
determine prices, they ideally would not infringe on the independence,
creativity, and regional character of the participating industries.  There would
be a balance between “guidance” and “voluntary cooperation,” according to
Aikawa.
185 There would not be a “national economic council” like in Germany,
and regional control associations that took local conditions into account would
concurrently exist.
186  Moreover these regional associations would assert the
interests of small to medium business, which constituted most of the Japanese
economy.
187 Thus similar to Aikawa’s diagram of society as an integrated
network of specific technologies unified beneath the organic principle of
production, the integrated network of control associations would unite under
state objectives.  The particular needs of regions and small businesses would
be respected and encouraged, while total state production goals would be
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realized at the same time.  The particular would merge with the needs of the
totality without significantly affecting the particular.
The new technician or skilled worker would be the central figure of this
new technical economy, according to Aikawa, since he or she could truly
embody the practical and social nature of technology.
188 “Their merit lies in
intellectual praxis rather than practical knowledge,” Aikawa writes,
emphasizing the equal combination of spiritual and practical elements within
“technological practice.”
189 Technology was not just narrowly practical but also
infused with a social vision.  Moreover while technological practice was
rational and scientific, it also included a creative, “prayer-like” moment most
apparent in the process of invention.
190 The “formative praxis” of technology
always strives to go beyond itself towards new possibilities.
191  One of the keys
to the New Orders of the economy and technology then was to fully display
both the rational and irrational forces of technology, its systematic and
organized character, as well as its imaginative and contingent one.  This would
be achieved primarily through the “vocational organizations of science and
technology” described above, which would also be the primary locus of identity
for the worker.  By fully exhibiting the rational and creative powers of
technology, technicians and skilled workers would lead the way in overcoming
capitalism, which enslaved workers to the machine and dampened creativity
through the patent system and the need to always maximize profit.
192
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The New Orders within Aikawa’s Larger Philosophy of Technology
The New Orders for Industry and Science and Technology represented
some of the key components of the broader idea of technology as cooperation,
creativity, and praxis advocated by Aikawa and others.  Vocational
organizations of science and technology along the lines of the workplace
associations at Hitachi would be organized to mobilize worker creativity and
encourage cooperation and self-discipline.  Technology would be firmly rooted
in the lives of the workers, not the boardroom of the capitalist.  Industries
would be taken away from the control of shareholders and organized into
“production cooperative bodies” or control associations, thereby enabling firms
to focus on industrial organization, research, investment, and training, instead
of just the profit margin.  The economy as a whole would be reorganized by
technical process and function, creating an integrated network of technologies,
as well as an overall focus on how to encourage productivity, efficiency,
innovation, and rational organization, rather than solely on what the economy
was producing.  Technical values, process, change, and social vision would be
emphasized, not just the incessant churning out of goods for the market.
Workers would become more skilled, and identify themselves primarily through
their vocation and vocational organization, creating a corporatist society rather
than an individualist, competitive one.  In sum, technology as a dynamic ethic
of creativity, praxis, and cooperation that saturated everyday life would be
achieved by fully pursuing and intensifying the dictates of the Outlines for the
New Orders for Industry and Science and Technology.148
V.  CONCLUSION
The 1930s and 1940s in Japan are often believed to represent the apex
of anti-modernity and anti-rationality in comparison to the program of rapid
modernization during the post-war period.  Yet as the fascination with
technology by Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual leaders like Aikawa
shows, this was farther from the truth.  Technology, one of the primary
foundations of modernization, was widely embraced by Japanese elites, who
actively developed its meaning and used it as a way to imagine and shape
society.  For Aikawa and other technocrats, technology was not just a matter
of assembly lines, engines, bridges, railroads, and telephones.  Technology
had to do with the very production and reproduction of society itself.
Administrative technologies produced efficient bureaucracies and businesses.
Hygiene technologies produced clean cities and healthy citizens.  Education
technologies produced patriotic citizens and skilled workers.  Communications
technologies produced telegraph and telephone networks.  Artistic
technologies produced mass movies, music, and literature.  In short, every
area of human life was to be mobilized through its very own dynamic
technology.   The end result of this smooth operation of multiple technologies
would be the end of all forms of political struggle to fundamentally transform
relations of subordination—the practical, creative energies of the people would
instead be directed towards establishing and consolidating the Japanese
empire.
This technological vision of society justified the creation of a
technocratic order of experts who devised policies to incorporate and govern
all aspects of life.  Such totalitarianism not only manifested itself as repressive
fanaticism and brute violence, but also as the mobilization of human creativity,149
spontaneity, and difference to the extent that these never threatened the
existing power relations.  Technology became a way for power to operate
productively instead of just repressively.  It became associated with the project
of “constructing” a new society without the social conflict, alienation, and
exploitation characteristic of modernity.  Japanese elites asserted that
technology’s nature was fundamentally practical, concrete, and creative.  By
proliferating this logic of technology throughout all areas of life through social
policy, life itself would supposedly become more concrete and creative as well.
For example, as Aikawa illustrated, the management technology of introducing
workplace assemblies would help encourage innovation and create a sense of
fulfillment and participation.  The economic technology of creating industrial
groups or control associations based on technological process and function
instead of industrial product would generate more advanced industries, and
therefore a more educated and prosperous nation.  Moreover, technology for
Aikawa was not just something present in the economy and factory but
permeated mass culture as well.  New cultural technologies of mass print,
radio, and film would help generate a mass sensation, as well as new avenues
for creative expression.  Aikawa was very interested in the question of how
technology permeated and changed human sensation, especially in how mass
media technologies could effectively stimulate and mobilize the creative
energies of the people for the war effort.  As we shall see in the next chapter,
he devotes much energy to supplementing his overall philosophy of
technology with a theory of “cultural technology” through analyzing and
actually producing documentary film.150
CHAPTER THREE
CULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES OF MOBILIZATION: AIKAWA HARUKI AND
THE WARTIME “CULTURE FILM”
I.  INTRODUCTION
Aikawa’s Theory of Cultural Technology
In the 1940s Aikawa was particularly interested in the technology of film
and mass media.  These cultural technologies could not easily be pinned
down narrowly as “objective means of production” because they involved the
production of immaterial images and the formation of human feeling and
sensation.  The very process of employing and consuming cultural technology
such as the camera to produce an image fundamentally involved a mass
subjective, emotive element that could not simply be reduced to being an
instrumental means to achieve a fixed goal.  In the context of the war, Aikawa
focused his attention on the bunka eiga (culture film).  This was the designated
term for the documentary film, and it referred to state mandated propaganda
films on everything from the importance of arts and crafts for young children to
hygiene campaigns for wiping out leprosy to the hard work of factory workers
producing engines for the war.  With the Film Law of 1939, which imposed
state control over the film industry and made the showing of bunka eiga
compulsory, there was an explosion of documentary films.
1 The bunka eiga
became an art form and the subject of innumerable articles, critical reviews,
and study groups.  For Aikawa the bunka eiga was the premiere aesthetic
form of the era.  They fascinated him because the production of these
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documentary films was not just a process of objectively portraying the outside
world but rather a complicated fusion of aesthetics and advanced technology
involving the cooperation of many people, resulting in a kind of technological
aesthetics or sensation.  Cinematic production compounded any simple
dichotomy of culture and science/technology but rather fused the two.
Moreover, film technology radically transformed human sensation into a mass,
collective sensation, thereby showing immense possibility to instigate people
towards social change.   Mass media technologies were inextricably tied up
with the subjective makeup of the people.  Thus in his cultural writings, Aikawa
was forced to reopen the question of delineating subjectivity and technology, a
question he answered earlier in terms of a clear division between subject and
object, human goals and instrumental means.
In 1936 Walter Benjamin also examined the aesthetics of cinema and
its revolutionary effects on mass sensation in his famous essay, “The Work of
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  Similar to Aikawa, he noted the
technologically mediated character of cinematic reality.  The cinematic image
presented to the spectator is the result of the “thoroughgoing permeation of
reality with mechanical equipment” and “extraneous accessories” such as
“camera equipment, lighting machinery, staff assistants, etc.”
2  The image was
no longer the subjective, “magical” portrayal of an external reality as in
painting, but the product of the “surgical” operations of the cameraman.
3 Like
Aikawa also, he described the camera’s more precise, scientific capture of
human behavior, for example, which allows people to analyze things that they
would not normally notice with the naked eye.  “The muscle of a body” on the
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screen, for example, is fascinating both from an artistic and a scientific
viewpoint, according to Benjamin.
4 He adds, “To demonstrate the identity of
the artistic and scientific uses of photography which heretofore usually were
separated will be one of the revolutionary functions of the film.”
5
Finally, similar to Aikawa, Benjamin was also fascinated with the “shock
effect of the film,” which painting kept “under wrappers,” and “the greatly
increased mass of participants,” which has changed their “mode of
participation” in art.
6 In the end, however, while both thinkers noted strikingly
similar aspects in the mass technologies of film and their potential for mass
revolution, their goals were radically different—communism for Benjamin and
a fascist “organic totality” for Aikawa.  This chapter will consider some of the
ways that Aikawa sought to harness the creative potential of cultural
technologies for the purpose of establishing the New East Asian Order beyond
communism and capitalism.  Benjamin’s thesis of the fascist employment of
cinematic technology as giving the masses an avenue for collective
expression without addressing the relations of class and power is germane for
my argument.
 7  Expanding on his argument I shall demonstrate some of the
specific cinematic techniques that Aikawa and his fellow filmmakers developed
and used to incorporate freedom, creative expression, and mass participation.
In Chapter Two I examined Aikawa’s broad theory of technology as the
various societal processes of production and transformation, and the
economic and political aspects of his theory within his vision of the “New Order
of Science and Technology.  In this chapter, however, I will specifically look at
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his work on cultural technology, an area where we can again clearly see
Aikawa’s broader sense of subjective technology at work.  I will analyze his
writings on the potential of “reproductive art,” and his1944 work, Theory of the
Culture Film, which is one of the few theoretical treatments of the documentary
film in Japan at the time.  Here he explores specific film techniques for
motivating citizens and subjects to actively cooperate with the creation of a
modern, technologically advanced community in East Asia.  I will also examine
the film, The Present Battle (1942), a bunka eiga produced by Geijutsu
Eigasha (GES) on the situation of an electric generator plant during the war.
8
Aikawa was involved in the production of this film, and he discusses various
techniques and problems that occurred during its making.  Thus in this chapter
I would like to demonstrate an instance of Aikawa’s theory of technology at
work in the arena of cultural production and spiritual mobilization.
II.  TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE
The Potential of Mass Media Technologies: Reproductive Art
After analyzing the spread of electricity as one of the material
conditions behind the emergence of “technological culture” in Modern Theory
of Technology, Aikawa begins to examine some of the immense possibilities of
cultural technology such as film, radio, and mass print.  According to him the
main characteristic of technological culture was the predominance of
“reproductive art” (fukusei geijutsu).
9 Radio culture has replaced the culture of
prose and poetry, film has overtaken theater, photography has challenged
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painting, and the record has replaced the live symphony orchestra.
10 However,
similar to Benjamin, instead of romantically lamenting the decline of classical
culture and the replacement of “originality” with an inferior “reproduction,”
Aikawa praises the “originality” of the “new genres of mechanical reproductive
art.”
11 In particular these new genres possess a “popular mass nature” and a
“circulatory character that can bring art closer to the mass psyche.”
12 Art was
no longer restricted by place or limited to the church or palace.
13
Moreover, mechanical reproductive art emphasized artistic form more
than the content, which in turn created new possibilities for content, according
to Aikawa.  He bemoans the fact that many artists are unable to take
advantage of the new technologies to create new art, and are stuck in their old
romantic, individualistic ways.  “The artistic activity of writers not only
presupposes a supportive thought and knowledge that are merged with the
fires of practical passion; it is realized through methods, processes, and
technologies that formalize the world of the artwork after working on and
describing the particular chosen objective reality,” Aikawa writes.
14 Art is not
“genius” or spiritual creativity but the employment of specific methods,
processes, and techniques of mass “expressive technologies” (hyôgen
gijutsu), having a “multitude of rich forms” such as film, radio, records, and
photography.
15  “New sake for a new flask,” Aikawa implores the artists.
16  For
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Aikawa, reproductive art does not degrade artistic content but enriches and
multiplies its possibilities.
The Potential of Mass Media Technologies: Film
Film was a prime example of the new potential of mechanical
reproductive art.  “Not only has film produced a form with mass
transmissibility, it has begun to develop a dynamic potential to express the
sensuous content of a new age,” Aikawa writes.
17 The very production of the
film embodies the mass nature of the medium.  It is an immense process of
production synthesizing “literary elements (scenario), theatrical and aesthetic
elements (filming), and musical elements (recording) for reproduction onto the
screen through movie projectors and sound mechanisms,” Aikawa writes.
18
The innovations in artistic form made possible by the film also created new
content.  For example, while films like Charlie Chaplain’s Modern Times
(1936) did not go beyond a romantic caricaturing of industrial rationalization
and technology as dehumanizing and therefore suppressive of art, Disney
animations like Popeye went beyond the old “technology vs. art” dichotomy to
create new technological sensations, according to Aikawa.
19 He writes of
Popeye:
Among Popeye’s unusual powers are a winding motor, the destructive
force of a cannonball, and a heart like a continuous electric engine.  His
astounding activity represents a burst of mechanical energy, and the
music emits a metallic dissonance.  Why does the conception of
Popeye completely match the dynamic optical technology that supports
its cinematic form; moreover, why is it strangely accompanied by a
sense of reality and freshness? Perhaps if this metallic and optical
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sensation aesthetically unites with real image content, the aesthetic
character of film is further developed.
20
Classical art forms such as music and poetry that assumed a split between
culture and technology, spirit and matter could not yet achieve such an
aesthetic fusion of technology and life, which Aikawa calls a “fresh modern
sensation.”
21 Instead of spiritual alienation, he feels dynamism, power, energy,
and life in the saturation of society by technology.  The new mechanical
reproductive technologies of art would bring about a renaissance in creativity
and innovation.  Their mass transmissibility and potential for stimulating new
sensations should be actively embraced and developed by artists instead of
rejected in favor of a romantic past.
22
The Relation Between Culture and Technology
Thus in modern society, culture/art is not the polar opposite of
technology.  Yet culture is not simply in an amorphous fusion with technology
either.  As we saw before, technology for Aikawa is a combination of clearly
identifiable objective means and goal-oriented ideals—the “matter” is always
infused with some conceptuality or ethical imperative.  He writes the following
about the relation between technology and art:
Technology and art are on opposite poles but not as two poles on a
horizontal plane where one pole is the material and the other the
spiritual—rather, technology forms something like the base and edges
of a three-dimensional cultural structure.  Moreover, technology today,
which has silently built itself amidst the base, has shaken the spiritual
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throne of art at the top, to the point where even aesthetic purists agree
that technology is on the rise.
23
Aikawa seeks a middle ground between the romantic view of technology as
opposed to art and the technologist/futurist view of technology and art fusing
into an indistinguishable whole.  As we saw before, practice unifies matter and
spirit into an organic whole.  In technology the material and spiritual moments
may be identified but they do not have distinct realities within the varied
technological processes of life.  Thus technology and art have a living, “three-
dimensional” structure, with technology forming the “base and edges” of all
kinds of artistic activity.  Technology and art form concrete three-dimensional
“complexes” in which neither is truly determinative.  For example, cinema is a
lively composite of different sensations and ideals.  At the same time, it has a
material “base and edges,” which constitute the camera film, the camera, the
sound equipment, the studio, studio workers, etc.  Together they form a
specific “three-dimensional cultural structure.” In his later works on
documentary film, Aikawa would explore the issue of the cinematic form more
closely, particularly this issue of what constitutes subjective and objective
elements of film, and how they interact with each other in a complicated
manner—creating a reality thoroughly permeated with mechanical equipment
and a the “surgical” operations of a specialized studio staff, as Benjamin would
describe it.  For cinema and other forms of mass media reworked this relation
between subjectivity and objectivity, and even threw it open to question.
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III.  AIKAWA’S THEORY OF THE CULTURE FILM
The Rise of the Culture Film or Bunka Eiga
Filmmakers and critics during the wartime regarded the documentary
film or bunka eiga (“culture film”) as the preeminent aesthetic form of the
period.  Even theatrical or fiction films (geki eiga) began to take on a realistic
documentary style and quality.
24  Mark Nornes writes:
In the largest scheme of things, documentary has always been
conceptualized as peripheral to the feature film’s center.  However, by
the end of the 1930s it would be more appropriate to conceptualize
fiction and nonfiction as two overlapping spheres with constant flux
between them.  With respect to the conventions of representation, the
feature film/documentary hierarchy appears inverted in the late 1930s
and early 1940s.  Indeed, it is tempting to place the feature fiction film in
the peripheral position.
25
As we shall see later, documentary films also incorporated theatrical forms
and techniques, creating the genre of the bunka eiga.  This blurring of genres
was caused by a number of factors.  The Film Law of 1939, which established
the “New Order for Cinema,” created a film inspection system and enforced
the showing of a minimum of 250 meters of nonfiction film in any movie
program.
26 Documentaries also frequently escaped the censorship laws since
they often did not have scenarios, thereby making their production easier.
State inspection fees were even waived for nonfiction films further
encouraging their production.  Such state promotion of bunka eiga led to an
                                                   
24 For examples of feature films with a documentary aesthetic, see Kurosawa Akira’s The Most
Beautiful (Ichiban utsukushiku, 1944) and his mentor, Yamamoto Kajirô’s The War at Sea
from Hawaii to Malaya (Hawai, Marê okikaisen, 1942).
25 Nornes, 95.
26 Ibid., 63.159
explosion of documentary films, with the Ministry of Education approving 4.460
documentaries in 1940 alone.
27 Thus documentary film styles quickly made
themselves felt throughout the film world.  In addition to state promotion, the
historical exigencies of the war and battlefront, audience popularity, and
increased attention by film critics also contributed to the spread of the
documentary film form, and the resulting preeminence of the documentary
aesthetic.
The term bunka eiga originally came from the import of Kulturfilme
produced by the German film giant UFA beginning in 1930.  These were
originally films describing the achievements and processes of modern science
and technology.
28  The Ministry of Education, however, soon began using the
term bunka eiga to refer to all documentary films produced in Japan.
29 With the
beginning of the war, bunka eiga took on more nationalistic overtones,
designating propaganda films that would serve to “enlighten,” “modernize,”
and mobilize the people for the war effort and the imperial enterprise.  Films
ranged from describing the spiritual vigor of elite air force pilot trainees (Young
Soldiers of the Sky, Sora no shônenhei, 1942) to portraying the rural poverty
and cooperative spirit of peasants in northern Japan (Snow Country, Yukiguni,
1939) to capturing the lives of railway workers on steam locomotives (Train C-
57, Kikansha C57, 1941).
30 The term bunka (culture) in bunka eiga came to
have multiple meanings depending on the particular film.  Almost all had
nationalist overtones of valuing discipline, cooperation, self-sacrifice, and hard
work.  Many films celebrated the trappings of modern technology—the factory,
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the machine, cooperative management techniques, and innovation.  Many
sought to portray the superstitious and “modern” customs and beliefs of the
people.  For Aikawa, however, the bunka eiga was at the vanguard of
representing all aspects of modern technological society and of mobilizing
people to construct a new “technological culture” throughout Japan and East
Asia.
Aikawa’s Theory of the Culture Film as an Extension of his Theory of
Technology
“My theory of the bunka eiga,” Aikawa writes in Theory of the Culture
Film, “is concerned with providing a broad cultural foundation to my theory of
technology.  The fundamental problem of the ‘in between’ (aida) of science
and art constitutes an important question at the background to a theory of
technology.”
31 The bunka eiga is in fact a concrete instance of Aikawa’s theory
of technology at work.  As we saw before, he defines technology broadly as all
types of practical, goal-oriented human activity in the world.  Production
technologies, consumption technologies, hygiene technologies, legislative
technologies, and moral technologies are intricate “complexes” of objective
structures such as machinery, laws, and institutions and subjective ethos and
goals.  Together these technologies form the dynamic social architecture of
modern Japan.  Thus technology has the ontological status of being “in-
between” science and culture (the material and spiritual) for Aikawa—or as his
contemporary Miyamoto Takenosuke aptly described, of being “bodies of
possibility.”
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Bunka eiga are cultural technologies that also constitute intricate
“complexes” of scientific and aesthetic, subjective and objective elements.
According to Aikawa, they cannot be reduced to objective documentations of
external reality as many people pretended, and of course, they can never be
described as pure works of fiction or conceptuality.   In the same way that
other technologies were concrete syntheses of material objects/processes and
human objectives, bunka eiga were cultural technologies consisting of material
cinematic technologies and conceptuality resulting in the cinematic image.
These images bring forth a “new world” within objective reality by synthesizing
the material technologies/techniques of film and abstract concepts such as
"national unity" and “construction of East Asia,” for instance.
32   For Aikawa the
documentary film embodied the “in-between” nature of technology in general
as both material and imaginary product, or more specifically, as something
concrete that goes toward realizing some practical idea.  Moreover the bunka
eiga represents some of the most important aspects of technology for Aikawa:
praxis, sociality, imagination, transformation, and scientific rationality.  Thus it
was not outside the purview of his larger project of envisioning imperial Japan
through his overall philosophy of technology.
The Technological Structure and Organization of the Culture Film
The Theory of the Culture Film, published in 1944 just before Aikawa
was conscripted, was primarily a collection of his essays on documentary film
during the 1940s, with some additional material and revisions.  It was the
culmination of his experiences at Geijutsu Eigasha (GES) writing, producing,
and studying documentary film.  Aside from the film critic Imamura Taihei’s
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book, Theory of the Documentary Film (Kiroku eiga ron), it remains one of the
few full-length theoretical treatments of the documentary film in pre-war and
wartime Japan.  Like many film commentators, Aikawa admired the scientific,
high-tech quality of documentary film.  Film in general, according to Aikawa,
has a “particular technological structure.” “Films are possible worlds
conditioned by creative and projective mechanisms that are the integrated
product of physical, chemical, and electrical applications such as modern
mechanics, optics, photo-chemistry, acoustics, and so on,” he writes.
33
Moreover, film production has a “modern manufacturing structure,” unlike
classical artistic production, which is primarily individual and artisan-like in
nature.
34 For example, he writes, “The director must bring out his own artistic
image while simultaneously engaging in a complicated teamwork of
cooperating with scenario writers, cameramen, and those being filmed, for
example.”
35
Aikawa also places a certain type of “productive critic” at the center of
the documentary film production process.  He attacks critics who merely give
their personal impressions or wax eloquently about the artistic qualities of a
film without contributing in any way to their improvement.  For Aikawa the
wartime critic actively participates in film production.  The critic cooperates
with technicians, cameramen, editors, actors, consultants, writers, and so on,
in actively concretizing the “cultural conception of the Great East Asian War” in
the cinematic image.  Thus the new productive critic needs to be versed in all
of the “thought technologies” of the bunka eiga.
36 As we shall see, Aikawa
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provides a detailed account of the “complicated teamwork” involved in film
production, his role as a productive critic, and the specific problems they
encounter in the technological process of making the film, The Present Battle.
The practical, productive critic involved in the intricate details and collective
endeavor of filmmaking resonates with his overall idea of grounding
technology in concrete praxis and sociality.
The Technical Rationality of the Culture Film
Aside from the “technological structure” of documentary film production
and the “complicated teamwork” and organization involved, Aikawa specifically
admires bunka eiga for their “principal standpoint of discovering rational
constructions within social and natural scientific reality.”
37 Bunka eiga “bring
out knowledge against feeling, concepts against intuition, documentation
against imagination, fact against fiction” within their very constitution.
38 Thus
they represent progress over theatrical film, which primarily emphasize feeling,
intuition, imagination, and fiction.
39 The scientific elements within the
“technological system” of the bunka eiga “awaken the scientific elements
asleep within the producer’s subject matter, and it permeates the film’s
planning, construction, production, and in the end, even the way the film
perceives, understands, and represents objects.”
40 Thus science and
technology thoroughly infuses the subjectivities and actions of those
cooperating in the production of the documentary as well.
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In fact Aikawa even sees this “scientification” (kagakuka) of the “means,
subjects, and objects” as part of the overall campaigns to “scientificize” and
“rationalize” everyday life through the New Order for Science and Technology.
The principal goals of the New Order were to spread scientific and technical
knowledge, to promote rational work techniques and organization, and to
encourage technological innovation.  In actively bringing out ideas and
structures in the world and cooperatively coming up with new ways to
represent social reality and thereby influence human thought and sensation,
bunka eiga were at the vanguard of “scientificizing” and “technologizing”
society.
The Techno- Aesthetic Quality of the Culture Film: Neo-Realism
Yet as mentioned before, Aikawa asserts throughout that the scientific,
technological quality of bunka eiga is inseparable from its aesthetic, theatrical
quality.  “The screen is a filmic reproduction or representation.  It is a created,
manufactured product cut out and represented through subjective intent,”
Aikawa writes.
41 “Visual formalization” is the cinema’s mode of expression, and
improving that mode “requires improving its aesthetic quality,” he adds.
“However, it is also a fact that unlike other arts, in the case of the cinematic
form, the improvement of the aesthetic quality is firmly linked to an
advancement of its scientific quality, and if the form is not supported by a
scientific understanding of its technological foundation, it will not be
aestheticized,” he writes.
42  Thus the image itself is a subjectively created
“form of expression,” and inevitably involves an aesthetic element; however,
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the subjective, aesthetic element also inheres in the objective cinematic
technology itself.  Different cameras, lenses, sound equipment, lighting
technology, and shooting techniques have their own aesthetic qualities, and
any improvement in them can also improve the overall aesthetic quality of the
film.  In short, just as “objective” science and technology permeates the more
“subjective” elements of planning, directing, producing, and acting, aesthetics
permeates the more objective cinematic technology of the camera, lighting,
editing equipment, and lens.  Linking this to Aikawa’s wider theory of
technology then, documentary film production is the complicated operation of
multiple technologies that each synthesize “subjective” and “objective”
elements into themselves—planning technologies, optic technologies, acting
technologies, sound technologies, marketing technologies, and so on.  Bunka
eiga represents for Aikawa the epitome of the fusion of technology and art,
productive power and the imagination.
He spends most of the book exploring the particular techno-aesthetic
qualities of bunka eiga.  Documentary filmmakers, according to Aikawa, must
not delude themselves into thinking that documentaries instrumentally and
objectively represent bare reality.  Instead, they should pay close attention to
the very essence of the cinematic image.  “The essence of the cinematic
image is the spirit of flow, the spirit of process, the spirit of montage,” Aikawa
writes.
43 He adds:
Different from painting, the technological possibilities of film, which
possesses a temporal structure, lies not only in explaining and
recording, but in expressing the content of a narrative.  Even in the
rhythm and tempo of its constitutive flow, it is easy to incorporate
dramatic elements, and depending on the situation, even “tricks” that
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would be impossible to depict on the theatrical stage.  That is to say,
groups of actors (performers), stage equipment (set and location), and
the director appeared [with the advent of film], and thus the
“scenario”…became necessary.
44
“Documentarianism” (kirokushugi) ignores the flowing temporal structure of the
film, according to Aikawa, by leaving everything to editing, placing too much
emphasis on the timely snapshot, making the cameraman the director, and
looking down on the integrated scenario in favor of a vague “roadmap.”
45
Instead the spirit of continuity, montage, and flow should permeate the entire
process of film production, and it should be realized through creative editing,
camerawork, acting, use of music, and subtitles, for example.  Since the
primary goal of the bunka eiga is not only to record reality but also to bring out
ideals supposedly latent or brewing within reality, it has to fully utilize its very
own techno-aesthetic or “constitutive power” (kôseiryoku) of continuity and
flow.
46 The bunka eiga transcends both the documentary and the theatrical film
in combining “scientific” and “aesthetic” elements into a dynamic, technological
synthesis—a “new world” or “body of possibility.”
Aikawa and other critics describe the ideal techno-aesthetic of the
bunka eiga as “neo-realism.”
47 Realism, according to Aikawa, is “trivial” and
“desolate” in its obsession with the minute details of the world.  It lacks any
concern with national ideals such as “cultural construction of East Asia,” for
example that might also be apparent within the flow of reality.
48  Romanticism,
on the other hand, is escapist and self-absorbed.  Aikawa writes, “The
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desolation of realist trivialism, empiricist self-consolation, and a type of
socialized escapism are all problems necessitating internal reform.  Because
the construction that should arise—a romanticism toward tomorrow—should
burn within them as the subjective impulse of neo-realism.”
49 Like technology
in general, neo-realism synthesizes aesthetic feeling and scientific
conceptuality in order to bring out hitherto unseen “truths” within reality,
“truths” that cannot be fully captured in realism or romanticism.  He writes:
In the process of reality are hidden stories that exceed stories, and it is
often the case that the intelligence has its eyes opened by feeling.  For
example, while the portrayal of Hitler’s countenance in the Compeigne
Forest and his embrace of Hermann Göring in front of his Berlin
residence in the documentary, Seiki no gaika (Victory of the Century),
are theatrical representations of performance exceeding performance,
nevertheless, they are useful in strengthening the verisimilitude of
reality.  Even in science films such as Aru hi no higata (On the Beach at
Ebb Tide), if a sense of wonder towards unperceived reality was not
assumed [by the camera work and production], the appeal to the
intelligence would have been weakened.
50
Theatrical performance is necessary to presumably capture the moment of
national joy in reversing years of “German humiliation” at the hands of France,
for example, which could not be captured as well with cold, distant camera
shots or through political speeches by the leaders.  In On the Beach at Ebb
Tide (1940), the use of the zoom lens, witty narration, and punctual music
brings the unapparent world of a Japanese coastline’s wildlife and vegetation
to life.
51
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Recalling Benjamin’s reference to the “surgical” operations of the
filmmaker constituting the cinematic image, and its scientific and aesthetic
character, Aikawa writes:
I believe in the image’s infinite volume of rich, sensuous content, and
think that it should lie within the image in the same way as scientific
intelligence and theatrical aesthetics should also inhere in the image.
The key lies in the process of discovering these images, pulling them
out, and forming them in the practice of making the work.  I think there
is a danger of being obsessed with the narrow boundary between
theatrical film and bunka eiga.
52
While the bare image contains “rich, sensuous content,” this content must be
actively produced and teased out through practically interacting with reality,
not passively observing it.  As he mentions earlier, the film image itself already
contains a certain scientific and “sensuous” quality; however, in
documentaries, the conceptual, sensuous quality often needs to be brought
out more strongly through staging and framing the subject.  In this way the
dramatic, emotional aspects of life can be captured better thereby bringing the
audience closer to the subjects and ideals put forth in the film.
For example, Aikawa praises the “structure, color tone, flow, and
lyricism” of Kyôbashi Takahide’s film, District Boat (Hômensen), which
“beautifully” captures life on and around a local boat route.
53  However, the
film’s gentle, flowing feel over-romanticizes life on the “small, muddy, and
smelly” river.
54  In order to balance this out, Kyôbashi needs to emphasize
“practice more than knowledge;” to focus more on the subject’s “actions” and
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“expressions;” and to create a “decisively upward drive” within the gentle
narrative flow, rather than merely describe, according to Aikawa.
55  These
elements, combined with Kyôbashi’s “aesthetic sense” of river life would only
add to his “truth-like brush of the pen” and to the “thick volume” of his
images.
56 Thus “neo-realism” involves sharp camera angles, close-ups on
human movement and expression, and the use of montage, for example, to
fully bring out the dynamic energy and feeling within life.
The bunka eiga, The Unknown People (Shirarezaru hitobito), on the
other hand, was too realistic, according to Aikawa.  He praises the camera’s
stark portrayal of “sewage workers toiling in the sludge,” “the darkness, filth,
and odor of a rich neighborhood’s sewers,” and the “workers’ fight against the
danger of disease.”
57 The film exudes a “young, rough feeling,” a kind of
purposefully “unskilled” technique, which helps capture the reality of the
sewers.
58  The lack of intrusive narration, the use of close-ups and pan shots
to “make the images speak,” and the creative use of a human chorus in
conjunction with the “reverberating sound of machines, the noise of grinding
and squeaking, and the sound of shovels” all help create a sense of sympathy
within the viewer.
59 However, the overall point of the film is unclear.  “Is it
merely to express our thanks from the bottom of our hearts for their self-
sacrificial work in the darkness against the filth that we produce?,” he writes.
60
The film should also bring out the “vigor and strength” of labor, and the
“cooperation and solidarity” involved in work, in addition to the hardship and
                                                   
55 Ibid., 90.
56 Ibid., 90.
57 Ibid., 90.
58 Ibid., 91.
59 Ibid., 91.
60 Ibid., 92.170
toil, according to Aikawa.
61 The filmmaker should dig into the “depths of the
workers’ minds” in order to bring out a sense of “awareness and responsibility”
towards the larger war effort among both the workers themselves and the
audience in general, and the larger significance of their roles as “worker
soldiers” on the home front.
62  Thus neo-realism should not just realistically
capture the minute details of life through the use of innovative techniques, but
it should also capture the larger, national concepts supposedly at work in
everyday life.  The labor of sewage workers, for example, should also be a
microcosm for the larger mission of “cultural construction of East Asia” and the
war effort.  These larger ideals should also be present in the details of the
“neo-realist” image.
IV.  THE MAKING OF THE PRESENT BATTLE (1942)
Background of ‘The Present Battle’
Let us now turn to Aikawa’s attempt to realize such a neo-realist
aesthetic through his involvement in the film, The Present Battle (1942).  His
commentaries and impressions of the film production process are very
instructive since they illustrate his broader theory of technology as practical,
creative, and cooperative action at work within a specific realm.  We not only
see his theory at work within the film production process, however, but in the
very subject matter of the film itself—skilled workers within a large complex of
factories that manufacture electric generators.  In these two different
production processes, we catch a glimpse of the problems and difficulties that
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Aikawa’s theory of technology encounters on the ground.  We see some of the
messy details, which are occluded in Aikawa’s neater diagrams of society as
the simultaneous operation of integrated technologies whose overall logic is
production and cooperation (and therefore, the elimination of the political as
transforming relations of subordination).  More importantly, however, we see
examples of what Aikawa specifically means by defining technology broadly as
transformative praxis, creativity, and cooperation.  Referring to his study trips
to Hitachi, Aikawa writes, “It goes without saying that those who grasp the
theory of technology practically…must leave their paper-filled study behind
and go to the actual site of technology.”
63 Only then can one see the theory of
technology concretely in action.
The Cabinet Information Bureau commissioned GES in 1941 to make
an “epic” documentary film tentatively called, National Solidarity (Kokumin
rentai).
64 Formed in 1937, GES was one of the most prolific producers of large-
scale documentaries, and they were known for their in-depth, aesthetically
innovative films on different aspects of daily life.
65  Aside from Snow Country
(Yukiguni, 1939), Train C-57 (Kikansha C-57, 1941), and the popular Young
Soldiers of the Sky (Sora no shônenhei, 1942) described above, they
produced a film by the former Proletariat Film League (Purokino) screenwriter,
Atsugi Taka, entitled Record of a Nursery (Aru hobo no nikki, 1942).  This film
showed the difficulties involved in making unruly children learn values of
cooperation and self-discipline, and the nursery mother’s job of teaching
mothers modern techniques of childrearing and housekeeping.
66 The goal of
                                                   
63 Aikawa, “Hatsumei hôshôsei no moderu,” 42.
64 Aikawa, “Hitachi kôjô kengaku-ki,” 40. Aikawa, “Hatsumei hôshôsei no moderu,” 42.
65 Nornes, 59.
66 Available at Yamagata International Film Festival office in Tokyo.172
National Solidarity was to somehow concretely depict the abstract concept of
“solidarity” between very different people—the manager, the soldier, the
farmer, the engineer, the skilled laborer, and the “nation,” for example.
67
Moreover, the film was part of a GES series of three bunka eiga filmed in large
factories released in the same yea—Mizuki Sôya’s Production for Victory
(Shôri he no seisan, 1942), Imaizumi Zenju’s The Shipbuilding Corps (Zôsen
teishintai, 1942), and the film at hand, Nakayama Yoshio’s The Present Battle.
Each film was set in a different type of industrial complex.  Production for
Victory portrayed the lives of workers in a crane factory trying to meet stiff
production deadlines (shot at Ishikawajima Heavy Industries).  The
Shipbuilding Corps presumably dealt with one of Japan’s several world-class
shipbuilding yards.  Finally, The Present Battle focused on an electric
generator plant (Hitachi Manufacturing in Tokyo).
According to Kubo Kenji, the filmmakers really wanted to capture the
power of production from the “worker's point of view.”
68   They did not want to
make yet another film that merely described the industrial process from start to
finish, or what he aptly called, the “start to finish film” (dekirumade eiga).
69
Such films employed the tired formula of showing the “sincere expressions of
diligent workers using similar work methods,” the continuous movement of
machines and conveyer belts, or the flashing sparks of a grinder.  Rather than
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assuming an attitude of “human versus machine,” they tried to capture the
sites of connectivity between human and machine in order to better represent
the immense power of industrial production.
70  For example, when shooting the
expression of a worker, it was also important to highlight what his or her hands
were doing, Kubo writes.  Or when filming a machine belt, it was also
important to capture the handle that adjusted the belt.  Or finally, instead of
focusing on the sparks coming off of the grinder, one should film the thickness
of the material as well, as it was being cut with a machine tool.
71  Like this,
they sought to capture “the worker's point of view,” which was inseparable
from the machine and the organization, rather than totally external and alien to
them.  Also, particularly in the case of The Present Battle, the filmmakers
wanted to show the tremendous organization and cooperation between
different types of workers that was involved in putting together a technological
product.  This was part of their goal of illustrating “productive power” to the
fullest.  Thus according to Kubo, representing “productive power” did not mean
just filming and describing the mechanical process.  It also meant showing the
dynamic interaction and relationship between worker and machine, as well as
worker and worker, worker and management, and ultimately, worker and
nation.  In the end, the audience themselves would become even closer to
technology, particularly industrial technology, according to Kubo.
72
Aikawa was asked to assist Asano Tatsuo, the screenwriter and editor
for Nakayama’s film probably because of his expertise in industrial technology
and technology issues in general.  Nakayama was primarily known as a
cameraman, and he was probably interested in the difficult technical task of
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filming within an enormous, dark, and confusing factory.
73 Aikawa visited the
factory of Nippon Kôkan (Japan Steel Tubing) and the main Hitachi electric
generator plant in Taga-Hitachi in June, July, and August of 1941 for many
days at a time each in order to do research for the screenplay.
74  The film was
filmed soon after at one of the factories in the Hitachi complex.  As mentioned
in Chapter Two, he was particularly interested in the general characteristics of
the invention promotion system (hatsumei hôshô sei) and the workplace
groups and assemblies (shokuba jôkai) there.
75 He made another one-week
research trip to some other Hitachi plants at the end of January 1942.
According to Aikawa, the filmmakers were then struggling over how to end the
film in a dramatic, uplifting, and more poetic manner.  They were just about to
shoot the final scene where the workers were preparing to test an 85,000
kilowatt water turbine to be sent to Malaysia, which at face value, was not very
cinematically exciting, according to Aikawa.
76  Also, Pearl Harbor had just
happened, and the filmmakers felt that some aesthetic mechanism was
needed to connect the workers and factory more firmly to the expanding war
effort and the ever more urgent task of the “cultural construction of East
Asia.”
77 Thus they sent Aikawa again to come up with ways to achieve these.
78
This time he explored the invention promotion system or the way in which
Hitachi encouraged and mobilized worker creativity more thoroughly.
Apparently Morikawa Kakuzô, a former Mitsubishi Trading Company engineer
                                                   
73 For Nakayama’s filmmography as a cameraman, see
http://www.jmdb.ne.jp/person/p0271750.htm. Kubo describes the challenges of factory
shooting in his essay.  Kubo, “Kôjô to bunka eiga,” 37.
74 Aikawa, “Hitachi kôjô kengaku ki” 40. Aikawa, “Hatsumei hôshôsei no moderu,” 42.
75 Aikawa, Hitachi kôjô kengaku ki,” 40.
76 Ibid., 40.
77 Ibid., 40.
78 Ibid., 40.175
and the head of the Cabinet Planning Board’s Science Section, studied
Hitachi’s factories carefully when he helped draft the Outline for the New Order
for Science and Technology.
79 Like Aikawa, Morikawa wanted to recreate
Hitachi’s invention promotion system and encouragement of worker creativity
on a national level.
80 As we shall see, this technological mobilization of worker
creativity and cooperation turns out to be a key component of the film as well.
The Scenario of ‘The Present Battle’
Before examining Aikawa’s experiences of making the film, let us first
describe the scenario and imagery of The Present Battle.  While the film no
longer exists, an abbreviated version of the scenario was published in GES’s
research journal, Culture Film.
81 The film begins with a war song during the
opening credits.  The song exhorts people to “burst through the dark clouds of
East Asia” and to collectively take pride in the war and “construction of East
Asia.”
82 The first scene shows the outside of the electric generator plant: a
baffling collection of steel structures, blast furnaces, holding tanks, cranes,
large ships, and dark smoke that collectively “smother the sun.”
83 The factory
is a complex of many factories employing thousands of workers for the
production of powerful electric generators from start to finish.  The next scene
shows forty-five “half-naked men” throwing iron ore into the blast furnace and
shaping them into steel parts for the generator.  These parts are then shown
transported one after another on electric trains to the rotary engine factory.
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The next several scenes depict the many problems that occur within the
rotary engine factory.  A missing part in the cast iron factory delays the
delivery of an important rotor.  Workers are playing shôgi instead of minding
the lathes.  Machine parts are declared unusable because they have been
sheared too much.  A skilled lathe worker of thirty years complains about the
lazy, careless younger workers.  A younger worker is fed up with factory life
and dreams of returning to the countryside.  The factory office is inundated
with complaints about delays, the irregular pace of work, and unusable parts.
A crane hits a careless worker, causing a panic in the factory.  The last scene
in the chapter shows the chief engineer talking to another engineer while
inspecting the factory.  He talks about the lack of awareness and sense of
responsibility towards the entire industrial complex.  The slightest mistake is
felt throughout the factory and affects the morale of other dedicated skilled
workers.  Production is steadily declining while demand is rising especially
after the beginning of war with China (1937).  The chief engineer worries that
irresponsibility, waste, and carelessness will spread from factory to factory,
and eventually to the entire country.  He decides that new policies are in order.
The next chapter begins with the chief engineer reporting to the higher
executives.  He begins by blaming the poor results on the rotary factory’s lack
of a guiding management principle.  He then outlines their new course:
First of all, shouldn’t we respect our workers as human beings, trust
them, and boldly ask for their cooperation? Shouldn’t we treat them in a
way so that they can take charge of their own positions within the
factory, take responsibility for their own work, and spontaneously exert
their whole energy? As a specific policy, we are therefore asking every
work group leader to hold regular workplace meetings.  We will have
workers talk honestly about the problems they are facing, let them
resolve the problems by themselves in a responsible manner, and177
kindly guide them in these activities.  In this way, their everyday work
will directly connect with that of the state as a whole, and a self-
awareness that their work is contributing to the expansion of victories
on the Asian continent will take root.
84
The factory is not merely a collection of cold, impersonal steel conveyer belts,
machines, tools, and cranes; it should rather be a humanized space of
spontaneity, creativity, and self-government as well.  As we saw in Chapter
Two, these values were at the core of the New Order for Science and
Technology.  According to the film, productivity and the spread of technology
throughout life could best be achieved through guided devolution of
responsibility and creativity, not simply by coercion and command.
The next scenes show groups of twenty to thirty workers gathering in
the evening or at lunch under the shade of the machines or in open spaces.
The old skilled worker complains about the selfish, lazy younger workers “of a
different mindset,” and how they made work no longer enjoyable.  The young
worker from the countryside talks about the lack of excitement and challenge
in his work, and he begins to ask whether a rural youth like himself was ever
really suited for heavy industrial work.  The following scene shows the youth
leaving the factory in a bus.  In the background the large factory overlooks
decrepit huts.  The voice of the chief engineer talks about the large number of
rural youths who have lost hope in factory life and have returned to the
countryside.  While he says these youths are selfish, he also places
responsibility on management for not making factory work more interesting
and stimulating.  Thus the chief engineer insists on the importance of the
workplace meetings as the first step towards building cooperation between the
workers and improving their conditions.
                                                   
84 Ibid., 68.178
 The following scenes show the rural worker returning to his village only
to be confronted by the spectacle of mechanized, cooperative agriculture, and
the villagers forecasting an abundant harvest.  An engineer from the
agricultural cooperative tells the farmers how electrification, mechanization,
and cooperative agriculture have eliminated waste and labor shortage and
given the village a “spark” that it never had before.  Upon seeing this spread of
technology into the countryside, the worker suddenly realizes the importance
of his former job.  Farmers were employing the kinds of advanced machinery
that he helped produce to increase food production for themselves and the
nation.  Lathe operators at motor factories like him therefore really did have an
important role in improving the conditions of the countryside.  The worker
immediately rushes back to the factory.  The voice of the chief engineer
implores every person to do their part in their respective occupations to display
the total power of Japan.
Images race across the screen symbolizing the building of the new
Japan: coal flows on conveyer belts, trains speed across the horizon, boats
are furiously being built, fish are writhing in their nets.  The hard working faces
of people working with all their might in their respective vocations are shown.
The factory is alive with activity.  The workplace meetings come alive with
ideas as well.  The voices of various workers talk about how the meetings
have become useful for improving efficiency, rather than as just a venue for
complaints.  Headlines of the worker group newsletters flash across the
screen, announcing their monthly goals.  “The Foundation of Work is Order
and Arrangement!” “Let us Eliminate Waste in the Workplace!” “Turn Your
Ideas into Inventions!” An engineer and a worker are shown employing some179
new invention, which improves productivity.  Names of workers who have won
invention awards are displayed on the news board.
The final chapter of the film begins with the announcement of war with
the U.S. and Britain in 1941.  A worker reads a statement at a factory
assembly pledging to give everything to their work and to serve as “industrial
soldiers.” Hundreds of workers yell Banzai in response.  The next image is of
the morning sun bursting through the clouds and workers marching to work to
the tune of a war song.  The song compares the color of the rising sun to the
color of the sparks given off in their work shearing steel.  Their work is directly
connected to the “southern skies” and the “southern seas,” the song
continues.  The next images are from inside the factory, again to the tune of a
war song:
Listen to the booming of the dynamo!
The grinding of our steel-shearing tools!
Our precise parts are for this great holy war!
Come to life, oh engines!
Our nation’s power, 10,000 kilowatts!
With this fierce power,
Let us build the victory of tomorrow!
The creativity of our spark-emitting tools!
The power of our great nation!
This power, this glory,
Connects with our workplace!
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Her technology (engines, tools) is associated with spiritual and martial vigor,
as well as creativity and cooperation.  Technology is no longer alien and
uncooperativ but merges with human values and the national mission.
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The following scenes focus on the precise handiwork and skill of
shaping steel.  The rural worker is shown walking slowly on top of a revolving
water turbine shaping its speed ring.  His voice talks about the thousands of
ways there are to shape steel and the pleasure of finding one’s technique and
creating a fine speed ring.  This speed ring, he says, will eventually help
generate 10,000 kilowatts, which will advance the culture of East Asia and
defeat the US and British forces.  “This fine way of cutting—this is the path to
the new world order,” he adds.
86 The film shifts to the engineering office where
the chief engineer is rushing around busily while talking.  “We have to build
more water turbines for the newly occupied islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi,”
he says.
87  He receives several phone calls announcing the progress of
different parts of the generator.  The generator portion, housing unit, water
turbine, and end bracket are all on schedule or ahead of schedule.  Only the
shaft and the rotor are left.  The chief engineer tells the various section heads
to encourage their skilled workers to exert utmost care in shaping these very
difficult parts.
The next scene shows the chief engineer talking to the older lathe
operator, who is carefully shaping the shaft.  “The entire generator will revolve
around this shaft,” the announcer says.  “Not only the generator, but the new
Greater East Asia will revolve as well,” he adds.
88 Another skilled worker is
shown repeatedly shaving and measuring the rotor.  The shaft has to perfectly
fit into the rotor so every millimeter is important, the announcer says.  “The
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precision of one-one hundredth of a millimeter is the first step to winning the
Greater East Asian war,” another voice adds.
89
The next scene is set in the evening.  Strong lights illuminate the sides
of the workers’ faces looking on nervously as a blowtorch widens the rotor
hole ever so slightly.  The slightest mistake will ruin the entire generator, as
the shaft will not be able to fit into the rotor.  The shaft is gradually lowered into
the rotor by crane.  The work group heads, engineers, crane operator,
signalman, and assemblers are shown in tense cooperation.  “Hurry and lower
the shaft into the rotor while the hole is expanded from the heat! If it cools, the
hole will shrink, and the shaft can no longer be inserted or removed,” the
announcer shouts.
90 The shaft successfully fits into the rotor, to everyone’s
relief.
  The final scenes are of the test run.  The testing engineer climbs the
turbine as everyone looks on nervously.  The announcer says:
All of you who have battled millimeter by millimeter throughout the
night! All of you who have sheared one too many milimeters and
produced unusable parts! Are you watching today’s test? Today’s test
will show how your ability has been utilized, how much everyone has
cooperated, and whether you have the unashamed qualifications to be
the leaders of the East Asian peoples!
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The switch is turned on and the turbine begins to slowly turn.  The engineer
listens to the different parts as everyone holds their breath.  He hears
something abnormal and talks to the assembly foreman.  The engineers,
foreman, and workers spring into action fastidiously inspecting the problem
and dirtying themselves with oil and grease.  No malfunction, they signal.  The
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generator is re-started: thirty revolutions, fifty revolutions, one hundred
revolutions, the subtitles read.  The next image shows the testing engineer
and his assistant reading the meter.  The machine reaches maximum power,
emitting an enormous sound.  The testing engineer gives a satisfied nod—no
problems.  Everyone rejoices.  The film ends with a war song announcing that
the flag of Greater East Asia will be planted around a “blooming creativity” and
“blood-soaked war victories.”  Workers are building a new tomorrow, a brighter
future.  The final scene shows the “sun of imperial glory” gradually spreading
across a spinning globe in unison with the chorus.
V.  THE PRESENT BATTLE AND AIKAWA’S PHILOSOPHY OF
TECHNOLOGY
Technology in ‘The Present Battle’
The film abounds with themes and concepts that resonate directly with
Aikawa’s theory of technology as creativity, transformative praxis, and
cooperation.  In the beginning the factory is presented as large, impersonal,
overwhelming, and confusing.  It is a place of unresponsive and frequently idle
machinery, industrial accidents, uncontrollable processes, unusable engine
parts, and frustrated and bored workers.  Thus technology in the beginning
has a narrow meaning of the external, alien means of production.  Only when
the chief engineer introduces the new management principles does technology
take on broader meanings of spontaneity, cooperation, and responsibility.
Workers become responsible for their own work results and for improving their
own working conditions.  They are allowed to come up with their own
techniques and ways of handling machinery.  Creativity is recognized with183
invention awards.  The machines, conveyer belts, lathes, grinders,
blowtorches, and other machine tools burst into life, and they are infused with
a new productivity, efficiency, and precision.  Parts are manufactured far
ahead of schedule.  Mistakes and waste decrease.  New technologies,
techniques, and methods of organization are created and encouraged.  Thus
as the film proceeds, technology unites smoothly with the values of
responsibility, cooperation, and self-government as well as Japan’s war
objectives in East Asia.  These “technological values” even extend to the
countryside where technology becomes associated with cooperative
agriculture and a productive harvest, as the film portrays.
Technology also takes on aesthetic values in the film.  As evidenced in
one of the war songs during the film, industrial tools and machines exude
creativity and power, which will pave the way for victory and the construction
of East Asia.  The turbine, the speed ring, the rotor, and the shaft will not only
contribute to powering the entire generator but all of East Asia, says one of the
lathe operators.  Generators no longer simply produce electric power—they
will actually generate a new society and culture in East Asia as well (the
generators are destined for Sumatra and Sulawesi).  Even the shaving of one-
one hundredth of a millimeter from the shaft and the rotor hole has larger
meanings of victory and “cultural construction.” The test run of the generator at
the end of the film represents the culmination of the idea of technology as
spontaneity, creativity, and cooperation.  As the announcer says, everyone’s
technical ability, level of cooperation, and even “qualifications to guide East
Asia” are all being put to the test.  It is not simply the testing of yet another
generator to be supplied to the market.  In the final scene, the popular term,
“construction of East Asia” (Tôa kensetsu), is given concrete form as the184
cooperative, technical work of manufacturing the generator, which in turn will
form the foundation for building an advanced industrial economy and culture
throughout East Asia.
‘The Present Battle’ as Empty Propaganda?
The Present Battle is undoubtedly representative of many other
propaganda films during the war, and it twists the reality of industrial (and
rural) life and the actual effectiveness of industrial, technological organization
during the wartime.  The portrayal of industrial accidents, worker
dissatisfaction, and inefficiency, and the suggestions of rural poverty at the
beginning of the film illustrate some of the actual conditions.  Also, while state
mandated workplace associations and management initiatives to promote
responsibility in the end failed to sufficiently increase productivity and pacify
worker discontent, they laid the groundwork for post-war “Japanese-style
management” initiatives and forms of rule.
92 Moreover, as Andrew Gordon
writes:
[Effectiveness] should not be the standard by which to judge the
undeniable existence of a new structure of rule…However passively,
the people were instead linked to the state and the emperor through a
vast and expanding network of functional organs imposed upon them
by the state: youth groups, women’s groups, village and neighborhood
associations, Sanpô workplace associations, and agricultural and
industrial producers’ unions.
93
As I have argued, however, an essential aspect of this imposed “new structure
of rule” was its insistence on the spontaneity, creativity, practicality, and
cooperative nature of technology, which was propounded in all of the
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institutions Gordon mentions.  As Aikawa shows elsewhere, the invention
promotion programs portrayed in the film were actually implemented to some
degree at Hitachi, which went on to become one of Japan’s leading electronics
manufacturers in the post-war.
94 These invention promotion programs were
also part of a larger campaign announced in the Outline for a New Order of
Science and Technology to promote and mobilize scientific-technological
research, and to “cultivate a scientific spirit” through education and technical
training.  Thus while these institutions were indeed imposed, we should not
ignore how they tried to operate at the level of creativity, spontaneity, and
cooperation, which continued to be important values in Japan’s post-war
mobilization for rapid economic development.
The Aesthetic Technologies of ‘The Present Battle’
As we saw above, the filmmakers also mention that The Present Battle
was part of the state’s attempt to familiarize and de-alienate people from the
impersonal processes of heavy industry and technology for the war effort.
Therefore it is important to analyze the specific aesthetic techniques by which
they attempted to bring people closer to technology and its associated values
described above.  Moreover, we can catch a glimpse of what Aikawa meant by
the “neo-realist aesthetics” that he associates with technological culture,
whose primary vehicle was the bunka eiga.  The bunka eiga embodied
precision, scientificity, and reason, as well as feeling, imagination, and
inspiration towards action.  These are precisely the values that the multiple
technologies of society should ideally embody as well.  By analyzing Aikawa’s
notes on The Present Battle, we can concretely see what takes place in the
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construction of a more subjective, “cultural technology,” as well as how it
actually operates.
Aikawa not only sees himself as the main screenwriter, but also as a
prime example of the “productive critic” who is deeply involved in all aspects of
documentary production—the writing, filming, editing, music, subtitles, and so
on—in order to constantly improve it.
95  Like all technologies, the cultural
technology of the bunka eiga was a “means in process,” or in other words, a
unified complex of technologies such as sound, camera, editing, ethical,
educational, and aesthetic technologies that were constantly changing and
evolving.  This complex of technologies created a dynamic, tension between
“scientific” and “aesthetic” (or “conceptual”) elements, which depending on
their proper combination generated an aesthetically pleasing and ideologically
effective bunka eiga.
96 According to Aikawa, the critic’s role within the film
production process was to somehow synthesize the various scientific and
aesthetic technologies to create a pleasing and effective documentary.  After
production the critic must then discuss what went wrong and how things could
be improved so that better documentaries can be made in the future.  His
book, Theory of the Culture Film, is therefore a reflection on how scientific and
aesthetic technologies—the identity of which Benjamin said was one of the
“revolutionary functions of film”—were either effectively or ineffectively
synthesized in various documentary films.
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The Problem of the Epilogue
As we saw above, Aikawa was a fierce critic of “documentarism,” or the
belief that documentaries objectively represent reality.  Therefore many of his
critiques and comments of The Present Battle focus more on the need to add
the proper amount of “theatrical” elements to the film without overdoing it.  The
first problem of the film, according to Aikawa, was the epilogue.  When Aikawa
viewed a test reel during the filming, he had the following critical comments:
“Today in the aftermath of December 8
th, shouldn’t a bright feeling filled with
hope towards the rising dawn of the cultural construction of East Asia, and the
will of the resolute nation (minzoku) at its center at least come out in the
epilogue?”
97 “Bright,” “hope,” “will”—these could not be fully captured using
typical documentary film techniques, which are based on the assumption that
the camera passively records reality.  According to Aikawa, the existing
epilogue was too “mundane.”
98 After the “dramatic” and “mentally tense” test
run of the “record breaking generator” described above, the filmmakers
apparently ended on the following series of shots: a dam, water bursting out of
the dam’s holding tank, water flowing into a water turbine and being
transformed into electricity (to the tune of the ending song), a factory, a house,
and soldiers marching to the front.
99 For Aikawa the epilogue is the most
important part of the film, similar to the grand finale of an orchestra and the fall
of the curtain at a play.
100 It should synthesize all of the film’s chapters, “burn
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the main point of the film into the audience’s eyes,” and “leave suggestions for
the problems of life.”
101
As it was, however, the last series of shots were not able to fully
connect with the “environment within the workplace after December 8
th” or the
“feeling of national solidarity in each workplace and work area” previously
represented in the “smooth” run-up to the final, dramatic test run.
102 The
ending was characteristic of a science film—merely a dry series of images that
tell the audience where and how the electricity was being delivered to the war
front.  The important ideas of the film such as “national solidarity,”
“constructing East Asia” through dedication to one’s vocation, and exhibiting
“total power” through cooperation, self-responsibility, creativity, and
spontaneity—all of these did not fully come out in the epilogue.  Apparently the
filmmakers took Aikawa’s advice since the scenario does not mention the
above series of images.  It just ends with the test run and the final shot of the
sun rising over a revolving globe.
103 Aikawa was also not very happy with this
ending; however, in the spirit of the productive critic, he analyzes this difficult
problem and poses it as a challenge for future filmmakers.
104 He calls it the
problem of “turning thought into image.”
105
Turning Thought into Image
The process of “turning thought into image” is not merely the
transmission of information such as in a “boring national policy lecture,”
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Aikawa writes.
106 It is a creative, transformative act.  “The bunka eiga should
not merely swallow a ready-made thought but rather, the bunka eiga itself
must create the very image of this national guiding thought,” he adds.
 107 As
mentioned above, the bunka eiga is not a mere instrumental documenting of
reality but the creative excavation of something potential or dynamic within
reality through the active use of different cinematic and conceptual techniques.
The subjective, aesthetic aspects of film technology exhibited in the editing,
writing, camerawork, sound, and lighting should be creatively utilized to not
only bring out a new reality but more importantly, to stimulate and mobilize
subjects towards producing that very reality.  As he writes in Modern Theory of
Technology, the “mass transmissibility” and ability to forge new sensations
constitute the true potential of film technology.
108  According to Aikawa’s theory
of technology, technologies are “bodies of possibility” or dynamic combinations
of subjective goals and objective processes of realization that constantly
produce new realities.  Therefore the cultural technology of the bunka eiga is
no different.  It constitutes a dynamic combination of advanced material
technology and innovative aesthetic techniques that virtually produce another
reality within the viewer and potentially stimulate the viewer towards
constructing that reality in some way.
Interestingly, the films that best embodied such effective combination of
feeling and realism, science and aesthetics, according to Aikawa, were Sergei
Eisenstein’s The Old and the New (1929) and Fridrikh Ermler’s Counterplan
(1932).
109 Eisenstein’s film portrays the Russian peasantry’s struggle to
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collectivize and introduce modern agricultural technology.  Ermler’s film
describes a metals factory during the first Five Year Plan, and how the
workers transform themselves into “socialist human beings” who cooperatively
and efficiently manufacture engine parts for the new Soviet Union.  The
similarity between these propagandistic scenarios to that of The Present Battle
is quite striking and illustrates the revolutionary idealism or desire for a new
reality that infused bunka eiga at the time.  Japanese fascism had indeed
converged with Stalinist socialism.
110  In fact this revolutionary idealism infused
Aikawa’s entire theory of technology as well, particularly its emphasis on the
creativity, imagination, cooperation, and spontaneity embedded within
technology.
Representing the Integrated Nature of Technology
Aside from the pressing problem of “turning thought into image” at the
very heart of the bunka eiga is the problem of how to represent the
“integrated” nature of technology.
111 Aikawa originally suggested a locomotive
factory or shipbuilding yard because these fully displayed the organic yet
intricately differentiated process of heavy industrial production from steel
making to engine production.
112  Moreover, the “dynamic feeling of the docks
with its forest of cranes” and the “mass mobilization for the ‘going out to sea’
ceremony” made for exciting cinematic material.  However, they eventually
settled on the Hitachi generator plant because it represented a “productive life
sphere” that was just as organically complex but easier to capture on film
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because of its smaller scale.
113 It was also more representative of Japanese
heavy industry than a shipbuilding yard, according to Aikawa.
An inseparable part of the synthetic, integrated nature of production
technology was the “vertical” and “horizontal” solidarity of the engineers,
workers, and managers.
114 This solidarity, however, was not the typical top-
down type of factory organization, but possesses a “flexibility” due to its
system of workplace associations whereby workers are made to take
responsibility and come up with new ideas.  For the filmmakers, this
technological organization presented a “powerful miniature diagram” of
“national solidarity” as a whole.  The organically differentiated unity of the
technologically organized factory represented how all of Japan should be
organized as well.
However, the filmmakers needed to explicitly make this integrated link
between the factory and the rest of the nation.  The last thing they wanted to
produce was yet another specialized “factory film.” Thus they inserted the
scene where the worker from the countryside returns home only to find that his
village was prospering from the introduction of agricultural technology and
cooperative agriculture.  The message was that technological organization not
only occurs in the factory but also in the countryside.  Aikawa wanted to make
even more integrating links to the organization of urban consumers and the
organization of households into neighborhood associations.
115  In fact they
even filmed an epilogue that showed a “household of technology” (a
modernized household) and then the factory in an attempt to represent the
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technological links between the two.
116  However, they “reluctantly cut” the
scenes because they had trouble linking them with the film’s characters, and
they were afraid these would be too much of a diversion from the main
themes.
117 For Aikawa the lack of any representation of a synthetic connection
to city life was a major down point of the film.
118
Inserting “Theatrical Elements” into Film
The problem of inserting “theatrical elements” into bunka eiga came into
sharp relief when the filmmakers decided to focus a little on the lives and
characters of the chief engineer and two skilled workers in the film.  This, of
course, required the use of actors.  Aikawa was a firm believer in using actors
and inserting mini-narratives as part of producing “neo-realist” bunka eiga.
While very difficult to do successfully and convincingly, according to Aikawa,
“these methods are fine to use even in bunka eiga, when systematically
constructing facts that should be possible within reality.”
119 As we have seen,
Aikawa views reality as multiple technologies that are imbued with human
objectives.  Technologies are “means in process” going towards some
conception of “the possible.” This philosophy infuses his theory of the bunka
eiga as well and affects their very production.  In order to bring out the
“possible facts” within reality, the bunka eiga must not simply represent the
outside world but should actively intervene in it as well so that these “possible
facts” become clearer.  In making The Present Battle, they apparently filmed
several more elaborate scenes with actors and inserted more side-narratives
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as well in order to put color into the characters and their lives; however,
apparently these “failed.”
120 Aikawa is aware of the danger of the film
becoming an unconvincing, overly theatrical “factory story” by using such
“dangerous methods.”
121 However, he continues to encourage the producers
to find subtle, creative ways of dynamically representing the world without
overdoing it.
122
Constituting the Cinematic Flow
The cinematic form itself necessarily demands the creative use of
aesthetic techniques because of its temporal structure and nature, according
to Aikawa.  He writes, “The flow of the film is an art, and it should be called an
art of process.  ‘Continuity’…is the life of the film, and here a particular
construction is formed; therefore, montage also has a particular importance
here.”
123 The film is always a manufactured product, and it can never pretend
to be a simple reproduction of reality.  Instead of taking this type of deluded
stance, documentary filmmakers should focus on the innumerable aesthetic
and sensory possibilities of the cinematic form.  The constitution of the flow, in
particular, creates numerous possibilities and is essential to the construction of
the film.  He writes:
Film must have a temporal structure that is of a different dimension than
that of theater.  From the standpoint of ‘representation technology’
(enshutsu gijutsu), the theory of editing is decisive, and it must
emphasize what I call the spirit of flow or the spirit of process.  The
continuity formed by the montage is the basis of representation, and it
distinguishes film from theater as something particular to film.
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Therefore, in film, production and editing are the primary technologies,
while acting and filming are divided, and merely become technological
elements subordinate to them.  Recording, music, and even the
scenario at the basis of the film must also follow these decisive
technologies.
124
Aikawa calls editing and cinematic production or representation,
“technologies,” rather than arts or instrumental techniques.  Even acting,
filming, voice recording, music, and scenario writing are technologies, albeit
subordinate to editing and production.  In short, the film is a “synthesis of
technologies.” 
125 The filmmaker, however, should focus primarily on the flow
of the film through creative experimentation with editing and production
technologies since the flow or continuity is the very life of the film, which
determines its aesthetic effectiveness.
In The Present Battle, Aikawa was primarily interested in how to
effectively constitute a cinematic narrative that flows from negative to positive.
The filmmakers achieved this by first showing worker discontent and industrial
accidents, and an overall “dull sensation” within the factory.  The transition
point from negative to positive occurs when the skilled worker returns to his
village only to witness the introduction of electric technology and cooperative
agriculture there.  In the conclusion, the film shows the awakening of a “spirit
of solidarity” and the coming to life of the entire factory.  Yet the production of
a simplistic linear narrative from negative to positive does not necessarily
guarantee effectiveness, according to Aikawa.  Another challenge the
filmmakers faced was to also insert historical time into the film.  How can the
continuity of the film capture the “zig-zag development” of history in the form of
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a “process,” Aikawa asks?
126 The film covered the period from the China
Incident in 1937 to Pearl Harbor in 1942.  In between these events, there was
the total mobilization for the “Advanced National Defense State” and the
beginning of the war with China.  When the film was released, Japan had
already invaded much of Southeast Asia.  The filmmakers wanted to make the
film more realistic by somehow capturing the excitement and punctuality of
unexpected historical events within a continuous temporal structure.
127  Thus
they presumably inserted the scene of a worker assembly right after Pearl
Harbor, and they kept associating the workers with the battlefront and the
“cultural construction of East Asia.” Editing and production technologies
allowed filmmakers to experiment with ways of representing these different
temporalities.  For example, Aikawa keeps emphasizing the montage as an
editing technology that allows for the representation of the related
temporalities of the workers and of historical events.
128
Music and Narration
Although editing was one of the primary technologies used for creating
cinematic temporality, it was not the only one.  As we saw above, acting and
the insertion of theatrical interludes were other techniques.  Aikawa also
focuses on the use of music and the announcer.  Just as too much acting and
too many theatrical interludes can be detrimental to the film, so can the
excessive use of music and announcements.  Aikawa particularly does not like
the use of narration or subtitles because these kill the aesthetic effect of the
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image due to their “conceptual nature.”
129 Bunka eiga should rather have more
music instead because this brings out the “scenery, the ups and downs, and
the flow.”
130 Documentary filmmakers should emphasize the “cinematic
language” of the film through editing, filming, acting, and so on, rather than
overtly inserting conceptual language through narration.
131  The Present Battle
suffered from too much narration, particularly toward the end.  Aikawa
preferred the “symphonic flow” of the series of factory images at the beginning
of the film.
132 While he recognizes that narration is unavoidable in
documentaries, he urges filmmakers to further explore cinema’s other
aesthetic technologies.
‘The Present Battle’ as an Instance of Aikawa’s Broader Theory of
Technology
Thus in the making and subject matter of The Present Battle, we catch
a glimpse of how Aikawa’s ideal world of an organic complex of dynamic
technologies actually worked on the ground.  First, we see some of the
problems in the engine factory that is supposedly at the forefront of Japanese
technology and worker innovation (i.e. Hitachi).  For example, there is
desertion, injury and death from industrial accidents, carelessness resulting in
waste and unusable parts, lack of organization and communication between
sections, boredom and disgruntlement among workers, and very little
innovation on the factory floor.  While in the end the film shows how
management technologies such as holding regular workplace meetings,
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developing invention promotion programs, devolving responsibility, and
instilling a higher sense of purpose corrected these problems, we nevertheless
see some of the very real problems and latent conflicts that helped bring about
the introduction of such management technologies.  The main point of
Aikawa’s society of technology, however, is that these problems never pose a
lethal threat to the system, but can always be managed through the operation
of newer technologies, as suggested in the movie.
Second, we see the problems involved in the very making of the film or
within the “cultural technology” itself.  Far from being the smooth operation of
various technologies of editing, acting, lighting, directing, and camerawork, the
filmmakers faced many different problems.  They struggled to make a dramatic
epilogue that powerfully captured the ideals of national solidarity and “cultural
construction”; they had trouble representing the organic connection between
the world of the factory and the world of urban consumption or family life, for
example; they experimented with actors and side-narratives, resulting in
forced, artificial scenes; they tried to combine the different temporalities of the
worker and the unexpected historical event using montage and editing
techniques, often creating a clumsy cinematic flow; they used music and
narration abundantly, sometimes killing the aesthetic effect through too many
announcements.  Similar to factory production, film production was a messy
combination of aesthetic and material technologies involving the immense
cooperation of many people.  While mistakes abounded, the end result was a
complex cultural product that served an important role in illustrating the
permeation of technology throughout life, and encouraging the technological
ideals of cooperation, creativity, responsibility, and praxis among the
populace.  The mistakes instead posed challenges for future filmmakers to198
develop new aesthetic technologies to produce even better bunka eiga, and
ultimately, new cultural forms.  Like the interaction of technologies in Aikawa’s
social system as a whole, the many technologies involved in film production—
while messy and conflict-ridden—would eventually manage whatever problem
arose.
Asano, the screenwriter, confirms most of the above difficulties involved
in making the film that Aikawa mentions.  He also emphasizes the overall goal
of concretely expressing the abstract ideal of “national solidarity” through the
microcosm of the high-tech factory and the ideals it exhibits—the
interpenetration of technology and the lives of the workers, technology and
creativity, technical cooperation between specialized occupations, and the
organic links between the factory and other parts of society such as the
countryside.
133 Through the prism of heavy industrial technology and worker
life, the entire film was an attempt to make people understand “national
solidarity” as present in all aspects of everyday life, according to Asano.
134
Thus it was necessary for the filmmakers to spend ten to twenty consecutive
days meeting with the managers, workers, and engineers, visiting their
houses, and drinking with them in order to get a feel for their everyday lives.
135
The entire production itself took two years.  This constant interaction with the
Hitachi employees apparently led the filmmakers to incorporate some of the
negative aspects of factory life into the film, according to Asano.
136 Thus the
production was not entirely propagandistic and fictional.
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In addition to presenting microcosms of Aikawa’s society of technology
at work, The Present Battle also displayed a range of aesthetic technologies
that if done well, could potentially mobilize people to adopt some of the values
of the society of technology (e,g, rational organization, creativity, cooperation,
praxis).  Ending with a tension-filled scene of the engineers, workers, and
managers working together to test the generator instead of ending with a
generic series of images showing how their work eventually produces energy;
using actors such as the chief engineer and the rural worker to personalize the
film’s themes; experimenting with montage to produce different temporalities
that go from “negative to positive” or that could capture the punctuality and
excitement of the outbreak of war; stringing together very different images
such as the countryside and factory to make abstract ideals such as “national
solidarity” more concrete; taking away unnecessary narration so as not to
upset the aesthetic effect of the images themselves and using more music to
bring out more feeling.  All of these “neo-realist” technologies of filming, acting,
editing, sound, and writing were designed to appeal to mass sensation in a
way that books, speeches, and “objective” documentaries could not.  In this
way, technology takes on a meaning as more than instrumental machinery
and tools, and more of an immaterial sense of the techniques that immediately
shape human sensation and subjectivity.  Aikawa was always interested in the
more subjective “cultural technologies” of film because of their closeness to
everyday mass sensation.  They best exhibited his theory of how technology
has come to productively permeate and saturate life in its entirety.  Ultimately,
however, these cultural technologies sought to mobilize collective expression
for the establishment of a New Order in East Asia, which promised an end to
class, ethnic, and social conflict some time in the future.  As such, they200
therefore worked to prevent the politicization of mass subjectivity towards
transforming property relations and other relations of subordination in the
present as Benjamin envisioned, and as we shall see later, Nakai as well.
VI.  THE RECEPTION OF THE PRESENT BATTLE
Critical Reception
The critical response to The Present Battle was mixed; however, the
critics recognized the difficulty of concretely capturing the ideals of “cultural
construction of East Asia” and “national solidarity” on film.  In the leading film
magazine, Film Report (Eiga Junpô), Ôtsuka Kyôichi praised the filmmakers’
effort to represent national solidarity through the specific situation of a factory
and its attempts at technical reorganization.
137 However, on the whole, he
considered the film a failure for several reasons.  First, the acting was
unrealistic and forced, and the voice narrations of the characters seemed
artificial.  The scenes at the beginning of the various problems occurring at the
factory were much more effective, he writes.
 138  Second, the scene trying to
connect the engine factory with technological development and cooperative
agriculture in the countryside was unnatural, as were the quick succession of
images of running trains, trees being cut down, and fish writhing in nets as a
way to connect the factory with other forms of economic activity.
139 Instead of
feebly trying to show solidarity and technological connectivity with various
parts of society, the film should have just focused more thoroughly on workers
using their creativity on the shop floor or on their different forms of
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cooperation, Ôtsuka writes.
140 Only at the end of the film should the creative
solidarity of the factory workers be shown to spill out to the rest of the country.
Instead the film haphazardly showed different types of technical solidarity
thereby weakening the theme as a whole.  More focus on the particular
workers and the factory would have been more effective, according to
Ôtsuka.
141 He also thought that the epilogue depicting the test run did not flow
well with the rest of the film.
142  Yet he conceded that The Present Battle was
an important first step in the difficult task of concretizing abstract concepts
such as “national solidarity,” and more importantly, that the heavy industrial
factory was an excellent choice of location to do this.
143
Another critic, Ueno Kôzô, also called The Present Battle an important
film that stood out from hundreds of other bunka eiga due to its ambitious task
of trying to communicate national solidarity in an aesthetically sophisticated
manner.
144 However, the task of representing all types of national solidarity
within one film was too much for the “young genre” of bunka eiga, according to
Ueno.
145 Like Ôtsuka, he also found the attempts to link the solidarity within
the factory to other areas such as the countryside through the trope of
technology unconvincing.  The scene where the worker goes back to the
countryside had the feeling of a “forced sermon,” and it did not directly link the
particular engine factory to the actual technology and work of the peasants.
146
The technologies used in both places were only abstractly linked.  The
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filmmakers should have just focused on the different forms of solidarity within
the factory, and let the viewer make the connections to other parts of society,
Ueno writes.
147 Or they should have made a more abstract film dealing with
solidarity in different parts of Japanese society.  Mixing both abstract and
concrete concepts did not work very well, according to Ueno.
148  Other
problems included too many fantastic and dramatic camera shots from the
crane without any more mundane shots leading up to it, and a discontinuity in
the narrative between the former and latter portion of the film.  Aside from this,
however, the camerawork, scenario writing, editing, and insertion of
announcements and music showed great skill and innovation.
149 The Present
Battle was a film that should definitely be questioned and debated more, he
concludes.
150
Ticket Sales and Popular Context
The Present Battle was released on the same date as one of the most
popular films of the wartime period—Nihon Eigasha’s two-part film Malayan
War Front: A Record of the March Onward (Marê senki: shingeki no kiroku)
and Malayan War Front: The Birth of Shônan Island (Marê senki: Shônan tô
tanjô).  This bunka eiga dramatically captured the Japanese army’s rapid
advance through Malaysia and capture of Singapore in 1942.  The film is
famous for its shot of the meeting between General Yamashita Tomoyuki and
Lieutenant General Arthur Percival to negotiate the surrender of Singapore.
By running the camera slower to emphasize their facial expressions and bodily
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movements, the filmmakers made Yamashita look vigorous and forceful, and
Percival look weak and obsequious.
151 The film also shows footage of soldiers
marching through muddy terrain and building bridges, speeding tanks and
soaring fighter airplanes, and thousands of prisoners of war watching the
Japanese army march into the city.
152  It grossed around 700,000 yen, more
than twice what the filmmakers expected.
153 The fact that a bunka eiga or
documentary grossed this much made it all the more remarkable.  The fiction
film, The Song of the Eight Maidens (Yaotome no uta, 1942), which ran along
with The Present Battle during the week of August 27, 1942, only made
280,000 yen.  One commentator called this overtaking of a feature film by a
documentary an outrage to the film world, and wrote that this should serve as
a wake up call for those making traditional feature films.
154 While the demand
for war footage fueled much of the film’s popularity, one cannot deny that the
documentary aesthetic was also beginning to overtake traditional fiction film.
Young Soldiers of the Sky (Sora no Shinpei, 1942), a bunka eiga released one
week later about a young boy’s training to become an air force pilot, also
managed to gross more than other feature films.
155 Thus it was quite obvious
to many that the more realistic, hard-edged quality of the documentary film
was beginning to dominate public culture.  In this sense, The Present Battle
was released to an audience already receptive to the bunka eiga form.
While many people perhaps went to watch the feature film, The Song of
the Eight Maidens, The Present Battle was nevertheless seen along with it by
                                                   
151 Nornes, 88.
152 The film is available at Waseda University Library.
153 Kiyomizu Chiyoda, “Geki eiga no bujoku kiroku,” (An Insulting Record for a Fiction Film),
Eiga junpô, (October 1, 1942):3.  Nornes, 88.
154 Kiyomizu, 3.
155 Ibid., 3.204
a relatively large number of people, raking in 106,705.71 yen during its first
week in eleven major Tokyo theaters.
156 Ticket prices in Tokyo ranged from 46
sen to 1.11 yen for first class tickets.
157 This means that around 231,968
people viewed the film if we divide the gross revenue by the lowest ticket price
of 46 sen.  A more realistic figure would probably be around 200,000 people,
taking into account the varying ticket prices at each movie theater.  Malay War
Record, which it was competing with, earned more than twice as much at
264,831.99 yen during the first week.
158 Using the same very rough calculation
method, this means that around 500,000 people in Tokyo viewed this film.
The statistics were comparable in other major cities such as Yokohama,
Kyoto, Nagoya, and Fukuoka—around twice as many people saw Malay War
Record than The Present Battle.
159 Glancing at statistics for other movies
during 1942, The Present Battle can be said to have done averagely.  But
given the unusual circumstances where bunka eiga were outperforming
feature films, we can surmise that more and more people were indeed paying
attention to them.
Popular Effectiveness of ‘The Present Battle’
Judging from the critical response then, it is clear that people
recognized the different aesthetic techniques used by the filmmakers and
viewed the film as an important landmark in the development of the bunka
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eiga genre.  However, the techniques of representing national solidarity
through technology were largely unconvincing to the critics, who were more
interested in the particular organization and solidarity within the factory itself.
The film can be said to have been somewhat effective since it engendered
some interest in the technical workings and organization of an engine factory,
and made people think about representing society through the paradigm of the
technical factory.  Moreover, the fact that the critics recognized some of the
techniques of the filmmakers and acknowledged their importance showed that
they were engaged with the themes and techniques of the film.  Obviously, the
film was not just another typical bunka eiga, even though it was not entirely
convincing.
While it is very difficult to truly know the popular effectiveness of the
film, it is clear that a significant number of people watched it.  Its release
during the month where two other bunka eiga outperformed traditional fiction
films almost guaranteed that people were paying some attention to The
Present Battle as well.  The “neo-realist” documentary aesthetic dominated the
public sphere and had a very receptive audience.  While the events of the war
and state patronage probably helped generate some of the enthusiasm for the
documentary form, we cannot totally rule out the effectiveness and popularity
of the genre itself.  As mentioned before, many popular fiction films such as
Akira Kurosawa’s The Most Beautiful also incorporated documentary
aesthetics.  Thus bunka eiga such as The Present Battle can be said to have
contributed to spreading a certain techno-aesthetic among the people.  For
Aikawa, this aesthetic of the bunka eiga was one of the most effective ways of
spreading the technological values of creativity, cooperation, practical206
involvement, and rationality necessary to build the imperial society of
technology.
VII.  CONCLUSION
For Aikawa, “reproductive art” revolutionized human sensation and held
multiple possibilities for popularizing culture and enabling mass expression.
Documentaries or bunka eiga in particular represented one of the highest
forms of cultural expression of modern technological society, according to him.
Their mixture of scientific precision and rationality along with creative aesthetic
techniques of editing, lighting, and sound, for example, helped create a
dynamic technological sensation among the people, and encouraged
technological values of organization, innovation, and scientific rationality as
well.  Through the continuous development of newer cinematic technologies
and innovative aesthetic techniques, “neo-realism” would become the
predominant aesthetic in society, helping to mobilize the diverse energies of
the people for the war effort and the “cultural construction of East Asia.” Like
the other technologies that constituted society, “neo-realist” cultural
technologies such as the bunka eiga fused subjective, ethical intent with
objective processes and practices, according to Aikawa.  For example, The
Present Battle fused the goal of encouraging important technological values of
responsibility, creativity and organization with evolving technologies of filming,
editing, script writing, and acting in an attempt to proliferate those values
among the people.
While we clearly see suggestions of the failure of technical values in the
content of the film, as well as the failure of aesthetic technologies in Aikawa’s
description of its production, we are still presented with two microcosms of his207
broader theory of technology at work—the integrated complex of management
and industrial technologies of the engine factory and the complex of aesthetic
and material technologies that constitute the overall cultural technology of the
bunka eiga.  In these technological microcosms, we see how various
technologies worked together in producing certain values and sensations
conducive to the war effort.  Thus technology in wartime Japan entailed more
than just the production of war machines and materials, but the very
production and mobilization of diverse national subjects through economic,
political, administrative, and as shown by this chapter, cultural technologies as
well.  This mobilization and production through multiple technologies in turn
tried to co-opt and obliterate all other forms of political practice that threatened
to challenge the formation of an “organic,” total-war system.208
CHAPTER FOUR
PARA-EXISTENTIAL FORCES OF INVENTION: NAKAI MASAKAZU’S
THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM
I. INTRODUCTION
Re-envisioning Technology in Prewar and Wartime Japan
“Technology” in 1930s Japan not only meant tools, machines and
objective techniques of production, but also included a practical, subjective
and ethical dimension as well.
1 To give an example, the Kyoto School
philosopher/state ideologue, Miki Kiyoshi wrote in his 1938 essay, Gijutsu
Tetsugaku (Philosophy of Technology), “Technology is the act of making
things.  The common essence of technology is to make things, whatever they
may be, whether they are tools, machines, mental and bodily forms, social
systems or ideas.”
2 Technology was equated with all kinds of creation and
                                                   
1 See Koschmann, 139-172 and Iwasaki Minoru, “Desire for a Poietic Metasubject: Miki
Kiyoshi’s Technology Theory,” in Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Narita
Ryuichi, eds., Total War and ‘Modernization,’ (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program,
1998), 159-180.
2 Miki Kiyoshi.  “Gijutsu tetsugaku” [Philosophy of Technology] in Miki Kiyoshi zenshû (The
Collected Works of Miki Kiyoshi),  (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966-68), 7:220 (hereinafter
referred to as MKz).  Miki’s idea of technology as concrete activity has its roots in both the
philosophy of Nishida Kitarô, Heidegger’s phenomenology, and Marxism.  A key concept of
Nishida philosophy is what he later summed up as kôiteki chokkan (active intuition), which
designates what might come before or after the subject—“subject” as ecstatic, transformative
poiesis that is the complete annihilation of any reserve which can posture as an autonomous,
rational, or transcendental subject beyond the concrete, singular expressions of bodily
existence in the world.  Nishida devotes hundreds of pages in trying to articulate this idea of
“subject” as poiesis, which I cannot do justice to here; however the essays, “Kôiteki chokkan”
and “Ronri to seimei” [Logic and Life] are a good place to start for more on this thought, which
clearly influenced Miki’s wide definition of technology as production of all aspects of life,
including the subject itself.  However, many people—particularly Marxists–criticized Nishida’s
philosophy as idealist or mystical.  Miki himself turned to Marxism, helped found the Japanese
Communist Party-supported Purorataria Kagaku Kenkyûjo [Association for Research in
Proletarian Science] in 1929, an organization of Marxist intellectuals from different fields
dedicated to a historical-materialist understanding of society, and he wrote for the journal209
production; not only economic but scientific, cultural, intellectual, and
institutional production, and even the production of citizens and subjects as
well.  Many intellectuals looked at technology not simply as machines for
building a modern infrastructure, increasing wartime munitions production and
developing natural resources, but also as encompassing creativity and
imagination, inter-subjectivity and self-creation, sensuous being and existence,
and socially transformative action as well.
3 In sum technology did not merely
                                                                                                                                                     
Purotaria kagaku (Proletariat Science).  Miki also published a translation of Part One of Karl
Marx’s The German Ideology in 1930 for Iwanami.  His essays during this period share Marx’s
rooting of all thought and production in the concrete, practical nature of human existence.  For
example, see  “Ningengaku no Marukusuteki Keitai” [The Marxist Form of Anthropology] in
MKz, vol. 3, 5-41.  Thus through an engagement with Marx’s early works, Miki further
developed a practical notion of technology that was different from the conventional
understanding of technology as material means of production.
3 The origins of this wider discourse of technology are, of course, not just philosophical but lie
elsewhere as well, such as in the spread of Fordism, Taylorism and scientific management in
the face of massive labor unrest; the influential technocracy movement among engineers and
industrialists in the United States; the rapid building of a “proletariat culture” based on heavy
industry and technology in the Soviet Union; and the German discourse around technology in
the early 20
th century, which equated technology with culture and self-creation.
For more on the history of Taylorism in Japan, see Tsutsui.
For an overview of the technocracy movement in Japan, see Ôyodo Shôichi, Gijutsu kanryô
no seiji sankaku:Nihon no kagaku gijutsu gyôsei no makuaki [The Political Participation of
Technology Bureaucrats: The Beginnings of the Japanese Science-Technology
Administration] (Tokyo: Chuô Kôronsha, 1997).
Yuibutsuron Kenkyû [Research on Materialism], the journal of the research group of the same
name closely covered the rapid industrialization plans of the Soviet Union, Soviet aesthetics
and science, as well as debates surrounding technology occurring there.  In fact the journal
was the site of the “Gijutsuron ronsô” (debate on the theory of technology) among leftist
intellectuals such as Aikawa Haruki, Oka Kunio, Tosaka Jun and Nagata Hiroshi in the early
1930s.  This debate focused on the potential for revolutionary change of technology, which
hinged on its definition: was technology merely the neutral “system of the means of
production” whose productive power the proletariat instrumentally seize in order to build the
socialist society or did technology also include the various subjective, creative energies and
techniques of the people as well? The former view was the dominant, mechanistic Marxist
view of technology as the benchmark for the specific mode of production of a society (feudal,
capitalist, socialist), which in turn is reflected in culture, institutions and ideology.  The latter
view, however, roots the irreducible creative energies of the proletariat in their multi-faceted,
sensuous negotiations with their environment, which has been so permeated by modern
technology so as to affect the very way they interact with and change society. Thus this view
suggests that technology is not just neutral machines and processes that need to be seized
for revolutionary change but also need to be radically changed themselves in accordance with
the multiple, creative “technics” of the masses, since technology itself is not neutral and is an
integral part of capitalist management.  See Nakamura, Shima, and Kozai Yoshishige, Senjika210
refer to an external reality of automated and impersonal machines,
mechanisms, structures, and systems but also to the very existential
comportment of human beings in the modern world—what the philosopher,
Don Ihde, aptly describes as the “existential technics” of sensuous praxis and
creation amidst a world saturated by technology.
4
In fact with the outbreak of the China-Japan War in 1937, many
intellectuals and “reform bureaucrats” (kakushin kanryô) actively envisioned
the construction of a “New Order in East Asia” based on a wider notion of
technology as including human will and the production of all areas of life.  In
different ways, they incorporated a wider idea of technology as the basic
framework for society and fundamental comportment of human subjectivity
into their plans for constructing a modern, self-sufficient, rational, and non-
capitalist community in East Asia.
5  Such a community would both fulfill the
                                                                                                                                                     
no yuibutsuronja-tachi [The Materialists of the Wartime Period] (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1982).
For more on the “instrumentalist,” “substantive,” and “critical” theory of technology, see
Feenberg, 3-20.
The idea of technology as encompassing all creative and productive work also had its origin in
German philosophies of technology.  Eduard von Mayer, Eberhard Zschimmer, Friedrich
Dessauer, Werner Sombart, and Martin Heidegger are only some of the thinkers involved in
what Dessauer later called the Streit um die Technik (struggle over technology) in the early
twentieth century.  Most of these works were read and cited by Japanese intellectuals, and
even translated into Japanese.  For an introduction to this thought in Germany as well as
similar intellectual trends in the West, see Härd and Jamison.  For an overview of how
German thinkers on technology easily reconciled an ultra-nationalist romanticism with
technological rationality, see Herf.  For an introduction to Heidegger’s thinking on technology
and his project of establishing an alternate metaphysics, see Michael Zimmerman Heidegger’s
Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990).
4 Don Ihde, Existential Technics, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).  Taking
a cue from Lewis Mumford’s Technics and ______ series, Ihde uses the term “technics” rather
than “technology” or “technique” because the term “technology” only captures the “hardware”
meaning of technology rather than the practical one, while the term “technique” is too abstract
and can refer to any set action without a material referent.  See Ihde, Ibid., 1.
5 For an introduction in English to some of these renovationist bureaucrats who emphasized
the creative, spiritual and cultural aspects of technology and their efforts to propagate an
ethics of technology as the basis for a “New Order for Science and Technology” in East Asia,
see Mimura, “Technology Bureaucrats,” 97-116.  See also Kawahara and Furukawa, “Shôwa
senchûki.” While the above works on these officials in the Kôain (Asian Development Board)211
imperialist, wartime goals of Japan while simultaneously thriving upon the
multiple, creative, technological energies of its people.  Thus they worked
toward a fascism that was not merely the use of overt violence, repression and
exploitation to control all aspects of life but also the employment of techniques
to mobilize human creative energy and desire towards the production of active
subjects in service of the state and empire.
6
However, despite the context of a growing militarism and imperial
fascism in the 1930s, which often appropriated these discourses of technology
as practical, sensuous activity into technocratic visions of a hyper-productive
society or justifications for a brutal Japanese imperialism, they did not
inherently lead to such complicity.  Other notions recognizing the potential of
“mass technology” to challenge Japanese fascism and the growing wartime
rationalization of society by transforming human sensation and subjectivity
towards social change or critique existed during this period.
7
                                                                                                                                                     
and Kikakuin (Cabinet Planning Board) emphasize their ideas and policies of creating a
technocratic, imperialist order in East Asia through the rule of elite, “creative” engineers and
experts, they do not delve into the wider discourse of technology as active, subjective
production of all areas of life, which informs their thought and policy.
6 I characterize fascism not only as the employment of power, violence and force for political
ends, the spiritualist promotion of a unified, organic community over the individual or a
multiplicity of groups, and the rejection of class struggle, parliamentary politics, and capitalism,
but also as the active mobilization of the creative energies of the people to revolutionize the
social order.  For more on such rational techniques by government and civic leaders in Japan
to integrate women, students, workers, and others into larger groups, make them adopt
scientific methods, and settle conflicts under the purview of state institutions, for example, see
Yamanouchi, “Total War and Mobilization.” Thus I disagree with the modernization school of
thought represented by thinkers such as Maruyama Masao who characterize Japanese
fascism narrowly as the repression of subjective freedom and the failure to develop a moral,
private sphere separate from the state.  Maruyama therefore focuses on the so-called
particular characteristics of Japanese fascism such as emperor-centered familialism and
agrarianism, and ignores the many efforts by bureaucrats and intellectuals to incorporate and
mobilize “active and free subjectivity” into the imperial project itself, many of which are
continuous with post-war Japanese efforts by many of the same people to create a
“democratic” and prosperous Japan.  See Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-
Nationalism” and “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism,” 1-24 and 25-83.
7 For example, see Tosaka, 231-297.212
Nakai Masakazu’s Theory of Technology and Critique of Japanese
Society
This essay will look at the thought and practice of one such
philosopher/aesthetician, Nakai Masakazu, from 1929 until his arrest in 1937.
I choose Nakai for two reasons.  First, he develops a wider notion of
technology as sensuous, creative activity that avoids the pitfalls of similar
discourses of technology that equate the productive, technological subject with
the mobilized subject of Japan’s total war system in East Asia.  He does so by
developing concepts such as the “projective structure of consciousness,” the
inventive “middle,” “technological time,” the new sensorial formations” of film,
and the “bodily technologies” of sports.  In various ways, these concepts seek
to highlight and stimulate the critical, transformative, technological energies of
the masses themselves, which were increasingly subject to ultra-nationalist
ideologies and technocratic efforts by the Japanese state to organize all
aspects of life.
8 By looking at Nakai’s thought on technology, I seek to show an
alternative to both ultra-nationalist and technocratic discourses of technology,
productivity, and mobilization during the 1930s.  While the Japanese state
attempted to absorb the political energies of the people within the
technological imaginary, Nakai and others attempted to show the utter
impossibility of stamping out the inventive, creative forces that contradicted or
departed from that imaginary.
Secondly, I choose Nakai since his object of critique is neither just an
irrational, ultra-nationalist fascism nor the complete technocratic, rational
                                                   
8 I am using “ultra-nationalism” to describe the emperor worshipping, agrarian, and spiritualist
ideologies of the far right in Japan during this period, which Maruyama sees as the principal
characteristic of Japanese fascism.  See Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-
Nationalism.” “Technocratic efforts” describes the rational techniques of Japanese fascism
used to mobilize active popular participation.213
reorganization of society for maximum productivity, but also the very
foundation of these two social tendencies—capitalism and the logic of profit
itself.  In the context of an increasingly violent, emperor-centered fascism, and
efforts by technocrats, intellectuals and businessmen to re-organize society for
war, Nakai instead focused more on the “specialization” and “commodification”
of human beings under capitalism, as well as on how these subvert the
possibility for radical critique and social transformation.  Rather than just
looking at techniques and technologies of maximizing worker performance or
at spiritualist ideologies of mobilization, Nakai’s critique of capitalism highlights
other ways by which the creative, technological energies of the people were
restrained and managed.  His insistence on the central role of capitalism in
fascism adds another dimension to our understanding of the disciplinary
techniques of Japanese fascism.  He suggests that the technological
imaginary of the state and capital was not something particular to fascism but
something broadly characteristic of capitalist societies at the time.  Thus, in
order to criticize that imaginary, it was necessary to understand some of the
cultural dynamics of capitalism as well.214
II.  HISTORICAL PROFILE
9
Nakai and the “Aesthetics and Critique” Group
Nakai entered the philosophy department of Kyoto Imperial University in
1922 and studied aesthetics under Fukada Yasukazu, one of the founders of
the discipline.  After finishing his thesis on Kant’s Critique of Judgment in
1925, he stayed on as a graduate student and served as editor of the journal
Tetsugaku Kenkyû (Research in Philosophy), one of Japan’s leading
philosophy journals, for several years.  During this period, he attended the
classes of famous Kyoto School philosophers such as Nishida Kitarô, Tanabe
Hajime, Hatano Seiichi, and Kuki Shuzô.  His classmates included other well-
known philosophers such as Miki Kiyoshi, Tosaka Jun, Watsuji Tetsurô,
Nishitani Keiji, and Kôsaka Masaaki.
10 Continuing his high school passion for
sports, he was also an active member of the university’s crew team, often
serving as coxswain, which is clearly evident in his later essays on modern
sports.  During this period, he not only studied the works of classical
philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel) but was also
exposed to contemporary movements in European philosophy such as neo-
                                                   
9 For overall biographical information, I have consulted Kinoshita Nagahiro, “Nakai Masakazu
no ikikata” (“Nakai Masakazu’s Way of Life”) in Kinoshita Nagahiro, Nakai Masakazu: atarashii
“bigaku” no kokoromi [Nakai Masakazu: An Experiment towards a New “Aesthetics”], (Tokyo:
Riburopôto, 1995), 119-193. See also Fujita Teiji, “‘Bi Hihyô,’ ‘Sekai Bunka,’ ‘Doyôbi’ no tanjô:
Nakai Bigaku no Shûhen 2” [The Origin of ‘Aesthetics and Critique,’ ‘World Culture,’ and
‘Saturday’] in Nakai Masakazu Geppô 2 [Nakai Masakazu Monthly Bulletin 2] in Nakai
Masakazu zenshû [The Collected Works of Nakai Masakazu] (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha,
1981), vol. 2, hereafter referred to as NMz.
10  He was particularly close to Miki and Tosaka.  See Nakai Masakazu, “Miki to Kosei” [Miki
and Individuality], NMz 1:339-343, and Nakai, “Tosaka-kun no Tsuioku” (“Recollections of
Tosaka”) in NMz 1:344-48.  For Nakai’s reflections on his time as editor of Tetsugaku Kenkyû,
see Nakai, “Kaiko jûnen: omoiizuru mama ni” [Ten Years in Retrospect: As I Recall it] in NMz
1:349-356.215
Kantianism (Herman Cohen, Heinrich Rickert, Ernst Cassirer),
phenomenology (Adolf Reinach, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Oskar
Becker), and Marxism (Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Georg Lukacs).
As a graduate student in aesthetics and philosophy at Kyoto Imperial
University in 1930, Nakai organized a small research group of young
intellectuals and artists interested in the contemporary mass aesthetics of
modern technology as manifested worldwide in film, photography, radio,
architecture, print, and design, for example.  By this time, of course, Japan
already had a thriving mass media centered on film, radio, magazines and
newspapers, as well as an urban consumer culture of department stores,
large-scale advertising, cafes, bars, restaurants, movie theaters, concert halls,
sports stadiums, and entertainment districts.  Together, this group published
the monthly journal, Bi Hihyô (Aesthetics and Critique) from 1930 to 1934,
which engaged with contemporary European modernist trends such as
Surrealism, Bauhaus, Neue Sachlichkeit (neo-objectivism), montage film
theory, reportage literature, and Russian avant-garde film, among others.
11  It
was here that Nakai published many of his essays on the sensation and
subjectivity of mass technological modernity, and “technological beauty and
time” as manifested in film, music, drama and literature.  In 1932, Nakai and
another member of the group, Tsujibe Masatarô, worked with the composer-
violinist Kishi Tatsushi, Andô Haruzô (engineer at Asahi’s Osaka Planning
                                                   
11 Bi Hihyôsha, Bi hihyô fukuseiban [“Aesthetics and Critique” Reprint Edition] (Tokyo: Waseda
Daigaku Toshokan).  For a general introduction to the journals and magazines Nakai was
involved in, see Hirayabashi Hajime, “’Bi hihyô,’ ‘Sekai bunka,’ to ‘Doyôbi:’ Chishikijin to
shomin no teikô” (‘Aesthetics and Critique,’ ‘World Culture,’ and ‘Saturday:’ Intellectuals and
Mass Resistance) in Senjika teikô no kenkyû I: kiriutosha jiyûshugisha no bâi [Research on
Wartime Resistance I: The Case of Christians and Liberals], (Tokyo: Misuzu shobô, 1978).
For a treatment of Nakai and contemporary European modernist trends in Japan, see
Takashima Naoyuki, Nakai Masakazu to sono jidai [Nakai Masakazu and His Age], (Tokyo:
Seikyûsha, 2000).216
Department who experimented with color film technology), and Naitô Kojirô
(composer in Kyoto University’s Psychology department experimenting with
what he called, “color music”) to produce two avant-garde films, “Poem of the
Sea” (Umi no shi; 1932) and “Ten-Minute Meditation” (Juppunkan no shisaku,
1932), which were Japan’s first color films.
12
Nakai and the Kyoto Consumer Cooperative Movement
Against the background of the Great Depression, the late 1920s and
early 30s was also a period of widespread labor unrest and social protest in
Japan, as well as increasing efforts by the government and business to co-opt
and repress these movements.  In Kyoto major labor strikes broke out during
this period, such as the Kanebô strike and City Bus Strike, and broad-based
movements around lifestyle issues such as rent and food prices were
organized as well.
13  For example, the consumer cooperative movement was
quite strong during this time, culminating in the formation of the Kyoto
Consumer Cooperative (Kyoto Shôhi Kumiai) in April 1932—a coalition of
consumer cooperatives such as the Kyoto Workers Consumer Cooperative
(Kyoto Musansha Shôhi Kumiai), Kyoto University Students Consumer
Cooperative (Kyôdai Gakusei Shôhi Kumiai), the Suiheisha Consumer
Cooperative (cooperative of burakumin) and the Korean Consumer
Cooperative (Chôsenjin Shôhi Kumiai).
14  Nakai’s close friend and colleague,
                                                   
12 See Nakai, “Shikisai Eiga no Omoide” (“Reminiscences on Color Films”) in NMz 3:232-235,
and Iwamoto Kenji, Nihon eiga to modanizumu, 1920-1930 [Japanese Film and Modernism,
1920-1930], (Tokyo: Riburopôto, 1991), 205-209.
13 For more on local labor struggles, see Watanabe Tôru, Kyoto chihô rôdô undôshi [History of
the Labor Movement in the Kyoto Region], (Kyoto: Kyoto chihô rôdô undôshi hensankai,
1959).
14 For a history of the consumer cooperative movement in Japan, see Yamamoto Osamu,
Nihon seikatsu kyôdô kumiai undôshi [History of the Consumer Cooperative Movement in
Japan], (Tokyo: Nihon hyôronsha, 1982).217
the lawyer Nose Katsuo, helped form and head the Kyoto Household
Consumer Cooperative (Kyoto Katei Shôhi Kumiai) in May 1930, which
consisted mostly of intellectuals, office workers, and artists.  Nakai participated
as an active member of the board of directors.  Nose then became the
chairman of the coalition cooperative, which reached its peak in the Kome
Yokose (“Give back the rice”) movement in 1932.
15  This was a national
movement among cooperatives that demanded the government to release
stored rice at cheap prices, and in Kyoto it culminated in a broad-based Kome
Yokose/Anti-war demonstration on August 1, 1932 (International Anti-war
Day).  The movement was quite successful and forced the government to
release its stored rice to the cooperatives cheaply.  Nakai took part in these
activities, helping to deliver and distribute this rice to communities, for
example.  This struggle against the increased commodification of the basic
necessities of everyday life, as well as their subjection to the technical laws of
the market and government-business collusion clearly influenced Nakai’s
insistence on a critique of capitalism in his writings throughout the 1930s.
16
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The Rise of Rationalization and Militarism during the 1930s
At this time also, the Sangyô gôrika (industrial rationalization)
movement among bureaucrats, intellectuals and businessmen became
institutionalized in 1930 with the establishment of the Temporary Industrial
Rationalization Bureau by Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi to coordinate
state rationalization efforts.
17 This movement promoted the adoption of
scientific production methods to increase efficiency, improve product quality
and decrease costs; the introduction of new management techniques to
increase worker productivity and labor-capital cooperation; and the integration
of businesses to eliminate waste and competition. “Rationalization” policies
extended to all areas of life, not just the factory.  Women’s organizations,
agricultural cooperatives, schools, village councils, and interest groups were
all subject to efforts by the government and civic leaders to integrate them into
larger units, adopt scientific methods and techniques, and to settle conflicts
under the purview of state institutions during a time of “national crisis.” As we
shall see, Nakai also focused on this type of rationalization in his writings.
A more fanatical and militarist discourse of “national crisis” and “state
renovation” (kokka kaizô) arose with the “Manchuria Incident” in September
1931 and the subsequent creation of Manchukuo in 1932.  In April 1933 the
famous Takigawa Jiken (Takigawa Incident) occurred, in which the Kyoto
University law professor, Takigawa Yukitoki, was discharged at the request of
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the Education Minister, Hatoyama Ichirô, for his writings on the Japanese legal
system, which did not recognize the supreme, divine position of the emperor,
and therefore were deemed “communist.”
18 Professors and students in the
Kyoto-Osaka area (including Nakai) mobilized heavily against this action,
which eventually resulted in the firing or resignation of two-thirds of the law
department and thus a repression of open dissent at Kyoto University and
among students and intellectuals in general. The strong Marxist cultural
movement revolving around groups such as the Purotaria Kagaku Kenkyujô
(Puroka, Association for Research in Proletarian Science), Nihon Purotaria
Eiga Renmei (Purokino, Proletariat Film League of Japan), and Zen Nihon
Purotaria Geijutsu Dantai (NAPF, the Federation of Japanese Proletariat
Artists) was also repressed during this period, taking away another forum for
resistance among intellectuals.
Nakai and the “World Culture” Group
After serving as a lecturer at Osaka Sôai Women’s Professional
College, Nakai became a lecturer at the Kyoto University Philosophy
department in 1934.  In the course of his regular activities with other members
of Bi Hihyô and its expansion to include other intellectuals and activists
involved in the consumer cooperative movement and the Takigawa Incident,
the journal took on a more openly political and anti-fascist character.  Together
with Nose, Tsujibe, and other leftist intellectuals and students from different
fields such as Kuno Osamu (philosophy), Shinmura Takeshi (French
literature), and Taketani Mitsuo (physics), they founded the journal, Sekai
                                                   
18 For more on this incident, see Matsuo Takayoshi, Takigawa jiken [The Takigawa Incident],
(Tokyo:Iwanami shoten, 2005).220
Bunka (World Culture).
19  This signified the beginning of what the Kyoto
Regional Court Investigator, Shimokawa Gen, and special police referred to in
their documents as the “Popular Front and Culture Movement” (Jinmin sensen
to bunka undô) in Japan.
20
Sekai Bunka served primarily as a vehicle to introduce the events of the
various anti-fascist popular front movements in Europe and the cultural
thought arising from them.  Special attention was given to news on the Popular
Front movements in France and Spain, which were broad anti-fascist, leftist
coalitions that went on to win elections in 1936, as well as events in the Soviet
Union, the U.S., and England.
21 The journal was quite eclectic, publishing
translations of French Popular Front writers such as Romain Rolland and
Andre Gide, and exiled German intellectuals such as Max Horkheimer and
Friedrich Wolf; introductory essays on new American drama and film; analyses
of Tokugawa and Meiji society; interpretations of Bergsonian philosophy; and
debates on the literature of Lev Shestov and Andre Gide, as well as many
book, movie, music and play reviews.  It was here in 1936 and 1937 that Nakai
published his most famous essay, Iinkai no Ronri (The Logic of Committee),
where he laid out his theory of organizing a non-technocratic society rooted in
the specific needs and desires of different social subjects, and imbued with a
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dynamic, historically immanent “critical nature” (hihansei) and “cooperative
nature” (kyôdôsei).
22 In fact if one were to perhaps sum up this highly eclectic,
cooperative-journal, one could describe it as a group of diverse intellectuals
exploring new theories, methods, and forms of political practice and
organization different from the classist formulas of orthodox Marxism and, of
course, the spiritualist, culturalist ideologies of ultra-nationalist fascism.
23
Nakai and the Mass Newspaper, “Saturday”
In 1936 Nose, Nakai, and several others from the Sekai Bunka group
joined up with the Shochiku film actor, Saitô Raitarô, who from 1935 published
a small agitprop magazine for film studio workers called Kyoto Sutajio Tsûshin
(Kyoto Studio News), to start the bi-weekly newspaper tabloid, Doyôbi
(Saturday).
24  According to Kuno, one of its active members, the idea behind
the newspaper was to somehow break out of the small, leftist, theoretical
journal format of other intellectual journals such as Yuibutsuron Kenkyû
(Studies in Materialism), Gakusei Hyôron (Student Review), and Sekai
Bunka.
25  More importantly, the newspaper sought to display the various
energies and dimensions of the people themselves, and it was based mostly
on anonymous contributions (by issue 42, 70% of the articles were
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contributions).
26  Each edition had a section on society, culture, film, women
and leisure.  Reviews of the latest Frank Capra, King Vidor or Shimizu Hiroshi
film; articles on the problems of Japanese working wives and working couples;
complaints about local government corruption, living conditions and food
prices, and the bad quality of journalism; gossip on the latest fashions, recipes
and cosmetics; news on worker sports cooperatives or popular photography in
the Soviet Union; introduction to the leaders and intellectuals of the Popular
Front in France; and reports on the Spanish Civil War were just a small
sample of what filled each six-page edition.  Nakai and Nose wrote the first-
page editorials, which were accompanied by a modernist print and headline
setting the tone for each issue (for example, “We should not let go of the fact
that we are living here and now”).
27  They also edited each issue, while Saitô
took care of the printing, distribution, sales, and advertising.  Having only a
fourth grade education himself, Saitô constantly made sure that Nakai and
others wrote in simple, understandable Japanese.  Newspaper circulation
reached eight thousand copies, which was quite large for the period.  It was
sold at bookstores and magazine stands for three sen and distributed freely to
coffee shops and restaurants in the Kyoto-Osaka area.
28  The tabloid can be
seen as an attempt to materialize a new mass subjectivity infused with a
“cooperative nature” and “critical nature” that were firmly rooted in the
everyday practices, techniques, and customs of the people.
29  It was published
during a time when the space for critique was either co-opted or repressed by
an increasingly virulent nationalism (the 2.26 right-wing coup attempt occurred
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in 1936 and war broke out with China in 1937), stronger efforts by the state to
mobilize and rationalize all aspects of society, and as Nakai pointed out, a
commodified, capitalist reality dominated by huge monopolies and
bureaucracies.  In November 1937, however, Nakai and others associated
with Doyôbi and Sekai Bunka were arrested under the Peace Preservation
Law, and both publications were shut down for supposed involvement with the
Comintern’s organization of an international People’s Front against fascism.
30
III.  NAKAI’S CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM
The Commodified and Specialized Nature of Life Under Capitalism
Before discussing Nakai’s theory of technology, we must first describe
Nakai’s object of critique—what he sums up in “The Logic of Committee” as
the “commodified nature” and “specialized nature” of life under heavy industrial
monopoly capitalism.
31 Many of Nakai’s commentators emphasize his thought
and practice during this period as one of building an oppositional
“embankment” against an increasingly repressive, militarist, and ultra-
nationalist fascism, and they fail to establish the central importance of
capitalism to his critique.
32 As I will show, however, the critique of capitalism
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itself, which restrained or co-opted the creative, critical energies of the
masses, formed a central part to his thoughts on fascism, technology, and art
throughout the 1930s.
Nakai first develops his ideas on modern capitalism in a 1932 essay
published in the journal, Risô (Ideals).  After criticizing philosophers such as
Oswald Spengler and Karl Jaspers who “under the guise of an intellectual
crisis, curse modernity” in general for its “mechanization and popularization of
culture,” Nakai instead focuses on the question of “intellectual mechanization”
(seishin kikaika) under modern capitalism.
33  “What makes up the largest
structure of intellectual mechanization is the specialization of intellectual
culture (seishin bunka) and its professionalization,” Nakai writes.
34 However,
this specialization takes the peculiar form of being a mass specialization,
making everyone “common laypeople” (zokushû) towards each other at the
same time, since each person has little or no knowledge of the other’s
specialty.
35  For example, philosophy has been professionalized and
philosophers take up the particular occupation of teacher to make a living—
“thought is an occupation.”
36 Within the specialization of philosophy there are
Leibniz specialists, Dilthey specialists, and so on.
37  Based on this
professionalization and specialization, philosophers find jobs at educational
institutions. The fact that the Ministry of Education, for example, has decided
in the past to halve the number of students at liberal arts schools is significant,
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Nakai notes, since this shows that they recognize that modern society is
based on the specialized division of labor.  By doing this, they seek to reduce
the number of humanities teachers in society.
38
Nakai then links specialization to the commodification of thought in
modern capitalist society.  He writes:
To the extent that literature is presented through institutions of profit
such as publishing houses, bookstores, magazines, and newspapers, it
is a commodity.  To the extent that it is a commodity, it is ordered
according to the plans of the newspaper or magazine.  Something that
is regulated by demand (chûmon) is a product.  There are cases too
where literature is sold by means of the ghostwriter, or by using some
famous person’s name – i.e. by the advertised name (label).
39
Writers must shape their skills and work according to the specific demands of
huge, profit-driven media corporations (such as UFA, Paramount or Nikkatsu
in film); the “structure of the demands of patrons and brokers; the editing of
newspapers and magazines;” and the specialized market of different
commodities.
40  For example:
Huge corporations have already been established [in the film and music
industries], which have boards of directors consisting of industrialists.
Dividends are announced each year in the newspaper and their stock
values rise and fall accordingly.  Here a plan is executed according to
the intentions of the board of directors and the estimate of the product’s
value is calculated in terms of money.  And if there are strikes, there are
also firings.
41
The very creative energy of art has been permeated by an instrumental logic
of profit.  Like everyone else, artists must sell their labor power to live—they
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are then re-packaged, commodified, and sold as “stars” or “directors” in the
mass market, for example.
42 “At present, all artistic geniuses are specialists,
and because they are specialties, they are occupations for livelihood, and
because they are occupations, they form their structure of life beneath profit-
driven collective organizations,” Nakai adds.
43 Artistic practice is not an
individual endeavor divorced from society but rather intertwined with it, and
takes the form of an occupation within huge capitalist organizations necessary
for life.
As a result of this mass specialization and commodification in modern
society, artists, for instance, form “self-enterprising blocks” or associations
such as Teiten and Nika, which link writers and media corporations together
and set the collective standards and limits for creative activity in the market by
holding large exhibitions of their members’ works, for example.
 44   In short
artists, writers, and teachers (and their collective organizations) fill specialized
niches or “posts” (busho) within larger profit-driven bureaucracies and the
markets they dominate.  Yet as we shall later see, Nakai does not view this
“collectivization” merely as negative.  He does not seek a return to some
romantic, individualist age of art or creativity untainted by capitalism but rather
sees a different, critical potential even within such mass intellectual and
material mechanization of life (i.e. technology) in modern society.  The logic of
capital and profit, which permeates the large organizations and technologies
that govern all aspects of life, however, restrains the potential for critique and
cooperation.  In fact they push specialization towards fierce competition and
an emphasis on individuality instead.  This manifests itself in art as
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“aestheticism” (art for art’s sake), romanticism, or mere self-indulgence,
according to Nakai.
45
He further elaborates on how modern capitalism restrains the critical
potential of the masses through specialization and commodification in several
essays published in 1936 and 1937, years characterized by an increasingly
powerful ultra-nationalism, large-scale roundups of intellectuals and activists,
and the beginning of the war with China.  In a 1936 Gakusei Hyôron essay
aimed at young film students, Nakai describes what he calls the “masses as
object of profit” or “the masses imagined by capital:”
46
[The production of film] must have its foundation in the collective and in
machinery.  In this respect, the current situation is such that film
accordingly requires an enormous amount of capital.  Capital requires
profit and profit forces the masses within the boundaries of capital….
This compulsion of the masses has increased more and more, and it
will probably only intensify in the future, with film now entering more into
finance capital, and with the tie-ups between newspaper companies,
magazine companies, record player companies and the organizations
of department store capital.  The result we should really pay attention to
here is the phenomenon of the consuming masses being mobilized
within the plans of the producers.  The so-called masses, while being
conscious of themselves as consumers, are rather domesticated and
disciplined within the systems of producer capital.  This discipline is
common to the phenomena of journalism, department stores, and film,
and its strength will probably only rapidly gain in intensity.
47
The masses become a “balance co-efficient, which seeks the economic
maximum of the two functions of purchasing power and number of
consumers.”
48 The creative energies and critical imagination of the consuming
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masses are more and more governed by the needs of the balance sheet, and
they are subject to the intense efforts of huge media combines to shape and
control them (e.g. through advertising and tie-ups).  Nakai therefore
encourages film students to instead develop the potential of mass film
technology, which can change human, collective sensation towards social
critique and transformation (more on this later).
Further exploring how the creative energies of the masses are
domesticated by capital, Nakai examines in “The Logic of Committee” how
inventive, creative action is governed by “price” and “the nature of buying and
selling” (baibaisei) in the “current stage of monopoly capital”
49 According to
him, people shape and implement their desires largely through the buying and
selling of commodities.  What cannot be sold “is excluded from the domain of
practical existence,” Nakai writes.
50 At a time when nearly everything from the
mountains to the rivers and of course, human beings, is commodified, things
“undergo a powerful distortion and fall into the realm of non-existence when
they lose their buying and selling value,” he adds.
51 Price becomes the chief
condition in determining the value of commodities (and human beings), rather
than concrete, sensuous human activity.
Nakai explains why commodification restricts the critical energies of the
people:
When demand is not accompanied by money, it descends into mere
representation, which makes demand unreal and null.  This quality of
demand or need (juyôsei) that forms the primary foundation of
technology [i.e. technology as sensuous, creative activity] is divided into
either having or not having money.  Possessing money, that is to say,
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demand and need based on money becomes a real object.  But not
possessing money, that is to say, demand based on empty desire,
hope, and so on becomes mere representation temporarily existing
within the self as just a relation between being and thinking.
52
Similar to his Marxist contemporary in Europe, Georg Lukacs, Nakai argues
that a logic of reification restricts the critical energies of the people.
53  Price
and value appear to people as external, scientific laws divorced from human
activity and control.  The fulfillment of human need and desire is subject to
price and the possession of money, obtained through selling one’s labor.  Not
only are they governed by the plans of huge corporations but also the very
reality of human desire and activity to fulfill that desire is based on capitalist
rules of money and price.  The result is that human need without money is
“unreal” and becomes “mere representation” or contemplation among
people.
54  Instead of actively producing all aspects of their lives and fulfilling
their needs accordingly, capitalism has forced people’s desires into the
“structures of buying and selling,” which limits that activity to an endless
“repetition” of mere reflection on commodities, and the forced sale of labor to
purchase them.
55  In short, the constant transformation of everything from
things technologically produced in everyday human life into external
commodities with prices subject to the laws of the market has engendered an
“uncritical nature” among the masses, who are then forced to conform their
energies accordingly rather than actively create their own social reality.
56  Yet
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as we shall see, Nakai does not subscribe to the orthodox Marxist view that
the masses therefore have “false consciousness” and must be led to the
correct path of overthrowing capitalist society.  Rather, he always seeks to find
potential within the everyday, concrete structures and practices of modern
capitalist life that would somehow stimulate a transformative “critical nature” in
the masses.
Capitalism and Rationalization
Nakai also sees capitalism as inseparable from the rational,
technocratic organization of Japanese society and its empire then proceeding
apace under the leadership of businessmen such as Riken’s Ôkochi
Masatoshi and Nissan’s Ayukawa Gisuke, “technology bureaucrats” such as
Kishi Nobosuke and Okumura Kiwao, and a vast array of intellectuals.
57  As
mentioned above, the government was already promoting new management
techniques to eliminate waste and increase worker efficiency, consolidating
industries into larger units, and encouraging labor-capital cooperation, mainly
through its Temporary Industrial Rationalization Bureau.  Control laws
designed to rationalize production for war were passed throughout this period
for all the major industries such as petroleum, automobile production, and
electricity.  Nakai analyzes the relation between capitalism and rationalism in a
1937 essay entitled, “Gôrishugi no mondai” [The Question of Rationalism],
published in Gakusei Hyôron.
58  Nakai first quickly surveys the history of
rationalism in relation to different economic formations and shows how it has
always been accompanied by irrationalism.  For example, Germany’s late
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transformation from a commercial-agricultural economy to a heavy industrial
one in the nineteenth century manifested itself in thought as a scientific,
empirical belief in the rational order of nature (e.g. Kantian thought) and an
irrational, semi-religious belief in the practical, individual subject (e.g. Fichte,
Nietzsche).
59 This contradiction in fact propelled Germany’s transformation into
a heavy industrial power—rationalism providing the intellectual basis for
scientific-technological development and irrationalism providing the subjective
motivation for the German people to work for this transformation.  Thus in
capitalist development, rationalism and irrationalism are complicit.  In fact as
Nakai shows, capitalism even promotes irrationalism to sustain its existence in
times of crisis.
Rationalism in the 1930s, according to Nakai, reveals itself as a “heavy
industrial, financial, block economy opposed to the remnants of liberalism.”
60
“This is the rationalism of the rationalist movement (gôrika undô).  It is the
rationalization of production and labor in a profit economy, and the rationality
demonstrated in advanced Taylorist and Fordist systems, which were
established by focusing on the profits of mass production amidst the trials of
World War I,” Nakai writes.
61 Rationalism has become “subordinate to the
pursuit of blind profit” and tied up with the capitalist commodification and
specialization of modern society, according to Nakai.
62  It has therefore
become “rationality opposed to human life.”
63 “The more the belts of the
                                                   
59 Ibid., 133.
60 Ibid., 134.
61 Ibid., 134.  Emphasis Nakai’s.
62 Ibid., 136.
63 Ibid., 135.232
Taylorist systems are rationalized, the busier and more stressed the factory
workers need to become,” he writes.
64
Capitalism and Irrationalism
As a result of being incorporated into the structures of capitalist
commodification and specialization, the people have become less aware of
profit as something fundamentally opposed to human beings, according to
Nakai.  In fact educators and intellectuals have been actively encouraging the
pursuit of profit, which only exacerbates discontent among the masses.
65 This
discontent and frustration creates the seeds for reviving all sorts of irrational
“feudal remnants” amongst the people, which merely serve as safety valves
and do not bring about any real change (what Nakai calls, a “refusal without
negation”).
66 They therefore express their anger at an abstract, amorphous
“rationalism” rather than at the profit-driven institutions of capitalism itself.
Nakai gives three examples of such “irrationalist doctrines” propagated by
intellectuals during the period: the doctrines of geography, nation and family.
The doctrine of geography (chirishugi) proclaims that truth is relative to one’s
region and therefore, rationalism is something Western and inapplicable to
Japan.  Nationalism (minzokushugi) and the doctrine of the family
(kazokushugi) say the same thing, but ground truth in the nation and family
respectively.
67 These doctrines are often confused and seek to revive feudal
traditions of spirit, militarism and hierarchy.  When mixed with other influential
philosophies in Japan such as Heidegerrian existentialism, Sorelian
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syndicalism (action for action’s sake), and other “philosophies of crises,” the
frustrations of the people can manifest themselves as “terrorism,” according to
Nakai.
68 “When [these feelings of desperation] express themselves in action
like terrorism, they have the power to destroy everything cultural at one
stroke,” he adds.
69
Nakai instead asks the reader to direct his or her attention to how
institutions of profit (rieki kikô) and rationalism work together with various
forms of “irrationalism” to discipline human life.  He writes:
First, we should pay close attention to the fact that even though the
institutions of profit are what oppose people, these institutions of profit
rather make people attack rationalism, which they subordinate, thereby
hiding their true form, and that people are also completely falling into
this trap.
70
Japanese capitalism in the 1930s relied on rational techniques of control and
management; however, at the same time, capitalist ideologues also
encouraged “irrationalist” critiques of rationalism in order to diffuse worker
discontent.  “The institutions of profit made rationalism, which it controlled, into
a target, turned tail, and fled into their safe concrete fortresses.  Unaware of
this, the intellectual world divided up the work and issued an order of attack
against rationalism, which has degenerated into something opposed to human
life,” Nakai writes.
71 In short, Nakai recognized that capitalist rationalism and
irrationalism were complicit in the fascism of 1930s Japan.
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The Complicity of Totalitarianism and Capitalism
He also asks the reader to focus on how totalitarianism (zentaishugi)
and doctrines of controlled economies (tôseishugi)—contrary to their anti-
capitalist statements—often fulfill the needs of the profit institutions of “finance
block economies.”
72 The efforts by bureaucrats and businessmen to control
and organize all aspects of society for war have the danger of completely
subordinating rationalism to capitalism thereby entrenching their systems of
control even further.  Thus aside from looking at how capitalism employs
irrationalism as a safety valve for discontent, we should also look at the
complicit relation between technocratic rationalism and capitalism, according
to Nakai.
Instead of merely rejecting rationalism, Nakai seeks to establish an
alternate one, which is historically rooted in the concrete, minute interactions
of human beings with each other and with the world.  “Rationalism is by no
means an ‘ism’ or doctrine.  It is not something artificial,” Nakai writes, “It is
being humble towards the strict quality of principle within nature that human
beings depend upon.”
73  Rationalism is not some abstract, idealist doctrine of
belief but rather, something rooted in creative experimentation with the
external world.  According to Nakai, human beings discover innumerable
dynamic principles in the world and within their social order, and in turn, they
become aware that they shape and form that very order through their
sensuous interaction.
74 The rationality he is affirming is not a passive,
reflective, and abstract one but rather active, inventive and concrete.  “This
passion toward reason is no longer dependence but rather creation.  This is a
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jump from the reason of nature to the reason of technology,” Nakai writes.
75 It
is this dynamic, tense “reason of technology” rooted in everyday human
existence that Nakai develops in his explorations on the critical potential of film
and his writings on the form and feeling of modern sports.  These specific sites
illustrate a radically different notion of technology, one that has the potential to
question the massive commodification and specialization of human life by
monopoly capitalism, and its discipline of mass critique and cooperation by the
various means outlined above.
IV.  THE PROJECTIVE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
LOGIC OF TECHNOLOGY
Consciousness and Practical Subjectivity as “Projection”
Before looking at Nakai’s writings on the technologies of film and
sports, it is useful to first outline his general theory of consciousness and
practical subjectivity.  Like other philosophers of the period, Nakai does not
think of consciousness as a substance divorced from the material world or as
he says in a 1934 Bi Hihyô essay, as an “abstract, conceiving something” that
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grasps an “abstracted conceived something.”
76 Rather he thinks of
consciousness as a dynamic, projective relation inseparable from practical
subjectivity, creation, and concrete involvement in the world and with other
subjects.  Borrowing from the functionalism of Ernst Cassirer, Nakai gives the
example of the window, which is not produced from abstract mental
representations of a circle or square but rather from actively combining the
concrete, functional elements of circulation, view, and lighting.
77 Air circulation,
scenic view, and access to sunlight are three practical needs arising from
human negotiation with the world—in this case, the process of creating a living
space.  Thus the window is not merely some external thing but more of a
dynamic, living form in which the subject actively participates by projecting the
natural relations of air, nature and light into the form of a window.  Borrowing
from Martin Heidegger, Nakai sees the subject’s (or Dasein’s) fundamental
existential comportment as “care” or as an undetached, concerned, and
specific imbrication with the world.
78 Different from Heidegger, however, Nakai
sees this fundamental involvement as a kind of “projection” (shaei) and “re-
presentation” (mosha, Abbild—“copy,” “reproduction” or literally “from image”
in German), and it is here where he develops his more subjective notion of
technology.
In a paper presented in 1932 at the Kyoto Philosophical Society under
the title, “Bi no tenkô to sono kadai” (“The Conversion of Beauty and its
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Problems”), Nakai describes this projective structure (shaei kikô) of
consciousness:
Consciousness is not an originary mass that grasps a memory and then
realizes it but rather, the memory itself is one phase of a projective
structure with the potential to re-present (mosha, Abbild) the many
series that are in the world.  In providing a “dynamic axis” (dôsahyôteki
hôkô) to these projectable structures in the world, the actual modality of
“consciousness” is to transform potentiality, which has the character of
a medium, into actual action, which has the character of the “middle”
(Mittel)…In contrast to memory (or perception in a wide sense) being a
static projective element, consciousness, in heading towards a certain
direction, transforms these elements into a subjective body of real
action as an active, dynamic point or a projective moment.  It
transforms the projective nature of the modality of medium into the
projective nature of the modality of the “middle.” In other words,
consciousness comes to have its own logical structure as that which
transforms itself from medium-like mediation as “spirit/mind” (ki) to the
medium of the “middle” as “chance/opportunity” (ki).
79
Consciousness is not a contemplative substance but rather a practical,
transformative mediation of the world with two moments of projection based on
two inherent meanings of the word, “projection”—pro-jection (shaei) and re-
presentation (mosha, Ab-bild).  Based on its understandings of and
negotiations with air circulation, view, and lighting in forming the window, for
instance, consciousness enters into a projective mode of re-presentation over
how to best “map” or re-present these elements (or “series”—the blowing of
the wind, the change in the surrounding view, and the variation in light are all
natural series in movement, not static objects) into some form for that specific
dwelling.
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In his less jargon-filled lectures at Sôai, Nakai describes this subjective
mode of consciousness as the “demeanor of Hamlet,” which existentially
grapples with and agonizes over the specific problems it encounters.
80 In this
mode consciousness reflects on what it did wrong, what combinations worked
and did not work, possible scenarios and outcomes, and so on regarding that
specific problem.  In short, the form of the window comes to exist in this mode
as a dynamic potentiality (kanôtai) charged with the subject’s concrete re-
presentations or re-combinations of various natural series such as air
circulation and lighting.  It comes to exist as a “medium” or something with a
charged mental form or outline to be realized.
This re-presentational “Hamlet” mode is fundamentally linked with the
pro-jective moment of action or praxis—what he calls in the same lecture, the
“demeanor of Don Quixote,” who actively tries out and experiments with
different things.
81   The “subjective body of real action” is a kind of tense,
“pressing into” being or what Nakai calls a “leaping towards” (hiyaku), which is
some instance of invention in the world based on the subject’s charged
reflection of the previous mode.
82 This projective moment of invention is what
Nakai calls, the “middle,” which as we shall see, is not some clear,
representable result but rather the uncanny, untimely eruption of creation or
praxis itself—“chance” or “opportunity.”  The “middle” is not the step before a
finished product (i.e. the window), mere realization of a previous mental idea,
or some definite existential state but has a different “space-time” altogether,
which he calls “technological.” Rather than being a contemplative substance,
consciousness is an incessant, itinerant link or “switch” between these two
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modes of existential projection (Hamlet’s charged reflection and Don Quixote’s
sensuous “leaping” into the world), which discloses an originary space-time of
art and invention that is neither future nor past, before or after but merely,
“middle.”
83
Projection and the Body: Light, Sound, Words
This projective structure of consciousness is a bodily, sensuous
subjectivity, not a detached, epistemological one.  He writes:
The body is a natural formation (shizen kôsei) as the mediation of this
projective structure.  Light, sound, and words occupy the various realms
of meaning-connection in this projective relation mediated by the body.
The common characteristic of light, sound, and words is their
transmittability (dentatsusei), which serves as their greatest function.  In
short they have the potential to project the same structure of relations in
infinite directions.
84
In the body’s sensuous involvement with the modern world, “light, sound, and
words” are the specific forms that “bodily consciousness” projects in
transforming natural series or phenomena into inventions.  They form the vital,
dynamic, technological structure of bodies.  Rather than being things that are
instrumentally employed, they form the very being of the body’s active re-
presentation and pro-jection of what it minutely encounters in the world.  Light,
sound, and words are the very “stuff” or material of modern human sensation,
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which as Nakai points out, is transmittable in infinite directions.  Bodies are not
fixed substances but vital, changeable “formations” or “constitutions” (kôsei) of
transmittable light, sound, and words.
85  This “dynamic nature” (ryokugakusei)
and practical subjectivity (shutaisei) of bodily constitutions of light, sound, and
words has its own logic—what Nakai calls, the logic of technology.
86
The Dynamic Tension of Technology
Nakai builds on the notion of techne from ancient Greek philosophy,
which classifies “all action of human phenomena other than the serene and
contemplative episteme” as technology.
87 He describes the “being of
technology” as a “dynamic tension, similar to the warps and distortions of
energy fields,” and as an “action that vigorously transforms the very categories
of possibility to impossibility, impossibility to possibility, reality to unreality,
unreality to reality, contingency to necessity, and necessity to contingency.”
88
Thus, for example, while the navigable balloon was unreal one hundred years
ago, it has today become real in the form of an airplane.
89 Yet as we saw
above, this invention is not merely a linear, step-by-step process but rather a
tense “middle” of chance and opportunity that can go in any number of
unforeseen, surprising directions.  Nakai calls this instance, “technological
time:”
The concept of technology...has a dynamic structure in the sense of
being able to bend and distort as a field of energy or power.  Here,
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against ‘natural time’ that merely flows successively, ‘technological
time’ has an originary, productive character of existence in which any
moment is a ‘point of departure.’
90
This time where every point is an inventive “point of departure” is a tense “field
of power” (chikara no ba) with a positive and negative direction.
91  The
negative direction is the reflective, re-presentative moment of consciousness
while the positive direction is the pro-jective, active moment as described
above.  Technological time is a field where projection towards the past
(“treading firmly upon one’s mistakes”) incessantly alternates and interacts
with a projection towards the future (“praxis”).
92  This time of the “middle”
where invention takes place is an unnatural, exceptional time that goes in two
temporal directions at once.  Moreover, as mentioned above, this invention
takes place concretely through “light, sound, and words,” which form the
dynamic, transmittable structure of bodily sensation.  By exploring the material
technologies of film, which he saw as in turn revolutionizing these bodily
technologies of “light, sound, and words,” and what he calls the bodily
technologies of modern sports, Nakai sought to disclose and intensify these
specific, everyday forces or “middles” of invention and critique amidst the
increasingly commodified, technologically permeated reality of the 1930s.
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V.  THE NEW SENSORIAL FORMATIONS OF FILM
The “Social Collective Character” of Film
Similar to Walter Benjamin’s famous description of the collective
character of film and its transformation of mass sensation in his 1936 essay,
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Nakai describes the
“social collective character” and “physical collective character” of film
technology, and their effects on subjectivity and sensation in the 1931 Bi Hihyô
essay, “Butsuri-teki shûdan-teki seikaku” (The Physical and Collective
Character).
93  The social collective character of film refers primarily to the
process of making film.  Unlike painting or other “individualist” arts, the
process of making a film involves hundreds of specialized workers (actors,
directors, camera and sound technicians, etc.) and organizations (studios,
movie companies, distributors, advertisers, etc.).
94 This collective process of
production accompanied the immense changes of urbanization, heavy
industrialization, and the development of mass media and consumer culture in
the early twentieth century.  These changes, according to Nakai, have
transformed human subjectivity itself from an individualistic “ego” or “self” (jiga)
to a mass subjectivity, which is fundamentally tied up with larger social
organizations encompassing different aspects of life.  “These might be said to
take on a capitalist form, and the age is already making the character of the
‘group’ (shûdan) its unit of exchange.  Associations, companies, factories,
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schools, military units, newspapers, magazines, and so on are all examples of
this,” Nakai writes.
95 These large organizations are similar to immense,
mathematically precise machines in which each part has an essential, active
role.
96  These social machines or formations (kôsei) are not lifeless
mechanisms but “logos in movement” and “morphe in formation.”
97 Each
member is infused with an active “feeling of organization” and “solidarity:”
“Strong feeling is within these systems, these systems are within a strong
feeling,” Nakai writes.
98
The “Physical Collective Character” of Film
This social collective character of immense, life-like, and precise
organizations permeating people’s bodies and subjectivities, and manifesting
themselves aesthetically in collective processes of film production, are
accompanied by a “physical collective character.” This describes the mass
technologies that accompany the development of large social institutions.  In
film, this is the camera film, lens and tubes that constitute the very material
form of the film.  Like the social collective character, the physical collective
character immediately shapes and forms mass sensation and subjectivity by
manipulating its projective, technological structure—what Nakai described
above as dynamic bodily formations of “light, sound, and words.”  For
example, the camera lens can “spatially expand and minutely focus the range
of our vision by adjusting and constituting the degree of light refraction,” and
lends a freedom to vision not possessed by the human eye,” Nakai writes in
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an earlier 1929 essay entitled, Kikaibi no kôzô (The Structure of Machine
Aesthetics), published in Shisô.
99 Temporally, the lens and film have a
“preservative precision of sight and a variable freedom [to record], which the
sense of vision cannot hope to achieve.”
100 He adds:
The variation brought about by the quality to capture forms evenly,
sharp contrasts, a precise realism, and definite straight lines and
curves; the freedom and richness stemming from the punctuality of that
capture, and the freedom of technical direction as well as light direction
all have a fiercer ‘leaping-forward’ quality (hiyakusei) than the variation
capable in any other period in the history of the pictorial image.  Not
only does the lens have the power to grasp fierce speed but it can even
grasp the interior of a cell, the constitution of a crystal, the orbit of
constellations and ultimately, the Brownian movement of molecules as
well.
101
The lens is not merely an instrumental tool of production but immediately
affects human perception itself by expanding, varying, enriching, preserving,
and focusing it.  As Benjamin writes, the camera “opens up an immense and
unexpected field of action” and an “unconscious optics” for the mass viewer to
learn and discover new things—art is no longer the privileged arena for the
cultured elites.
102
This vision shaped by the lens is accompanied by an “aesthetic sense
of feeling of scientificity,” Nakai writes.
103  He adds, “Ultimately, as a result of
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these different constitutions of vision, an accompanying character always
appears.  In other words, a subtlety, starkness, sharpness, precision, or in
short, ‘a sharp feeling of ease or relief (mune ga suku) appears.”
104 “This
seeing eye of the machine that deeply permeates all areas of everyday life,
newspapers, laboratories, investigation rooms, astronomical observatories,
and so on, along with the character of this eye, drops its point of vision upon
every person, as a character that is larger and deeper than every person,”
Nakai writes.
105
Technologies such as the lens do not just fundamentally change vision
but standardize it as well.  In a 1931 Bi Hihyô essay, Nakai describes this as
follows:
The camera film, and so on, of Eastman, AGFA, Pathé, Bolex, Dupont
and other companies.  The level of brightness and darkness, vividness,
and particular functions of the 9.5 mm, 16 mm, and 35 mm lens, and of
positive, negative, reversal, and panchromatic film exposure, etc, as
well as the functions of various combinations of these, which have a
standardness that no individual can change.  Moreover, this
standardness is a depth graph with its own kind of vision that deeply
enters where no individual would be able to go. I call this type or
standard, the physical collective character.  It is the standard reached at
the time by collective technology.
106
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While technology expands and diversifies vision, it also socializes it through
standardized lens and film technologies with set ranges produced by large
corporations.  Nakai, however, does not view this technological
standardization of sensation as a limitation but with tremendous hope in its
inventive, democratic possibility.
Together with what he calls, the “social collective character” of large,
dynamic, machine-like organizations permeating everyday life, this “physical
collective character” of mass-media technologies such as the camera lens
fundamentally transforms mass subjectivity and sensation.
107  Nakai writes:
The characters of lens, together with film and camera tubes, have a
particular character of the collective.  This is not merely their
possession of a relational sentiment as object of contemplation.
Rather, what we should particularly note here is that they enter into the
very senses themselves.  They are the so-called nerve organization
itself of the social collective character; their eyes, ears, and voice.  Film
is their memory and re-presentation.  We might think of the social
collective character as having its form stimulated, solidified, and
developed by the appearance of these functions.
108
Technology is not merely an instrument but the very “nerve organization” or
active sensorial structure of an emerging mass subjectivity embodied in large
organizations.  It is not something external or abstract but fundamentally tied
up with social practice and invention in the world through its concrete
manipulations of “light, sound, and words.”  This collective social and physical
character of technology as fundamentally tied to subjectivity and sensation is
the potential basis for new collective, institutional, subjective, and aesthetic
forms, according to Nakai.  Like Benjamin, he sees immense possibility in the
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immediate availability of mass media technology to the people and their
transformation into critics or “experts.”
109
At this point, we might think that Nakai comes frighteningly close to
describing a techno-fascist dream society of large, productive institutions
composed of active subjects and connected and driven by mass, collective
media technologies.  Yet as mentioned before, rather than romantically
rejecting the formation of mass, collective institutions such as the factory,
school or association, and the rise of standardized mass-media technologies,
Nakai criticized the capitalist appropriation of these institutions and
technologies.  Also, instead of just negatively rejecting capitalist institutions
and technologies, he sought to develop and intensify the immanent, often
overlooked critical possibilities within them, and ultimately, the critical
possibilities of the masses themselves.  He did so primarily by outlining a
different notion of technology linked to the revelation of an untimely, non-
instrumental “technological time” or “middle” of subjective praxis and invention.
Mikhail Kaufman’s ‘Spring’ as a Realization of “Technological Time”
Nakai develops the core of his notion of technology as the revelation of
an untimely, non-instrumental “technological time” or “middle” of subjective
praxis and invention in another 1931 Bi hihyô essay on the Soviet avant-garde
film, Vesnoj (In Spring, 1929), directed and filmed by Mikhail Kaufman, Dziga
Vertov’s brother.  The film is a poetic social documentary that portrays the
springtime devastation of rain and flood as preliminary rebirth, making the
spring a kind of metaphor for revolution.
110 The representations of nature are
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interspersed with shots of collective heavy industry and agriculture, everyday
life and work, a May Day parade, and a sports festival.  So impressed were
Nakai and his colleagues by the contrast of images constituted by the frames,
their tempo and speed, and the overall sense of time created through the
editing, that Tsujibe and him went to the Kyoto Shôchikuza Theater and
measured the time of each image with a stopwatch.  The result is a long
sequence of numbers, marks and letters in the essay representing each of the
six parts of the film.  For example, here are sections of the sequence from Part
Six, “Once Again to the Workings of Spring,” which Nakai was most
mesmerized by: “ 7(~~~) 6 6 7 7 ޒ f f f 6 11 10 f 4 3 5 f 4 ….11 12 4 13 (slow
motion) 7 9 4 6 6 6.”
111 The numbers represent the length of time of the
moving image (1 = .6 seconds, therefore 7 = 4.2 seconds.  A silent film image
contained around 16 frames per second).  The “~” mark represents a certain
rhythm generated by the succession of frames.  The Japanese numbers
represent the length of time of the subtitle image.  The letter “f” means
flashback or the use of the same image repeatedly.
112 Interspersed in the
sequences are parenthetic notes such as “slow motion,” “overlap,” “top-
bottom,” and “maximum speed” to represent Kaufman’s cinematic techniques
such as rapid cutting, dissolving, superimposition, and split screens.  At the
end of these sequences of symbols, Nakai lists the average time of each
image in each part of the movie.  The average for Part Six was 1.79
seconds.
113
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For Nakai, the arrangement and editing of the frames in Part Six
suggests a “new sensorial formation that is neither simply the standard
visuality by structure of color or lines, nor merely a structure of aurality or
language.”
114 The film’s “particular temporal sensorial form” is something more
and less than a clearly defined structure of visuality, aurality, or language.
115
Rather than being a clear object of vision, hearing, or understanding, the
“rhythmical fierce effect” of the images constituted by the rapid succession of
frames under 0.6 seconds each is instead an “extreme taking away” from or
attenuation of the pictorial elements of the frames, as well as an incessant
“transfiguring of these pictorial/visual elements…into musical and linguistic
ones.”
116 Note that this “taking away” or stripping down of the visual and
sensorial transformation into sound and signification is a process that never
                                                                                                                                                     
also seems to be something imposed by Nakai or the Japanese editors, as they are not in the
original.
114 Ibid., 149.  Nakai was very much influenced by the Soviet constructivist school of film as
exemplified by Vertov and his film group, Kino-eye.  Nakai’s essay and experiment can be
seen as an elaboration of Vertov’s theories on film and the transformation of mass sensation
towards critique.  Vertov emphasized the construction of “film-objects” through montage,
rather than producing theatrical productions with clear narrative or mimetic representations of
reality.  These film-objects aimed to go beyond the naked human eye toward the formation of
the “kino-eye.” Vertov writes:
Kino-eye is the possibility of seeing life processes in any temporal order or at any
speed inaccessible to the human eye.  Kino-eye makes use of every possible kind of
shooting technique: acceleration, microscopy, reverse action, animation, camera
movement, the use of the most unexpected foreshortenings – all these we consider to
be not trick effects but normal methods to be fully used.  Kino-eye uses every possible
means in montage, comparing and linking all points of the universe in any temporal
order, breaking, when necessary, all the laws of film construction.  Kino-eye plunges
into the seeming chaos of life to find in life itself the response to an assigned theme.
To find the resultant force amongst the million phenomena related to the given theme.
To edit, to wrest, through the camera, whatever is most typical, most useful, from life;
to organize the film pieces wrested from life into a meaningful rhythmic visual order, a
meaningful visual phrase, an essence of ‘I see.’ [Vertov, “From Kino-Eye to Radio-
Eye” (From the Kinoks’ Primer) in Vertov, Kino-Eye, 88.]
It is this dynamic “essence of seeing,” which is different from naked sight or transparent
visibility, that Nakai is trying to explore in highlighting the new sensorial formations of film.
115 Nakai, “Haru no kontinyuitii,” 149-150.
116 Ibid., 149.250
ends or arrives anywhere.  The visual images are never fully captured or
overwhelmed by sound or signification since they are always incessantly being
transformed.  The film, according to Nakai, points towards a new sensorial
structure constituted by “cinema sentences” (Eiga-go, Kinosatz) and “cinema
tones” (Eiga-on, Kinoton).  According to Nakai, the Kinosatz is something
“totally separate from the meaning of the subtitles” and the Kinoton is
something “totally separate from the meaning of talkies.”
117 Literal meaning
and clear sound are insufficient to express the “new sensorial formation”
constituted by the particular cinema sentences and cinema tones of part 6 of
Spring.
The Kinosatz is a series of moving images constituted by the frames.
Each image by itself has very little meaning as a visual image, according to
Nakai, since they are often formed by a rapid succession of 12 to 19 frames of
less than 0.6 seconds each, which hardly register to the senses.
118  It is
unnecessary to clearly see each and every image.  Instead, what we “see,”
according to Nakai, is another time constituted by an edited continuity of
images—the “beauty of seen time.”
119 The montage sequence is not a
sentence of signification or sufficient object for the understanding but an
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cameraman announces the following at the beginning: “This film presents an experiment in the
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intertitles), without the aid of a scenario (a film without a scenario), without the aid of theater (a
film without sets, actors, etc).  This experimental work aims at creating a truly international
absolute language of cinema based on its total separation from the language of theater and
literature.” The footage from “Spring” was taken during the filming of “Man with the Movie
Camera,” however, it was not used there.  Thus there is a strong resonance between Nakai’s
project of highlighting new, creative possibilities for sensation within mass-mediated, heavily
technologized subjectivity, and Vertov’s project of forging a new cinematic language and
sensation through film.
118 Nakai, “Haru no kontinyuitii,” 149.
119 Ibid.251
“immediate language without grammar and conjugation.”
120 Or as Nakai would
write in a post-war work, “cinema sentences” are like sentences without
copulas, without a de aru or de nai (is or is not).
121 While words are always
symbols made to intend some meaning, images are symbols that extend in
innumerable directions in people’s memories, according to Nakai, and are
open to innumerable results, unexpected sensorial effects, and interpretive
possibilities.
122 In Benjaminian terms, the cinematic experience is
“characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment
with the orientation of the expert.”
123 The mass spectator’s vision and affect
are combined with a type of comportment characterized by “testing,”
questioning, and probing.
124  Both Benjamin and Nakai see great social
significance in this transformation of mass sensation through film, which is
immediately opened to affective politicization, whereas classical arts such as
painting, for example, were much more oriented to passive, individual
“contemplation.”
The Kinoton is not just perceived sounds such as accompanying music
and speech but is also constituted by a number of other factors such as the
contrast of images formed by combining many successive frames with the
“right calculation of lightness and darkness,” and the editing of frames to
create a certain tempo or as Nakai writes, “the rhythm of its tempo, of its
hardness and softness, of its lightness and darkness” (“objective relations of
sound”).
125 The Kinoton then is something more than a heard tone (although
                                                   
120 Ibid., 150.
121 Masakazu Nakai, “Bigaku nyûmon,” 77.
122 Nakai, “Haru no kontinyuitii,” 150.
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124 Ibid., 229, 234.
125  Nakai, “Haru no kontinyuitii,” 149.252
the music, for example, is a part of it) and perhaps more of a “touched” and
“seen” one (yet irreducible to touch and sight).
He describes the singular sensorial “tone” arising from the succession
and contrast of two quick images of the Kinosatz:
When this image of the horse is repeated with a 0.6 second image of a
general, and these images are switched with a good tempo, people
might experience a rhythmical movement in the directionalities of two
spaces of signification—the positioning of the self toward the
constitution of meaning that intends the decorated horse and the
positioning of the self toward the constitution of meaning that intends
the representation of the decorated general.  It is as if we were moving
while pleasantly bounding in the unevenness of signification.  And like a
child, our spirits would probably clap their invisible hands within that
gliding movement.  Here the particular tone (oto kôsei) of the cinema
sentence (Kinosatz) emerges.
126
The significance of the Kinosatz does not lie in the interpretation of meaning of
each image or the entire sequence of images but rather in the movement and
event of the images themselves, which disclose the very force of
signification.
127  The seen object of signification is less important than the
“pleasant bounding in the unevenness of signification” and the simultaneous
“positioning of the self” towards two specific “constitutions of meaning” (the
horse and general) or two “spaces of signification” without ever arriving there.
Achieving signification is less important than the very eruption of signification
where every point is, as Nakai says elsewhere, a “point of departure.”
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In sum the “new sensorial formation” of film enacted by Part Six of
Spring is a concrete manifestation of the inventive “middle” or “technological
time” (the force of praxis and poiesis itself) that Nakai gestures towards in
other essays.  This uneven, gliding “middle” of invention cannot be fully
grasped as an understood sentence, audible sound, or perceived image.  Yet
it is not completely outside sensation and thought either but rather, beside or
“in the shadows” of it.
128  Perhaps we can only express such attenuated
sensations that are not fully visual, aural, or hermeneutic in a singular
language such as Nakai’s mathematical one.  In these sequences, rather than
merely seeking to capture and understand the technical structure of the film,
Nakai tries to concretely express the very dynamism and material force of a
new, technological sensation in language—that behind each frame is a “deep
mathematics between the infinite intersections of representations and the
bright/dark, fast/slow formations of infinite light.”
129 Each frame does not stand
alone as an object of interpretation but relates to other frames and images, as
well as various projections of light that form the singular cinema sentences
and cinema tones that immediately constitute our “particular temporal
sensorial forms.”  Rather than an adequate, interpretive language sufficient for
the understanding, the immediate sensorial formation of the Kinosatz and
Kinoton demands a different, unconventional language to express the bare,
material force of the “pleasant bounding within the unevenness of
signification,” perhaps nothing more and less than the specificity of “f f f f f f
(~~~~)< up-down(~~~~~)(double exposure) 10 f f f f < up-down(~~) 7 7 6…”
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itself.
130 Benjamin describes the sensations of cinema as a “shock effect.”
131
Nakai, however, tried to minutely trace this dynamic, inventive, and techno-
aesthetic structure of cinematic sensation—a sensation with immense
revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) potential, as both recognized.
Nakai’s Cinematic Practice: “The First Anniversary of ‘Saturday’”
Unfortunately, Nakai’s experimental color films, “Ten-Minute Meditation”
and “Poem of the Sea,” shot with a fish-eye lens and released to much public
fanfare in 1932 no longer exist.  However, the 8mm camera films of Nakai’s
close colleague, Nose, have been preserved.  One particular film in which
Nakai and his colleagues clearly had a role in is “‘Doyôbi’ no isshûnen kinenbi”
(“The First Anniversary of ‘Saturday,’” 1937).
132  As mentioned above, Nakai
and Nose were two of the main organizers of this bi-weekly mass tabloid,
which ran from July 1936 to November 1937.  The seven-minute film has two
parts, the first depicting a boat outing among seventy or so members and
friends of Doyôbi (including Nakai), the second showing a picnic in early spring
among many of the same people.  It opens with camera shots rolling over
scattered copies of Doyôbi.  After announcing the arrival of “a happy day for
seventy-odd friends,” we are shown slow, flowing shots of the shore of Lake
Biwa and then shots of a boat deck where middle-aged men in summer suits,
women in bright dresses or kimono, uniformed students, and little boys and
girls in their best clothes are having a lively party.  The film is constantly
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punctuated by short images of a tri-colored Doyôbi flag fluttering fiercely in the
wind.  The camera continues to slowly flow over the different people on board,
scrupulously yet fleetingly capturing the facial expressions—usually from a low
angle—of the women, men, and children who are smiling or laughing for the
camera, idly leaning against the boat railing, staring off onto the lake, chatting
with their friends, or running around with toys.  The film then suddenly cuts to
a rapid succession of shots of various people at sharp, crooked angles from
above and below.  The images hardly register to the eye and are usually
images of people in the midst of some mundane action such as taking a drag
off of a cigarette, turning their head, putting their hand to their face, chewing
away on a snack, or walking to another part of the boat.  The film then cuts
again to wavy shots of men pouring sake for each other and happily drinking
away.  The men begin to clap, jig, and waltz with each other, the camera
rhythmically weaving amongst and between the dancers.  It then ends again
with careful shots of the faces of the people on board enjoying the bright sun
on the lake, the Doyôbi flag waving in the wind, and finally of some hands
shuffling through copies of the tabloid emblazoned with its slogan, “Saturday:
A Joyful and Memorable Afternoon.”
Part Two begins with the large subtitles, “Singing voices resound in a
field of early spring,” and then of shots going over men, women, and children
eating out of their lunch boxes in an open field.  A close-up of a spinning
record player follows.  Next we see longer shots of many of the same people
rhythmically passing their hands to each other interchangeably in a bouncy
folk dance.  The shots focus on and bring out the moving bodies, shuffling
feet, and swinging arms flowing across the screen.  After another shot of the
record player, the camera shows different scenes of people streaming by, arm256
locked in arm, shooting from the bottom up and at various crooked angles
against the background of the open sky.  They show each person’s bouncing
facial expression whizzing by in a blur, ranging from vigorous joy to careful
nervousness.  Then we see a shot of Nakai sitting on a log with four other men
mockingly pretending to row a boat in an absolutely uncoordinated and most
likely drunken manner.  A scene of five women laughingly doing the same
follows.  The movie ends with a raucous, collective toast to Doyôbi.
At a time of increasingly militant fascism, repression, and wartime
mobilization (the film was made right before the outbreak of war with China,
and Nakai was arrested soon after this), the film at first seems quite optimistic
or even escapist.  However, taking a cue from Nakai’s efforts to disclose an
immanent “technological time” of inventive and critical energy embodied in
everyday practices, as well as in the “new sensorial formations” of film, we
might think of it instead as an attempt to materialize another sense of time
different from the uniform, linear, capitalist time of hyper-production.  As
mentioned above, Nakai continued to place central importance on the role of
capitalism in disciplining the critical energies of the masses during this period
of militant fascism.  Not only have these energies been co-opted into an
endless, repetitive time of buying and selling commodities, but they have also
been incorporated into specialized, rationalized, machine-like organizations of
mass production, according to Nakai.  On the production side, Taylorist
production schedules designed to maximize worker output, the introduction of
faster and more efficient machinery, and the increasing simplification and
specialization of tasks are some of the ways large capitalist firms disciplined
workers and transformed time into a linear, instrumental time for profit.
133  On
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the consumption side, the disciplining of the imagination into the designs of
corporate combines and the supposedly natural laws of price and value, as
well as the constant process of purchasing and selling commodities (including
labor) created a repetitive time.  In short, capitalist temporality is based on an
instrumentalist idea of technology as a subjective or objective means to an
end—in production, a means to control and profit, and in consumption, a
means to the fulfillment of need and desire.  Yet as we have seen, Nakai has a
different notion of technology altogether and seeks to disclose a singular,
“technological time” of invention amidst the time of capital.  He does not find
this “technological time” outside of the capitalist institutions of society nor in
some future utopic space beyond it.  This time or “middle” is already here and
now (as he said in one of his Doyôbi editorials), in the minute, everyday
practices and techniques of the masses, and within their subjectivity and
sensation already shaped by mass organizations and mass media
technologies.
 134 Moreover, as we shall see, the film’s striking resonances with
Kaufman’s film, which tries to materialize a certain temporality and sensation
of socialist revolution, also suggests similarities in terms of objectives.
What first strikes one about the film is the combination of longer, flowing
camera sequences that glide over the people’s faces and sharp, quick shots of
the same.  We see each outlined facial expression only briefly before the
camera either flows or cuts to the next one.   Our sight is constantly moved to
the next image either by the gliding camera or the editor’s cut—little time is
provided for a viewer to reflect and settle on anything.  Subjective reflection
seems to be beside the point since the movement of images always constantly
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drives the viewer away from him or herself to another instance.  In fact the
camera seems to try and realize this very movement of vision itself (vision
without a viewer, that instance of driving the viewer “beside” him/herself),
which might be described as that difficult to grasp, immediate, and incessant
“stripping away” of the pictorial to another instance, rather than a simple
representation of what lies in a viewer’s field of vision.  Kaufman’s film
interestingly also juxtaposes rapid, fleeting shots of children’s facial
expressions and body parts while at play or rapid frames of spectator
expressions, for example, in order achieve a different type of visuality.
Secondly, through sharp-angled and flowing shots of the dancing bodily
forms, swinging arms, and bouncing faces, the camera tries to make one “see”
and “touch” the sound and rhythm of the singing and dancing.  While the silent
film was accompanied by jazz records in the theater (Nose’s son, Kyô, also
put in a catchy jazz tune to the preserved copy), they do not take away from
the camera work and editing, which use sharp angles or focused shots on the
bodies and faces streaming or bouncing by, as well as punctual cuts to
different sections of the group dancing in order to achieve this.  Part Six of
Kaufman’s Spring, Nakai’s favorite section, also ends with a raucous folk
dance.  This scene is a well-coordinated, rhythmical, and fast paced series of
shots of people dancing, drinking, clapping, and laughing.  Moving shots are
mixed with still shots, diagonal shots with straight shots, close ups with
panoramic shots, fast cuts with longer cuts.  Shots of twirling dresses, shuffling
feet, fingers playing accordion keys, flashes of singing and laughing facial
expressions, and a moving accordion player on a unicycle are interspersed in
a fast and furious rhythm that climaxes the film.  Despite the lack of sound, we259
somehow “see” and “feel” the rhythm of Spring that Nakai was so impressed
with.
Third, while the film obviously shows the development of two raucous
parties, the images by themselves have very little meaning.  Instead of images
of deep narrative significance, we are bombarded, for example, with shots of a
girl swinging around a boat pole, a woman smiling and scratching her face,
people swinging hand to hand on a field, or a head quickly turning in some
direction.  Thus instead of merely trying to scrupulously capture some
historical event or story, the camera and editing try to reveal something else—
a more mundane, worldly “mass” time rooted in everyday life and custom such
as eating, singing, dancing, chatting, gazing, and playing.  This time is not the
time of mass consumption or Taylorist efficiency schemes, to which the
Japanese public was increasingly incorporated into.  Kaufman’s film also tries
to bring out everyday time in the Soviet Union through shots of people going
about their business in town, women cleaning or gossiping on the street,
young men playing soccer, lovers walking in the park, birds roosting, dogs
barking, and children playing.  The time of Spring is a different time than the
instrumental time of capitalist production.
135
This worldly, often unremarkable, non-productive time of the masses
has its own particular sensorial formation, which Nose’s film tries to realize by
emphasizing the movement of vision itself, the “seen” and “touched” sound,
and the less-than-significant, barely registering customs of the everyday.  At a
time when open criticism was increasingly impossible, Nakai and others set
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their focus on the various itinerant, creative forces of the masses as
manifested in their everyday pleasures and techniques.  Nakai’s practice
suggests that any inventive critique must emerge from these very practices,
rather than on some abstract ideology from above, since these are what the
masses usually “have” in spite of intense repression and mobilization.  These
overlooked practices are very difficult to fully discipline since they never really
coagulate into any significantly determinate form.
 The film can be seen as active experiments in realizing the “pleasant
bounding within the unevenness of signification” Nakai glimpsed in Spring or
the imperceptible forces of creation itself as manifested in the innumerably
minute gestures, customs, and techniques of the people that lie along side,
before or after the visual, aural or hermeneutic.  These “unworked” energies
that do not necessarily achieve any final form or significance are different from
the conventional epistemological registers of creation: means and ends,
subject and object, thought and practice, or in sum, the linear time of capitalist
wartime production and repetitive time of mass consumption.  In this untimely
time that is already always here and now but does not particularly lead
anywhere, the potential to “do, or think otherwise” exists.
136 This is the moment
of the political as “chance” and “opportunity” in the present that Nakai wanted
to unearth within worldly time, which was increasingly being displaced by an
instrumental notion of the political as realizing a productive, technological
utopia.  While at times it might seem that he is irrationally fetishizing or
mystifying creativity and invention, his grounding of it in mundane, secular time
differs from the aesthetics of fascist cinema described by Benjamin, which
merely gives people an avenue for liturgical expression.
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VI.  THE BODILY TECHNOLOGIES OF SPORTS
Sports as a Realization of “Technological Time”
We catch a further glimpse of this immanent, non-successive
“technological time” and sensation in two of his essays on the new sensations
of modern sports published in 1930 and 1933.   In these essays, Nakai begins
by criticizing theories of sports based on some natural instinct towards
production.  For example, theories that see sports as playful preparation for
so-called real, economic production of material goods or as expenditure of
surplus energy left over from productive activity.
137 Nakai instead writes that
“the human acts we usually call sport are largely indifferent to this idea of
technology [technology as “tools” or means to an end], indifferent to an
understanding of ‘reaching somewhere’ (nani nani ni made) or being ‘for
something’ (nani nani no tame ni).  Rather, in their character, these acts
simply enhance and bring to light the meaning itself of technology.”
138 Instead
of seeing sports in relation to an idea of technology as an instrumental means
of production, Nakai focuses on its “structure of feeling” (Stimmung), which he
says is “a particular existence based primarily on bodily technologies.”
139 By
analyzing the bodily technologies of sports, he seeks to highlight the very
creative potential and interruptive force of technology itself in a different way
from his writings on “technological time” and the “new sensorial formations” of
film.  This potential of technology itself cannot be understood as an
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instrumental use of the body “for something” or as bodies “reaching
somewhere” but has its own singular structure of feeling or existence in sports.
The Tense Feeling of Sports
First, Nakai describes the “tense excitement” of the sports player facing
the “many white, straight, and curved lines, circles and ovals, etc. that pierce
the eyes when one steps onto the field.”
140 The relation between the sports
player to these lines is not that of a “physical spacing or interval” (Abstand) but
more of an “existential distance (Entfernung) that needs to be run through,
overcome or reached.”
141 Within the “tense feeling” of the moving bodies, a
“moment of transformation is…at work, which through bodily strength,
transforms these physical intervals into something having the character of
distance.”
142 This “tense feeling” has a “character of the middle” (chûkan-teki
seikaku), which “for the time being, is distinct from [a meaning of] distance in
the sense of tools that are ‘for something’ or for ‘reaching somewhere,’ Nakai
writes.
143  Instead “the mere distance itself of ‘reaching’ (ni made) or ‘for’ (no
tame ni); the fact itself of having to run past or go through; or signification
(yûigisei) itself comes to appear,” he writes.
144 For Nakai the space of bodily
technology is neither a measured space to be traversed using various
instrumental means nor some existential state of arriving at a final end but
might be expressed as a kind of striving, panting distance of ‘for’ without being
‘for something,’ of ‘reaching’ without attaining something, of ‘running past’ or
‘going through’ without arriving anywhere.  This intense distance of sports
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neither completely has the character of an epistemological category (i.e.
object, space) nor an existential condition (i.e. subject, time) but is what he
calls, a “quasi or para-existential”—literally that which exists beside, near, or
alongside existence.
145 We might describe para-existentials as innocuous,
difficult to localize forces and relations, or as a singular feeling that is never
worked up into or contained within a subject or condition.
The “Spatial” Character of Sports
Nakai gives an example of a para-existential force from his favorite
sport of rowing:
Another three cho!—the mind of the coxswain gazing intently at the
goal and urging forth another sharp spurt at the end of a tight match
and bitter struggle deeply penetrates from a particular angle the entire
structure of production that pants and strives from plan to plan,
revealing a raw, bare spatial character arising out of human
existence.
146
The “structure of production” here is a shifting, “sweating,” uncontainable
structure that moves quickly and unexpectedly from plan to plan, not a simple
structure of implementing the proper means to reach the goal.  Thus the bodily
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formations of sports are always vanishing unexpectedly into one another,
leaving barely a trace—what Nakai describes as a “raw or bare (nama no
mama) spatial character.” This para-existential spatial character can neither be
described as a physical gap nor as an existentially charged space of rapture
but perhaps as a stripped down, itinerant, incessantly disappearing space of
“chance” wherein lies its power and dynamicity.
The Sociality of Sports
Nakai then looks at the “shared inter-being” (kyôdô sôgo sonzai) of
sports, which is not “communal” but rather, a “particular common world and
accompanying feeling that discloses.”
147 Nakai is interested in a kind of
common “being-in-separation” in sports, rather than some feeling of organic
fusion.  He gives an example of this from rugby:
When the whistle blows and the rugby match begins to swing into
action; when we gaze intently at each of our fourteen teammates
and…each of the fifteen opponents moving silently in a deep math to
their proper positions the moment the ball drops to one of us, we see
the waves of an unseen force, centered on the ball, moving in two
directions, one after another.  Aside from scoring, the formation of a
relation where one cannot even take a moment’s breath, or one pass of
a half-back to a tail back, must be the “constitution of an unseen
relation” that calls out to the fourteen other rugby players.  If a “sense of
the formation” is characteristic of today’s new art, then rugby, where the
touchlines are the canvas and the spikes are the paint, is the dream of
a reality where each moment crumbles away.  Or we might further say
that rugby never bears [the weight] of the eternal.
148
Every instance in rugby constitutes an unseen, fleeting equation or structure
between each of the players on the field.  Wherever the ball is, the players
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move in two opposing directions and position themselves in relation to it
accordingly like an instantaneously shifting formation.  One pass creates a
whole different relation or equation among the players, and this relation hardly
lasts a “moment’s breath” before another “unseen relation” or “wave of an
unseen force” bursts forth.  Thus the “sense of the formation” registers as a
barely visible, finite relation of incessant difference between and among the
bodies on the field.  This relation always crumbles away and vanishes without
ever completely doing so since each formation is always related in some
unexpected way to another.  The relations are not fixed, determinate ones
between the members but rather fleeting, itinerant relations amongst, amidst,
or “inter.” They are not a collective “being of something” or “as something” but
a more finite “being amongst and between” where the unexpected or
astonishing is possible.
The Technological Character of Feeling in Sports
Nakai then looks at the “physical technological character of sports
feeling.”
149 A central aspect of sports is the specific bodily form developed
through practicing, learning, planning, testing different actions, and making
mistakes.  The moment one falls into a certain form, one instantaneously has
a feeling that might be expressed as, “Ha, ha! This is it!,” according to
Nakai.
150 “This very feeling that tastes growth itself, which ripens atop of time,
is the exultant grin of the sportsman…It is a mood drunk in the sweetness
itself of time, a time that ripens itself,” he writes.
151 While here he seems to be
emphasizing a certain final state or achievement, the para-existential “state” of
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“This is it!,” is in fact, less than this—it is a grin (not a smile), “growing itself”
(not growth or development), a ripening time (not a linear time).  Nakai adds:
The ‘this’ itself of ‘Ha ha! This is it!’ is a grasping and revealing of a
thrown plan (Geworfener Entwurf) within the muscles in an existential
formation of ‘actuality.’  In this sense, it might be said to temporarily
have a direction towards an interpretation of being through the physical,
bodily structure; thus, here there is nothing that can be described by
words.  In this sense, it does not have a structure of ‘as’ (Als-
Struktur).
152
Struggling to find the words to describe this technology of the body falling into
a form, Nakai nevertheless persists in putting it into language.  He emphasizes
the “This,” of “This is it!,” in order to stress that finding one’s form is not a
completed state but something slightly less.  Falling into a form is instead a
“grasping” or “revealing” by the nerves, blood, muscles, and so on of an
instantaneously developing or “thrown” plan; what Nakai calls a “deep
easefulness (fukai kaitekisei) of the muscles evaluating their own actions using
their inner nerves,” in his earlier 1930 essay.
153  It is a “going towards” some
interpretation of being expressed in form, and so can never be fully
represented “as” this or that form—thus he simply stresses the untimely
punctuality of a partial sentence: “This,” not, “This is it!” Only after the fact, can
we identify “this” form “as” something.  The unexpected, eruptive instance of
bodily form is neither unseen nor clearly visible, but rather imperceptible,
remaining in vision yet never fully becoming visible.
154 This “technology of
sports,” Nakai writes, “has a particular aesthetic structure as the middle
(chûkantai) between natural beauty and artistic beauty, which might be called
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a purely act-like sense of beauty that is always disappearing in the
moment.”
155  Neither a purely external, natural beauty nor a purely internal
artistic beauty, the inventive, interruptive force of technology (and of art itself)
as expressed in the constitution of bodily form lies in the active, disappearing
“middle.” Or more accurately, in “middle”—always amidst and among (rather
than “in-between”) the instantaneous, microscopic, and at times, easeful
interactions of bodies, muscles, nerves, arms, legs, lines, poles, and so on.
156
The Eruption of Form in Sports
Finally, Nakai describes a more intense mode of the creative, untimely
eruption of form arising when the body is at the limits of exhaustion amidst an
intense race or heavy training.  Whereas previously he described a more
passive occasion of falling into a form, here he focuses on making an
unexpected one happen.  “When passivity in the sense of feeling the pain
persists in bearing, resisting, breaking through, and enduring that pain, it
contains something more active than the active.  Here the body becomes
architecture through the blood that rises forth out of the weight of fatigue,”
Nakai writes.
157 In bodily exhaustion an instantaneous, uncanny “architecture”
that is neither a determinate form nor sublime state often arises.  In the earlier
essay he calls this unexpected spurt of bodily form, an “act within an act.”
158
The visible form of the sportsperson’s act is less important than the
imperceptible (not invisible) “sovereign” act of the form producing itself as the
realization of an astonishing, dynamic architecture of blood, muscle, and
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nerve.
159 The feeling involved is one of “entrusting one’s body to the water or
oars; a limit, moreover, where one can row with ease even though it is most
painful, a relaxation found in the completely tense limit,” Nakai writes.
160 Here
one is outside or rather, beside oneself—subjectivity is beside the point.  One
“abandons” (not escapes) the self at the extreme limits of bodily exhaustion
where there is often an uncontainable, expanding, “serene” feeling of ease
and relaxation.
161 This abandonment at the limits of bodily exertion is “an
instantaneous grasp of a morphe that grows; a particular existential deepening
of time itself.” 
162 The non-linear time of the form that creates itself is not only a
“deep time” but also “‘the same now of a different time;’ or in other words, a
non-flowing time that is simply spreading out right there.”
163 This instance of
self-erupting form in sports characterizes “bodily technology,” and as we
previously saw in his writings on inventive “technological time,” it occurs in a
different, more textured, time that folds out.
164  This is not outside time as we
know it but rather, what imperceptibly persists throughout it.  Nakai suggests
that this time of art and invention can be found in everyday practices such as
sports, in the “new sensorial formations” characterized by film, and ultimately
in our singular, concrete, often barely visible interactions.
The Para-existential Forces of Sports
The para-existential spatiality of moving bodily formations in sports,
which is a sweating, vanishing distance and structure of “for” or “reaching”
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itself, without being “for something” or a “reaching somewhere”; the “shared
inter-being” of intricate, instantaneously shifting bodily formations or equations
that never quite fully coagulate into fixed forms or states; the “deep
easefulness” and untimely punctuality of the body falling into a form through
practice, trial and error, and so on; and finally, the “act within the act” of form
inventing itself at the limits of bodily exhaustion are all specific examples of
what Nakai means by technology.  Technology is not simply the material
means of production nor is it merely human subjects instrumentally producing
their own institutions, ideas and goods but rather, the interruptive force of
untimely and (at times) astonishing creation itself.  In the bodily technologies
of sports, Nakai seeks to disclose these imperceptible forces and relations,
spatialities and temporalities that lie alongside (“para”) everyday existence.  It
is in these difficult to perceive (and therefore, discipline) forces and energies
where the potential for unexpected change and perhaps, transformative
critique lies.
VII.  CONCLUSION: SEEKING THE POLITICAL
In the context of a growing fascism in 1930s Japan, technology has
usually been understood narrowly as outright exploitation of labor by
machinery or broadly as rational techniques to encourage creativity,
productivity and active cooperation with the plans of government and
business.
165  Both approaches have yielded significant insight into how
understandings of technology influenced methods of discipline under fascism.
Yet they only reveal some aspects of how fascist power worked in the 1930s.
Nakai’s interpretation of technology in terms of the “commodification” and
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“specialization” of every aspect of life adds an often forgotten dimension to our
understanding of power during this time.  The “intellectual mechanization” of
life under large capitalist organizations, the subjection of the people to the
profit-driven plans of monopolistic combines, their incorporation into the
“structures of buying and selling,” and reification of consciousness all served
to discipline the creative energies and imaginations of the masses, according
to Nakai.  Until his arrest, he continued to analyze the techniques by which
capital disciplined the people, despite the prevalence of irrationalist, spiritualist
ideologies in the public sphere and an increase in technocratic efforts by the
state to rationalize all of society.  Although his more cultural critique lacks an
understanding of the specific ways people were exploited by capital (i.e. the
colonized, women), it is nonetheless insightful.  It suggests that fascism
cannot be understood as separate from the efforts of capital to commodify and
therefore, produce every aspect of life, from the economic to the political to the
cultural
Nakai also put forth a theory of technology different from both a narrow
understanding of it as dead, instrumental machinery and a wider, subjective
understanding of it as production and creation in general.  As capital and the
state increasingly used various techniques in the 1930s to mobilize and
produce all aspects of people’s lives, understandings of technology as creative
action were co-opted into these efforts as well.
166  Rather than seeing
technology as the active, instrumental production of commodities, institutions,
ideas, and so on, however, Nakai saw technology as absolutely inseparable
from modern human subjectivity and sensation—as the unforeseen, often
overlooked, para-existential forces of invention itself.  He tried to articulate this
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in various ways: as the inventive “middle,” “technological time,” the “new
sensorial formations” of film, and the “bodily technologies of sports.” At a time
when the critical energies of the masses were more and more disciplined by
the techniques of capital, and when openly organizing a resisting political force
was increasingly impossible, Nakai sought to highlight and therefore, stimulate
these imperceptible, creative energies at work in the everyday practices,
sensations and techniques of the people within a heavily technologized and
technocratic society.  In short, while capital was attempting to foreclose the
possibility of transformative critique by techniques of mobilizing human desire
and practice into the mechanisms of profit-making, Nakai sought other
domains, multiple techniques, and itinerant forms of political action.  Rather
than only engaging in a politics of building some counter-hegemonic force or
collective resistance, he also sought after different “points of departure,” “acts
within acts,” para-existential “middles” of chance and opportunity, and uncanny
sensations irreducible to sight, sound or understanding as inventive sites of
the political.
167  Thus Nakai suggests that technology is not merely about
making things or ideas but about attending to the overlooked, unexpected and
sometimes astonishing potential of creating itself, a potential that lies amidst
the everyday structures and sensations of mass society.
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CHAPTER 5
 NAKAI AND THE POLITICS OF THE EVERYDAY
I.  ‘THE LOGIC OF COMMITTEE’ – TOWARDS A POLITICS AGAINST
TECHNOCRACY
From the Political to Politics: The Task of Logic of the Committee
At this point, however, we should ask how this concern with the
essence of technology as the unforeseen, overlooked forces of invention and
critique really challenges the dominant systems of technocratic control and
mobilization of all areas of life?  Despite the presence of innumerable sites of
critique and invention, are not these forces integrated into or diffused within
the various social technologies of capitalist reproduction in the end? How can
these diverse forces that constitute the political be mobilized into a potent,
effective politics of changing the technocratic order towards a more
democratic, equitable, and liberating one? Nakai was concerned with these
questions as well, as demonstrated by his involvement with the consumer
cooperative movement, and his involvement in the publication of the
experimental journal, Sekai Bunka and the mass tabloid, Doyôbi, which led to
his arrest in 1937.
As mentioned previously, Nakai’s 1936 essay, “The Logic of
Committee,” deals directly with the question of organizing some political
vehicle for transforming the capitalist, technocratic order.  The “committee” is
the autonomous political form that would transform the social technologies of
capitalist society (i.e. the “commodification,” “specialization,” and
“rationalization” of every aspect of life outlined above), which restrain the273
critical, cooperative energies of the people.  The committee would also
contribute to the realization of a mass subjectivity infused with a “cooperative
nature” and “critical nature,” yet firmly grounded in the multiple practices,
techniques, and customs of the people, rather than in one privileged vanguard
group (e.g. the “working class” or “nation”).  “The Logic of Committee” formed
the theoretical basis behind Doyôbi, whose objective, Nakai writes in the
opening editorial for the October 20, 1936 issue, was the following:
Today, people are deaf and dumb within their groups.
By the readers becoming the writers, Doyôbi is seeking a new language
whereby the readers first become the ears of several thousand people
and then the mouth of several thousand people.
We are discovering a new voice through which several thousands of
people can speak with several thousands of others.  What human
beings should discover [here] is not a machine or apparatus but rather,
actions toward a new order.
We can say that the voices of the several thousand people of Doyôbi
have not yet become the voices of several hundred thousands, several
millions, or several tens of millions of people.  This is because we are
like deaf and dumb people acquiring a collective language.
168
Doyôbi’s primary goal was to combat the alienation caused by the
“specialization” and “commodification” of modern capitalist life.  As we saw
above, “specialization” prevents cooperation by creating specialized technical
hierarchies and organizations while “commodification” stifles creativity and
critique by incorporating human desire into the repetitive “structures of buying
and selling,” the profit designs of large corporations, and the rational
techniques of production and organization, according to Nakai.  Being a
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newspaper based primarily on anonymous contributions and covering a wide
range of topics from contemporary film to women’s issues, Doyôbi would
reverse the overwhelming barrage of “one-way sermons” and “bargain sale
shouting” churned out by the capitalist media, which made people “deaf and
dumb” to each other, and instead provide a vehicle for the expression and
articulation of people’s everyday social, political, and economic needs.
169 By
“becoming the ears and voice of thousands of people,” Doyôbi would be more
than just an informational tabloid (“machine or apparatus”) and perhaps a kind
of loose “committee” for mass empowerment and social change.  Thus before
we examine the cultural politics of Doyôbi in more detail, it is important to first
explore its theoretical basis, Nakai’s anti-technocratic “logic of committee.”
170
What is the Committee?
A “committee” usually conjures up undemocratic images of corporate or
governmental committees of technical experts or the Leninist “central party
committee” of communist intellectuals that would guide the “unenlightened”
masses towards revolution.  In fact “committees” seem to be somewhat
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alienated from everyday life.  The committee Nakai envisions, however, is
something akin to a popular movement on environmental or consumer issues,
an independent newspaper, or an artist collective—in short, any group that
articulates and mobilizes around hitherto unvoiced or repressed popular
concerns that demand some form of egalitarian change in social, political,
economic, or cultural relations.
First, let us examine Nakai’s overall diagram for the “logic of committee”
(See Figure 4.2).  The “Logic of Committee” consists of four primary
moments—“Thought,” “Debate,” “Technology,” and “Production” – each
representing a development in the history of rationality (more on this later).
“Thought” and “Debate” form the moment of the committee’s “deliberation”
(shingi) while “Technology” and “Production” form the moment of the
committee’s “representation” (daihyô).  “Deliberation” is the moment of
articulating the “potential energies of the masses,” while “representation” is the
moment these “potential energies” or popular interests are translated into
some form of action (“actual energy in language”).
171 “Deliberation” and
“Representation” appear more specifically within the activities of the committee
as “Proposal,” “Decision,” “Delegation,” and “Implementation.” “Proposal” and
“Decision” fall under “Deliberation,” while “Delegation” and “Implementation”
are under “Representation.”
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Figure 4.2 The Logic of Committee
172
The activity of the committee begins with the “proposal,” which Nakai
calls, a “primary reflection” of an “immediate lack” (chokusetsu-teki ketsubôsei)
or “mediating alienation” (baikai-teki sogaisei).
173 Here, the unvoiced or
repressed desires of the people are articulated in language in the form of a
concrete proposal.  Nakai calls this “reflection as proposal,” the “primary
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objectification of subjective conditions.”
174 The various unarticulated needs and
desires that arise in everyday social existence (“potential energies” or
“subjective conditions”) are formulated (“objectified”) into a proposal to be
debated by the committee.  For example, when people encounter higher
prices of rice, lower salaries, and higher taxes amidst growing militarization
and capitalist monopolization, their need for cheaper food is articulated by the
consumer cooperative movement, which reflects this social need and puts
forth proposals accordingly (e.g. demand the equitable distribution of
government-stored rice at cheap prices).  “Distorted” reflection of the peoples
needs is also a possibility, according to Nakai—for example, by ideologies of
hard work and self-sacrifice or new religious movements that divert attention
away from the fundamental issue of food security.
175
“After undergoing numerous questions, clarifications, and debates, the
proposal reaches a decision,” Nakai writes, and in this process, “it is corrected
from distortions in the understanding of the actual situation and filtered of lies
and falsehoods.”
176 When the decision is made, the moment of “deliberation” is
over, and “representation” towards concrete action begins.  The moment of
conversion to action is the formulation of the “plan” of action.  To use the
example of the consumer cooperative demanding the release of cheap
government rice again, “planning” could be preparing negotiation strategy with
the government, organizing mass demonstrations and education campaigns,
and arranging mechanisms to distribute government rice equitably.  Nakai
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calls the formulation of the plan, “the secondary objective conditionalization of
the subject.”
177 Through “delegating” and “implementing” the tasks of the plan,
the participating subjects attempt to objectively realize their needs.  After this
“delegation” and “implementation” of the plan comes the “report” to the people
whose needs and interests the committee tried to previously articulate.  The
“report” inevitably runs into some discord with the people because of a
disconnect, thereby engendering a moment of “critique” by those very same
people whose needs are being reflected by the committee.  For example,
Koreans or burakumin might complain about discrimination in rice distribution
or others might demand wider social reform such as job stability, lower taxes,
or the expansion of cooperatives.  This critique then leads to the formulation of
another proposal by the committee towards a “planning” and “implementation”
that would concretely address these concerns.  Thus Nakai calls the “report”
by the committee, the “tertiary subjectification of objective conditions,”
meaning that the committee’s objective actions are democratically exposed to
the subjective critique of the masses.
178  “Critique” is then the “quaternary
subjective conditionalization of the object,” according to Nakai, meaning that
the objective “report” is once again prepared to be re-articulated as subjective
public opinion into yet another “quinary” concrete proposal by the committee
(i.e. another “objectification of subjective conditions”).
179 Thus the whole
process can be summed up as follows:
1.  Primary objectification of subjective conditions (“Proposal”)
1.  Secondary objective conditionalization of the subject (“Plan/Praxis”)
1.  Tertiary subjectification of objective conditions (“Report”)
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1.  Quaternary subjective conditionalization of the object (“Critique”)
1.  Quinary objectification of subjective conditions (“New Proposal”)
As we can see, Nakai grounds this unending process of translating the
unarticulated “potential energies of the masses” into concrete proposals and
plans of action (“actual energy in language”) in a dialectical process of mass
subjectivity.  The “potential energies” are given concrete form as a proposal,
debated, put into practice, critiqued, and given form again.  This process not
only transforms society but the people themselves, whose energies are given
form and put into practice by the committee, which always then reports the
often unexpected results back to the people.  This in turn engenders a more
involved critique and increasing demands on their part.  The “potential
energies of the masses” are the imperceptible, creative energies at work in the
everyday practices, sensations, and techniques of the people, which Nakai
strove to articulate throughout his career in his analyses of technology outlined
above.  He writes:
The actual circumstances [of life] are the foundation of the potential
energies of the masses, and even though the circumstances demand a
swell in these potential energies, if they are expressed in the expressive
form of indifference, they will certainly be distorted into other directions,
becoming dispersed actual energy, since a proper projection of that
very foundation is lacking.
180
Here he acknowledges that while there is immense “potential energy” for
change among the people stemming from actual social conditions, they are
often weak and easily distorted or dispersed by the social technologies of
commodification, specialization, and rationalization, which he discusses
                                                   
180 Ibid., 103-104.280
elsewhere in “The Logic of Committee” and other essays discussed above.
181
The driving exigency behind the “Logic of Committee” then is to articulate a
way to forge this dispersed, often distorted potential energy into a
transformative subjectivity or social force with its own critical momentum.
Deepening Subjectivity Through the Committee
Yet how is Nakai’s committee, which uses the same technocratic terms
of the very structures he criticizes, any different from a self-contained
bureaucratic committee of specialists, a corporate information management
system, or an authoritarian Leninist party?
182 Such committees of experts also
go through the same process of proposal, debate, planning, implementation,
and critique, yet they can hardly be called democratic and accountable.  In fact
specialized committees of experts are part of the system by which the
“potential energies of the masses” are dispersed or distorted.  However, there
is an important difference between Nakai’s committee and the committees that
characterize authoritarian or rationalist systems of control.  While corporate or
bureaucratic committees aim toward some form of linear progress and
development (e.g. increasing efficiency and productivity), interestingly enough,
Nakai’s committee chart moves downwards towards the “potential energies of
the masses” or what he calls “practical subjectivity” (see Figure 4.2).  In fact
Nakai writes that this “diagram itself turning into something else bears an
important meaning for the logic of praxis.”
183 Thus rather than being a
committee standing above the populace, which channels their energies into
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some determinate idea of progress without changing its very own power
relations, Nakai’s committee aims at democratically changing its very own
structure or subjectivity.  According to Nakai, the moment of “mediation” or
“self-negation” is a fundamental part of the logic of committee.
184  It is the key
to deepening and spreading egalitarian and democratic values.
Thus to take up the example of the consumer cooperative again, let us
say that that the committee failed to distribute rice equitably to Koreans or did
not take into account the structural aspects of their chronic poverty such as
lack of legal rights, systematic job discrimination, and frequent racial violence.
In order to address this, the committee would have to fundamentally change
themselves by incorporating more Koreans and campaigning for social
protections and better working conditions.  The committee would need to
transform itself from an organization that addresses the pocketbook needs of
the Japanese middle classes to one that is sensitive to the different needs of a
more marginalized population as well as the structural factors that lead to such
marginalization.
185 Or perhaps it would have to dissolve itself and form an
organization that addresses such wider structural issues of labor conditions or
discrimination.  Even if this antagonism leads to the dissolution of the
committee or into a decisive split, however, it still succeeds in spreading
egalitarian values to other sections of society, thereby deepening the
democratic revolution or “subjectivity.”
The committee’s articulation of the “potential energies” or “subjectivity”
of the masses in the form of a concrete proposal and plan of action becomes
the “mediation” or “self-negating” moment for renewed creative energy
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towards the forging of another collective subject or more “potential energy”
dispersed to newer social subjects.  The committee’s work is merely to serve
as a mediation or focal point for generating a more critical, more involved
collective subjectivity, rather than as an authoritarian guide for these popular
energies.  Nakai calls the committee’s mediating work, a “deepening” of
subjectivity.  “This deepening by a return from subjective condition to
subjective condition—here lies the sense of true subjectivity, as well as the
dialectical nature of transforming itself towards another mediation,” Nakai
writes.
186 Different from the systemized subject of modern rationalist
committees, which only critique and change themselves within certain
ideological parameters or structural limits, the “subject as mediation” of
Nakai’s committee is an endless process of subjective and social
transformation (or “self-negation”).  “Through such criticism, subjectivity truly
passes through its own foundation—sub-ject—and sinks its back further
towards a new, quinary proposal, or in other words, as the foundation for
another objectification of subjective conditions,” Nakai writes.
187
Yet despite this fundamental difference in direction between Nakai’s
logic of committee and specialized technocratic committees, there is always
the danger of bureaucratism or authoritarianism in his thought.  The problem
lies in the moment of the committee’s articulation of the “potential energies of
the masses” into a concrete proposal and plan of action.  Nakai calls this
“reflection,” which suggests that the committee members have some expert
ability to gauge and articulate the diverse needs of the people.  There is an
important difference between the “expression” of people’s demands and
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creative energies as they are and the “reflection” of these same demands and
energies.
188  “Reflection” by a committee in the name of the people can
simultaneously become a way in which technocrats silence or repress their
various demands.  At this point, however, let us just keep this danger of the
committee developing into a bureaucratic system of control in mind and
continue to analyze “The Logic of Committee.”
Logic as Living ‘Ratio’ (Rationality)
The five moments that constitute the “Logic of Committee” (Thought,
Debate, Technology, Production, and the moment that unifies these four,
Praxis—see Figure 4.2) are terms that Nakai abstracts from historically
specific “logics” that arose during periods of rapid cultural and social change.
For Nakai “logic” is not some transcendent ideal but rather refers to the way
people approach and understand the world, which in turn shapes culture and
society.  Thus in the end the “logic of committee” signifies the emergence of a
new “logic” of a critically engaged and cooperative mass subjectivity that
would transform the increasingly specialized and commodified reality of
monopoly capitalism.  He illustrates his historical idea of logic in another
diagram (see Figure 4.3 on page 285).  To quickly summarize this diagram,
historically, there have been three distinct cultures, “Classical Culture,” “Middle
Age Culture,” and “Modern Culture.” Each culture was characterized by a
particular logic—“Spoken Logic,” “Written Logic,” and “Printed Logic”
respectively.  Also, in connection with the specific social system, even more
specific logics arose.  In the transformation from the “Clan System” to the
“Slave System” during the period of classical culture, the “Logic of Dialectics”
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came about; in the shift from the “Slave System” to the “Feudal System” during
the middle ages, the “Logic of Meditation” appeared; in the transition from the
“Feudal System” to the “Commercial System” in early modernity, the “Logic of
Experience” arose; and corresponding to the particular developments of the
“Capitalist System” (Commercial System, Industrial System, and Financial
System), the logics of “Action,” “Function,” and “Production” appeared
respectively.  “Debate,” “Thought,” “Technology,” and “Production” are the
essential characteristics of each of these logics, and “Praxis” engenders the
“Logic of Committee” by unifying these four historical moments, according to
Nakai (see Figure 4.3, next page).
In the same way that Figure 4.2 illustrating Nakai’s “Logic of
Committee” is similar to yet fundamentally different from technocratic,
authoritarian committees, Figure 4.3 illustrating the history of logic mimics yet
essentially differs from a dogmatic mechanical base-superstructure theory
(see next page).  Just by looking at the diagram, it seems that new logics
merely reflect changes in the system and relations of production.  However,
Nakai reverses this and instead gives “logic” a principal role in instigating
social change.  He writes, “As one can see by this diagram, logic always plays
some particular role in the crisis of the collapse of one system and its
reorganization into another.  That is to say, we see logic itself becoming a
living ratio (reason) within a rift, or in other words, logic itself becoming a
mediation.”
189
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Figure 4.3 The Dialectic Between History and Logic
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For example, according to the figure, the “Logic of Experience” plays an
important role in the transition from the “Feudal System” to the “Commercial
System.” With the development of new forms of transportation and the rise of
commerce, tightly-knit communal relations are dissolved, and individualistic,
utilitarian human relations are formed—“humans are wolves towards humans,”
as Nakai describes it.
191 The rise of print technology and “Print Logic” enabled
people “to interpret [words] according to their particular life experiences or
circumstances,” whereas under feudalism, words had the character of univocal
divine sanction or meaning as illustrated by the practice of biblical
hermeneutics (or “the Logic of Meditation”).
192 As commerce dissolved feudal
economic relations and print technology enabled varying interpretations,
people began to understand themselves more as individuals, or as Nakai puts
it, “lonely individuals” in the universe.
193 From out of the “Logic of Meditation”
under feudalism whereby subjects understood themselves as subject to some
higher order, a tendency emerged whereby subjects began to understand
themselves as disinterested observers or interpreters of and actors on an
external world (i.e. as subjects).  Thus with the crisis of the collapse of
feudalism and the rapid rise of capitalism, people developed a new “living
ratio” of “individual experience” within that social rift to deal with that crisis.
This “living ratio” formed the basis or “mediation” for a new social system, new
social relations, and a new form of subjectivity.  Mercantile capitalism
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developed out of guild/feudal capitalism, market relations developed out of
patriarchal relations, and the epistemological subject developed out of the
subservient subject.
The “living ratio,” however, which provided a sense of liberation from
feudalism, soon spread throughout society and developed into a logic of
control or hegemony (the “logic of experience”), according to Nakai.
194  The
logics on Nakai’s diagram such as “Meditation,” “Experience,” and “Action” are
these hegemonic logics that originally began as tendencies or “potential
energy” filled with transformative possibility during periods of crisis.  Thus the
formation of the individual subject, new commercial relations, and new forms
of communication soon became the basis for the commodification and
abstraction of individual labor, the formation of impersonal market relations
and capitalist industry, and the alienation of words from everyday life through
uncontrolled market circulation.  In short the individualistic, interpreting subject
of the “Logic of Experience” became the ideal subjective comportment or
“logic” to sustain the capitalist system since it justified the commodification of
labor and market freedom, for example.  Capitalism comes to be subjectively
anchored in the logic of experience.
The “Logic of Committee” then was to be the new “living ratio” that
would form a collective subjectivity imbued with a “critical and cooperative
nature” to overcome the technocratic “Logic of Production.”  The logic of
production was characterized by the disciplining of the people’s creative
energies through the “intellectual mechanization” and functionalization of life
under large capitalist organizations, the profit-driven plans of monopolistic
combines, the overwhelming “structures of buying and selling,” and the
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employment of rational techniques of production and irrational ideologies, for
example.
195  The committee’s role was to articulate or “mediate” the diffuse,
often vaguely formulated interests of the people into a proposal, implement the
proposal, and report the results back to the people with the express goal of
fully subjecting itself to the potential energies of the masses, thereby
encouraging a more critically involved and focused subjectivity.  In a
technocratic capitalist world where not only consumption and production were
alienated from concrete, sensuous activity but the very structure and meaning
of collectivities such as “nation,” “corporation,” “family,” and “culture” also
seemed abstract and beyond human control, the committee would instead be
a specific collective subject grounded in clearly articulated projects and most
importantly, always be subject to the needs of the people (i.e. be “self-
negating”).  The committee would establish a “living ratio” that brought out the
creative energies of the “Logic of Technology,” which were being disciplined
by the social technologies of capitalism and repressive policies of fascism.
Yet what is to prevent the living “logic of committee” from becoming yet
another hegemonic logic that again stifles the potential energy of the masses?
What is the source of the critical power of the masses that could prevent such
hegemony and how could it be sustained?
The Structure of Communication
As we have seen from his explorations on technology, Nakai always
affirms an irreducible critical potential inherent in the customs, practices, and
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techniques of everyday life.  “The fact that they could discover something
rational within the movement of existence itself; that they could rationalize their
own lives within such movement—this is the pride of human beings, who have
made their way through these thousands of years,” Nakai writes in the same
Doyôbi editorial that announced the tabloid’s goal of forming a new collective
language amidst the “deafening” structures of capitalist modernity.
196 By
“rational,” Nakai means the various “living ratios” that humans have collectively
formed throughout history to overcome periods of social crisis.  While
historically these have always turned into hegemonic logics of control, newer
“ratios” in turn have always sprung up from the “potential energies of the
masses.” Nakai explores these critical energies further by outlining a general
structure of communication in everyday life that always generates some form
of “questioning” or “negation” of social reality.
Nakai describes this structure of communication in another diagram
(Figure 4.4).
197 Instead of minutely analyzing this complex figure, I will just
outline some of its basic features.  Nakai first differentiates between “Thought”
and “Debate.”  “Thought” is the act of constituting meaning “qualitatively,”
while “debate” is the act of extending meaning “quantitatively.”
198 In thought,
statements or phenomena are subject to questioning and examination, thereby
becoming objects of critique.  A critical “conviction” often emerges from this
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qualitative constitution of meaning in thought.  Criticism is precipitated or
“mediated” by a “negative judgment” within oneself.  A negative judgment has
two moments: a question (is the rose red?) towards some positive judgment
(the rose is red) and an evaluative answer (the rose is not red).
199  All
convictions must undergo the test of negative judgment, and if they fail that
test, they become critical convictions.  However, for Nakai, critical convictions
are not formed merely within the abstract individual but in relation to some
social space or context—the large factory, the office, the movie theater, or the
cooperative, for example (the institutions of high capitalism or technological
modernity).  Only questions and answers expressed within some social,
interactive space constitute critical convictions.  Thus “qualitative”
constructions of meaning within the individual only occur within “quantitative”
exchanges of meaning between people in definite social spaces.
200
The conviction enters language as an “assertion;” however, it never
enters language continuously or in some pure, unmediated form.  The
assertion is altered by power relations, large institutions, the prevailing
ideology, other people’s opinions—in short, all of the techniques Nakai
discussed before whereby the creative energy of the masses are disciplined.
Nakai calls this alteration in communication, “the structure of lying.”
201 Thus
despite the presence of innumerable questions and critical energy generated
in everyday life, the dominant systems of technocratic control and mobilization
work hard to prevent the emergence of new, transformative meanings.
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Figure 4.4 The Structure of Communication and Judgment
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As illustrated by the publication of Doyôbi, Nakai and others placed
their hopes in providing an expanding venue for public debate, a space where
people could express and articulate their needs and interests.  While there
was no guarantee that people would generate a strong enough critique to
break through the “structures of lying,” the tabloid still provided a rare space
whereby people could learn and debate, thereby creating unexpected social
critique and energy.  In “The Logic of Committee,” Nakai continues with his
outline of a general structure of communication in everyday life by exploring
the nature of debate.  It is only through proliferating debate that dominant
ideologies or the social consensus can be thrown into question.
When the critical conviction or assertion is presented as a question
awaiting the listener’s “evaluative response” rather than as an internal
“absolute conviction,” the space for “debate” is created, according to Nakai.
203
Even though the assertion is a critical conviction that has undergone the
process of negative judgment within the speaker, the listener has not yet
evaluated it for truth-value or agreeability.  The assertion thus awaits
evaluation by the other.  The listener also is not just a passive responder.  For
the listener, the speaker’s assertion is a “positive judgment” that should be
subject to questioning and answering, and perhaps, a reply in the form of
another assertion that questions the whole basis of the speaker’s assertion.
This is the moment whereby dominant ideologies or the social consensus (“the
structures of lying”) can be thrown into question.  The speaker of the first
assertion can also question the responder’s assertion or convictions, and so
on.  In this way, new meanings are formed.  By creating a space of debate for
a multiplicity of assertions and counter-assertions, Doyôbi would hopefully
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question and generate critical momentum toward alternate visions to the
restrictive ones of technocratic modernity.  The constant exposure to public
questioning would ensure that the “committee” would never become a
bureaucratic form of control since it would always have to justify itself.  The
constant questioning would also generate new ideas for the committee,
thereby giving it momentum.
Yet the provision of ready-made answers to common questions is
exactly what makes the institutions of capitalist modernity (factory, family,
nation) so powerful.  For example, Japanese fascism provided people with a
concrete sense that they were taking part in a world-historical project of
building a modern, prosperous empire.  Thus it provided a powerful response
to a growing anxiety and frustration over the devastating effects of capitalism,
which caused widespread unemployment, social conflict, alienating working
conditions, and increasing prices, among other things, without fundamentally
changing those capitalist relations.  The institutions of Japanese fascism were
increasingly able to appropriate or exclude questions that challenged it.  Thus
Nakai’s “committee” was designed not only to question, but more importantly
to question in a manner that would precipitate an unprepared or new response
by the institutions of power.  In short, a questioning that would catch the
dominant ideologies off guard.
The Critical Power of the Question
As we have seen, Nakai devoted much attention to these type of
unexpected, unforeseen, and overlooked “questions” or forces of invention in
his other work on the new sensations and structures of modern life.  The
objective of “The Logic of Committee,” however, was to intensify these forces294
of invention to stimulate social change or the formation of a new “living ratio”
different from the one sustaining high capitalist modernity.  In the essay, Nakai
identifies the source of this constant ability to question and therefore “negate”
dominant assertions and convictions as the “indifferent point” within oneself
and the other.
204 The “indifferent point” is the distance one can always take
from one’s own convictions or other people’s statements, which is always
made explicit in the act of questioning.  The “indifferent point” also represents
the potential of the other person to throw one’s own convictions into question.
In other words, there is always an “indifference” towards absolute validity
within any statement or conviction.  No matter how dominant a conviction or
assertion is, it can always be questioned.  In another essay where he develops
this concept of “indifferentness,” Nakai writes:
There is something that stimulates a doubt; something like the chill of
the split self; that is to say, something like ‘me’ being silenced by a
bottomless indifferentness (mukanshinsei), which exists in the form of
an inner language to be feared within the depths of conviction.  At the
same time, there is also a negator who always listens, an “other” in the
form of an outer language within the assertion.  Does not language
stand amidst these “two solitudes,” within a “questioning” in this
sense?
205
Thus language is not the bearer of univocal injunctions or universal truth but
always exists in a tense field of questioning within “inner language” (the
indifference within oneself) and “outer language” (the indifference of the other).
Language is a field of political struggle whereby new questions and meanings
emerge.  Politics and language can never be fully folded into an overarching
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logic of production as the state sought to achieve through its technological
imaginary.  Unexpected, contingent critiques or antagonisms would always
arise.  Nakai’s objective was to somehow proliferate and intensify these nodes
of conflict within the technocratic structures of daily life.
This “indifferentness” or potential for negation and critique does not just
exist in a void but always within concrete social relations—in Nakai’s case,
technocratic relations of control pervading the media, workplace, government,
and marketplace that restrain the creative energies of the people.  Therefore
unexpected, unforeseen critical questions and assertions, no matter how weak
or dispersed, always attempt to change or dissimulate those relations in some
form.  In his thought-provoking interpretation of Nakai’s essay, Takeuchi
Shigeaki gives the example of the environmental movements that arose out of
the famous Minamata mercury poisoning case in the 1960s and 1970s.
206
From the early 1930s, the Chisso Corporation produced acetaldehyde for use
in plastics production, which caused mercury waste to be spilled into the bay
from which Minamata residents fished and relied on for food.  With the
appearance of many cases of uncontrollable shaking, brain atrophy, and mad
behavior in the 1950s, medical investigators established that mercury from
Chisso in the fish was the cause.  However, it was not until very recently, after
a long, difficult struggle by the victims against an obstructive Chisso, resistant
and uncooperative local and national authorities, an often uninterested and
unsympathetic public, and a dragging legal process that the courts finally
ordered the national and local government to pay compensation.  The case
still continues, however, with many still not being recognized as victims.
207
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Minamata is a good example of how a small group of victims and
affected fishermen took on huge institutions and corporate interests intent on
silencing them.  The images of their trembling bodies themselves served as
powerful “questions” not only towards Chisso, but also towards industrial
civilization and the Japanese state itself.
208  Their small movement inspired
many other groups criticizing Japan’s rapid industrialization and its polluting
effects, which eventually forced the Japanese state and companies to adopt
stricter environmental measures.  More importantly, it generated a widespread
debate on Japan’s high-speed economic growth.  People began to question
whether economic growth at the expense of quality of life was really worth it,
creating further agitation for better working conditions, more leisure time,
greener cities, and cheaper consumer goods, for example.  In short, despite
the intense efforts of the state, media, and capital to suppress and co-opt the
Minamata victims, they could not suppress this fundamental indictment of
industrial capitalism and statism they posed, which demanded a change in the
relations with capital and the state.
Conclusion: From ‘The Logic of Committee” to the Politics of
‘Saturday’
Thus the engine of the committee’s political practice was the
unexpected questions generated amidst the social contradictions of everyday
life.  Although the questioning of fascism and capitalism continued to be
unheard and even violently repressed by the state and capital during the
1930s and 1940s, the mere presence of critical questions or traces of past
questions among the people itself was important for Nakai.  If they did not
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necessarily lead to immediate change in the present, they could serve as
“potential energy” for social change in the future.
209 One might argue that the
attempt to merely stimulate critical energy among the people without any firm
objective or clear trajectory from the very start (i.e. the overthrow of capitalism
and creation of socialism) is a passive, dissipating notion of praxis.  Nakai,
however, was always very suspicious of purist notions of praxis such as the
orthodox Marxist privileging of the proletariat since they easily became
dogmatic and alienating.  Rather, Nakai emphasized a “leaping into” the
messy sphere of political debate and struggle without any guaranteed
revolutionary outcome.  There were no neat formulas for political change and
there was definitely no time for resignation or pessimism over lack of success.
If Japan’s fascist, technocratic society were to be transformed, a politics that
mobilized the critical energies of the widest number of people would have to
be established.  If all areas of life were being threatened by commodification,
specialization, and rationalization, multiple issues would have to be taken up
for political struggle, and different techniques would have to be used to
mobilize critical interest.  This was the goal of “The Logic of Committee.”
The specific threat posed by Doyôbi, however, was slightly different.  It
not only sought to proliferate critical nodes of democratic transformation but
also sought to give them some direction within a broad “egalitarian imaginary”
or the ongoing democratic revolution whereby more and more people were
challenging relations of subordination throughout the world (e.g. the Popular
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Fronts in Europe).
210 Doyôbi was not a mere celebration of creativity,
multiplicity, and critique (as Nakai’s thought often seems to suggest) but
rather, it sought to mobilize the various nodes of critique within a wider
democratic imaginary of the expansion of liberty, democracy, equality, and
justice to more and more people.  The tabloid did not do so abstractly by
proclaiming empty slogans of freedom and equality as the political parties or
the state did; nor did they do so by insisting on a privileged revolutionary
subject or some teleological course of history as the communist parties did.
Rather, it sought to encourage these values within the specificity of people’s
daily struggles and pleasures, which it recognized as increasingly incorporated
into immense capitalist structures and technocratic systems of control.  As we
shall see, the state recognized the threat, which led to its shut down in
October 1937.
211
II.  THE POLITICAL PRACTICE OF THE MASS TABLOID, ‘SATURDAY’
Nakai’s Lead Editorials
In the lead editorial of the first issue of Doyôbi entitled, “Flowers Even
Bloom on Top of the Raised Ground of the Railway Rails,” Nakai writes:
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Long, long ago, people lived like adventurers filled with a sense of their
own strength beneath the towering sun and billowing waves.  Today,
people’s lives have become one of quietly living from morning to
evening in a cold, concrete underground room at one’s designated post
while listening to the sounds of a monotonous engine.
212
People’s lives are “incorporated into enormous organizational mechanisms,”
which destroy their hopes, dull their minds, and make them forget their
dreams.
213 Continuing the line of thought from his earlier philosophical essays,
he immediately describes the world in terms of specialized technocratic
structures of production.  Yet despite the apparently romantic language of the
passage, Nakai never yearns for the return of some idyllic, pre-modern past.
Invoking the image of flowers growing on top of cold steel rails, he asks
readers to never “let go of the fact that we are living here and now” and to hold
on to any criticism of that “here and now.”
214 Change does not come through
the “power of thousands of pounds of steel,” according to Nakai, but begins in
the form of asking small questions of one’s everyday surroundings and
activities.
215 These questions are the “flowers” that bloom on the “cold steel
rails” of the established technocratic structures that shape daily life.
By making the readers the writers, Doyôbi was to serve as a space for
popular reflection, questioning, debate, and planning for a different future.
Nakai writes at the end of his opening editorial:
‘Doyôbi’’ [Saturday] is the afternoon where we remember what we are
losing within ourselves; the evening where we sketch out serious
dreams in our heads, discuss actual knowledge with each other, and
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plan our schedule for tomorrow.  It is the evening where tears flow
without hesitation, and smiles bloom with abandon.
216
As he outlines in “The Logic of Committee,” Doyôbi was to be an arena for
proliferating debate on a whole range of concrete everyday issues facing
people who were living within the grid of technocratic structures of 1930s
Japan.  The “tears” and the “laughter” describe the difficult process of
changing one’s views and attitudes in order to arrive at something new—what
he refers to as a “negation” that “deepens subjectivity” in “The Logic of
Committee.”  The slogan printed at the top of each issue read, “Courage
Towards Life.  Clarity of Spirit.  Friendship Without Separation. Doyôbi: An
Afternoon of Rest and Reflection.”
217 Doyôbi would serve as a reflective space
for people to temporarily step back from a life that was increasingly mobilized
by specialized technologies of socio-cultural production within the factory, the
family, civil society, and the market.  Nakai envisioned Doyôbi as a kind of
creative interruption of life.
Expanding on his earlier notion of the “indifferent point” whereby people
have their convictions thrown into question, Nakai affirms a “feeling of
emptiness” as the source of critical power and creativity in his editorial of
August 15, 1936 entitled, “We Should Not Merely Remain in a Feeling of
Emptiness.” This “empty, lonely feeling” often appears amidst the “deafening
roar” of modern life, according to Nakai, and it generates existential questions
such as, “Why is there so much suffering,” “Why is everyone so busy,” “Why
are people laughing,” or “Why are people crying?”
218 Yet it is this very moment
of emptiness that often serves as the foundation for new “trajectories” or
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unforeseen opportunities.
219 “This very feeling is the basis of an affect that is
the springboard for all action; it is a source of knowledge; an originary,
inexhaustible storehouse for the critical spirit,” Nakai writes.
220 Emptiness or
“indifferentness” can be the origin of unexpected questions, insights, or
inspirations—“the raw ore that immediately transforms into people’s wishes for
tomorrow, the first breeze before the storm of real knowledge.”
221 Thus
“negation” is often necessarily a difficult and painful experience; however, it
often leads to unexpected “flowers” of critique and insight.  He therefore urges
people to “grasp” this emptiness, instead of just lingering in it. “‘Doyôbi’ is a
storehouse full of such treasures,” Nakai writes, referring to the numerous
contributions from people discussing their everyday struggles and
pleasures.
222 Each contribution represented a “small breeze” or “raw ore” of
critique and insight that would perhaps generate responses from others, or
some unexpected critical momentum for social change.
 As mentioned above, Nakai’s notion of negation is not a Hegelian one
whereby negation is merely one moment in the dialectical march of historical
progress.  In his lead editorial of December 5, 1936 entitled, “Truth is Seeking
Support More than Vision,” Nakai writes, “Does history traverse a path
schematically from one point to another like a line drawn on a map? Is it a
trajectory that we should be able to view horizontally? No, it is not.”
223 He
instead sees history as potentially going in different directions through
people’s minute, everyday actions:
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Any small, correct criticism or any little action amidst our minute lives
can become the basis for enormous actions that can shift history from
one pole to another.
Rather than being seen horizontally, history should be entered into; it is
seeking support.  Today truth is sincerely asking for each of your little
hands, both men and women, to not let go of your criticisms and actions
towards your lives at hand.
224
History has no inevitable destiny or mission to which people are subject.  In a
context where people were increasingly incorporated into larger state
discourses of war mobilization and “building a New Order for East Asia,” Nakai
instead implores people to remain at the level of everyday concerns and
problems.  History and truth arise out of people’s mundane lives and
concerns—they are not eternal, transcendent forces.  Instead of resigning
oneself to the course of national events or eternal truths, people should
actively look at and question what was happening in the “here and now” of
their everyday lives—this was the only truth.  “Just pick up any small clump of
dirt—let’s take it up in our hands and crush it,” Nakai writes in his lead editorial
of September 5, 1936.
225 People should simply grapple with an issue that they
immediately face, rather than concern themselves with “historical forces,”
“national missions,” or “eternal truths.”  In the face of increasing mobilization of
all aspects of life, Nakai urged for a kind of politics of the everyday that would
create new truths and multiple points of critique, rather than direct mass
resistance, which was becoming less and less possible at the time.
                                                   
224 Ibid., 41.
225 Ibid., 31.303
The Multiplicity of Doyôbi
Doyôbi’s anonymous contributions reflected the problems and opinions
of a range of people: working women, housewives, small businessmen, artists,
intellectuals, farmers, and laborers.  In the afterward to the September 19,
1936 issue, the editors expressed joy over the number of contributions.  “We
think that you should all consider Doyôbi to be your wall to scrawl graffiti on,”
the editors write.
226 They then apologize to the contributors they could not
include.  “We would like you to consider your submissions as disappeared
graffiti,” they add.
227 Saitô Raitarô, one of the founders of Doyôbi and owner of
its publishing license, insisted that contributors write for an audience with a
sixth-grade level education in order to ensure as wide a readership as
possible.  The advertisements from coffee shops, tea houses, record stores,
department stores, cosmetics shops, restaurants, liquor shops, movie
theaters, and clothing stores suggest a diverse readership ranging from
working class to upper middle class—in short, the growing consumer classes
of urban Japan.
The editors also made a conscious decision of keeping their price at
three sen, despite pressures to raise the price due to paper shortages at the
time.  One letter from a rural reader expressed gratitude at the cheap price in
comparison to the big “cultural magazines,” which were charging one yen or
eighty sen per issue.
228 The editors also made a conscious decision of not
solely relying on the “capitalist commercial” networks of bookstore
cooperatives, wholesalers, and small shops.
229 They encouraged people to
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mail their used copies to their friends and relatives in other cities and
especially to the countryside.
230 They also distributed free copies to coffee
shops in the Kyoto-Osaka area.
231 Thus they tried to gain new audiences and
create unexpected encounters with unknown readers through the use of other
methods of circulation.  In doing so perhaps new questions, debates, or
“flowers of criticism” would arise among a public saturated with big capitalist
media.
International News
Each issue was divided into six one-page sections: Opening Editorial
(by Nakai or Nose), Culture, Film, Women, Society, and Entertainment/Club.
The Culture section was devoted to progressive news from abroad, domestic
news items, and commentaries.  The anti-fascist Popular Front coalitions in
France and Spain received much attention due to the lack of coverage or
distortions in the mainstream Japanese press, according to one Doyôbi
writer.
232 The tabloid organizers and their network of friends probably wrote
these items.  Despite some complaints at first about too many overseas news
reports and not enough domestic ones, by January 1937, several readers
wrote about how interesting these items were, which made the editors very
happy.
233  The very first issue had an article on Irene Joliot-Curie, Nobel Prize
winner and Undersecretary of State for Scientific Research under Léon Blum’s
Popular Front government.  The article mentions how the government included
three women ministers, and how Curie was a strong advocate of women’s
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rights and suffrage.
234 A short biography of Spanish Popular Front president,
Manuel Azaña, described his strong secularism and his background as a
writer and lawyer.
235  Another issue had an article on the General Strike of
1936 in light of Leon Blum’s electoral victory.  It described the factory
occupations, city halls and workers organizing cooking and food delivery,
workers maintaining and cleaning machinery instead of destroying it, everyday
concerts and speeches, and the strikers’ maintenance of good public relations.
The strike resulted in the forty-hour work week, state recognition of the right to
collective bargaining, two weeks paid leave, eight to fifteen percent wage
increases, and a more widespread popularity for the Popular Front
government, it reported.
236 Inspired by the successes of leftist coalitions in
France and Spain, the Doyôbi editors tried to introduce these events in the
hope of encouraging similar expansions of the global democratic revolution
among their readership, instead of a set party line that narrowed their
practical-political force.
The cultural aspects of the Popular Front movements were also not
ignored.  One article covered a meeting in Paris of some of France’s leading
artists, architects, and film directors on the topic of realism.  Artists such as
Jean Lurcat and Franz Masereel, architects such as Le Corbusier, and
directors such as Jacques Feyder and Jean Renoir are only some of the
people who attended.  The article discusses this gathering as an attempt by
artists to form autonomous groups such as the “Youth Conference of 37,” a
gathering of architects dedicated to exploring realist and functionalist design
techniques, and “Ciné Liberté,” a group of filmmakers, directors, and critics
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who studied experimental and censored films in order to develop innovative,
non-commercialized techniques.
237 Another article introduces the “Photo
Correspondent” campaign in the Soviet Union whereby soldiers, workers,
students, and farmers from all over used their cheap “Fotocall” cameras to
take pictures of social, political, and cultural events in their respective regions
and then submitted them to newspapers and magazines.
238 The Doyôbi
organizers had a special interest in overseas independent artist movements
and campaigns to spread culture to people since these activities fit with their
overall goal of encouraging people to autonomously develop their creativity
and critical powers in the context of high capitalism and fascism.
The organizers also made an effort to include items on China and
Korea.  One writer urged readers to learn more about China in the same way
that thousands of Chinese students were coming to Japan to learn about the
country.  Instead of ignorantly disparaging China, readers should learn about
“why people like Lu Xun…were part of the anti-Japanese movement,” for
example, and about Chinese thought, economics, politics, and way of life in
order to better connect with their “close neighbor.”
239 One commentator
pointed out that anti-Japanese sentiment “ironically” helped achieve Chinese
national unity and that instead of focusing on “warlords and politicians,” people
should study the customs of the Chinese people, their particular conditions of
capitalism, and so on in the interest of achieving an alliance of the “Japanese
and Chinese masses.”
240 News items on drought and famine in the Chinese
countryside, rural dislocation, a special “grave cleaning” holiday for five great
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figures in Chinese history, and Chiang Kai Shek’s New Life Movement
appeared in the newspaper, trying to give a sense of the lives of the average
Chinese peasant, Chinese nationalism and efforts at modernization.
241 A
prominent obituary of Lu Xun was also featured in one issue, describing him
as “China’s Gorky” and briefly introducing his stories such as “The True Life of
Ah Q,” which the writer describes as capturing the mood of the Chinese
people on the eve of the Chinese revolution.
242 Another article described the
conditions of the “wandering people”—Koreans in Japan—who took up urban
occupations such as taxi driver, sewage collectors, and transporters of
concrete.  The author criticizes the criminalization of Koreans and the state’s
propensity toward “cracking down on” Koreans instead of helping them.  In an
indirect criticism of Japanese imperialism, he also mentions how Korea has
produced many famous scientists, writers, and politicians; however, today, the
social conditions for producing them no longer exist.
243 Thus the Doyôbi
organizers made some efforts to include items that indirectly criticized
Japanese imperialism and racism.  Europe was not the only source of inspiring
social struggle and critique.
Domestic Politics and Everyday Life
Domestic issues, of course, also took up much space in the Society
section and probably received the most contributions.  The leftist Social
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Masses Party was the target of several articles for their failure to criticize the
military’s restriction of the franchise and prevention of party leaders from
becoming ministers, their abandonment of the “masses” in favor of the “nation”
(kokumin), and their attempt to prevent any type of left popular front.
244
Technocratic tendencies such as the nationalization of electricity, the re-
introduction of a neighborhood patrol system, and the rise of the “reform
forces” also received some attention.  One writer criticized the state’s
nationalization of electricity, which was implemented under the guise of being
“for the good of the nation,” as merely an attempt to reduce wages and fire
workers—nationalization was totally consistent with capitalist interests.
245 One
1937 article urged people to support the proletarian parties in the face of the
growing power of the “reform forces,” who were pushing for the establishment
of total planning ministries, the prevention of political appointments in the
cabinet, and the dissolution of parliament.
246
Many articles expressed firm support for parliamentary politics,
fundamental democratic and human rights, and the legal-judicial system.  A
regular “Our Everyday Legal Rights” column appeared where readers wrote
about their legal problems, and a lawyer gave advice.  One woman asked if
she had any legal recourse against an old man who promised her a tobacco
shop in exchange for becoming his concubine but never fulfilled his promise.
Her only recourse, the lawyer wrote, was to sue for fraud since the state did
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not recognize concubines.
247 Another letter from a woman asked about legal
ways of addressing her husband’s chronic debt problems.  The lawyer urged
her to rationally make a chart of her debts, try to pay off the high-interest ones
first, make long-term payment plans, and have the courts approve the plans to
prevent any arbitrary change.
248 Articles on the threat to local self-government
from state centralization, the persistence of police torture and a weak sense of
human rights among the people, the growing fear of exercising basic rights of
free speech and assembly, and the rise of the left parties in local Tokyo
elections also appeared.
249 Thus most of the articles on domestic politics
stayed within the framework of parliamentary politics and the assertion of
basic legal and democratic rights.  This is understandable given that state
repression had shut down most alternative forms of dissent and was attacking
the parliamentary system itself.  Part of the politics of the everyday for the
organizers of Doyôbi lay simply in asserting these established democratic
rights.
Yet many of the articles in Doyôbi were also about the everyday lives
and problems of its readership.  Workers and small shopkeepers discussed
their lives in the regular series, “Essays on the Workplace.” One watch
repairman who rented some space in the corner of a shop wrote about barely
making enough to eat, recently being able to send some money to his family in
the countryside, having to rely on the larger watch shops for sub-contracting
work, and how Doyôbi was one of the few joys in his life.
250 Another report
from a factory worker discusses the frequency of rural youth quitting their jobs
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and factory attempts to replace them with cheaper female labor in order to
drive down wages and encourage competition among workers.
251 Other
reports included those from a film studio worker, a used bookseller, and a gas
station attendant.
252  A series of articles on rural Shinshû and Tôhoku also
appeared.  The organization of ineffective debt reorganization cooperatives,
the prevalence of tuberculosis from returning women factory workers, the
persistent poverty in northern Japan despite good harvests, and the
exploitative actions of a rural Shinshû silk magnate were some of the issues
discussed in the series.
253 One article called for the formation of a “farmer
book-keeping movement” whereby debt cooperatives would train farmers in
basic accounting practices, which would hopefully help them get out of the
paradoxical situation of being in debt during a good harvest.
254 Thus Doyôbi
made an effort to include the voices of a variety of people, who discussed their
lives and even proposed solutions to specific problems.  Moreover, they made
an extra effort to include the voices of women by devoting a section to their
concerns.
The Women’s Section
Reflecting the increasing number of women in the workforce and civil
society, many articles in the women’s section discussed their experiences both
in the workplace and at home.  One article describes a young department
store lady’s experience in her choral group where a rich woman refused to
sing with her on the grounds that she was a “working woman.” The department
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store lady asserts pride over the fact that she works for her food whereas the
rich woman lives in her own little “fictional” world.
255 Another article describes
how women workers at a clothing inspection center were made to prepare
lunch boxes for everyone as a part of the company’s attempt to cut costs.  The
author decries “male feudalism” and the work environment that treats women
as existing for the service of men.
256 One female doctor recounts her visit to
the Tenri countryside where farmers do not go to the doctor because of
poverty and rely on “superstitions” and religions instead.  As a result, many die
from easily treatable diseases.
257 A teacher writes about a meeting in
preparation for the school’s sports day where three to four men talk non-stop
for several hours into the evening.  Meanwhile, she is thinking about her one
month old baby at home.  For her this is an example of men’s lack of
consideration for the situation of women as both mothers and workers.
258 Thus
in Doyôbi, we see snapshots of the different subject positions among working
women in urban Japan.
There were also many opinion pieces on the position of women in the
workplace and at home.  One piece discusses how many women endure low-
paying jobs with bad working conditions in the city and hope that marriage will
save them from their work.  Yet what often happens instead is that men do not
want “tired wives,” and even if they do get married, a hard life of raising two to
three children on a low income awaits them.  The author ends by asserting the
right of women to have a good working life and an equal, cooperative
marriage, instead of having to choose one or the other.
259 Another talks about
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a male department store worker bragging to his female colleagues about his
rural wife, who was “sophisticated, yet not argumentative” like them.  He goes
on to say that his female colleagues were “not Japanese women.” The author
pokes fun at him, writing that instead of going back to his sophisticated wife,
he goes to billiard halls and bars enjoying “coquettish” women while his wife
manages his low salary.  “Why don’t you throw away your old-fashioned ways
and become more like a man,” she writes.
260 In response to these articles on
the “feudal” attitudes of men, one person asks women to see the root of
sexism in the exploitative capitalist system rather than in simply male
“attitudes” or behavior.
261
Another article celebrates the increasing number of jobs available for
women such as hairdressers, dressmakers, sales women, review dancers,
typists, bus conductors, waitresses, and teachers.  The author writes that such
jobs give women a certain degree of independence and in some cases,
practical skills in the event of marriage.
262 In the same issue another woman
praises the passing of the Mother-Child Protection Law, which provided
welfare for poor mothers without husbands, as well as for illegitimate children.
She writes, however, that the law should be expanded to include women with
criminal records, itinerant women, and women with mental disorders.
263
Articles celebrating research into artificial insemination as a step toward
women’s empowerment, decrying the registration of pregnant women in Chiba
Prefecture as a means to prevent abortion, and supporting the organization of
red light district workers in Osaka also appeared.
264  Thus, Doyôbi  was not
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merely a space for women to claim victimhood, but was in fact a dynamic
forum for asserting their many different political viewpoints and agendas.
The concerns of housewives also took up a lot of space in the Women’s
section.  Rising food prices were a constant theme for women.  One article
links the rising prices of some key food items such as beef, rice, tofu, flour,
miso, soy sauce, milk, sugar, and cold drinks to international events, state
price controls, and monopolies.
265 An article on the national meeting of
women’s consumer cooperatives highlighted the dispute between the middle-
class women leadership, who sought assistance from the state, and the
majority of women who wanted to be more autonomous from the state.
266 One
piece urged women to “turn your faces away from your account books” and
toward the politics of the state.  Instead of focusing on the minutia of prices,
bargains, and budgeting, women should look at the larger socio-economic
problems stemming from state policies that put more burdens on the people.
267
The entrance examination system was also the topic of much debate among
housewives and mothers.  One woman criticizes the petty competition among
the women in a local “Mothers Association” where the women of those who
were admitted to middle school socially excluded those who were not.  She
reminds women that the Mothers Association’s purpose is for the good of not
only all mothers but all of society as well—not just themselves and their
children.
268  Another woman asked whether there was a point to the exam
system given that corruption was more determinative than actual student
ability.
269 In a special edition devoted to the junior high school exam system,
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articles criticized the different systems in the Kansai area.  The system at a
famous Osaka school was particularly worrisome since it only tested national
history and did not really test children’s intellectual ability, according to one
woman.
270 In Kyoto schools adopted a three-part system of elementary school
grade reports, physical exam, and character exam.  Leaving intellectual
evaluation to the elementary schools made them vulnerable to parental
pressure and corruption, physical exams problematically glorified physicality
over intelligence, and character exams were often vague and of questionable
value, the article says.
271 The stress on memorization and the advantages
some children gained from going to private cram schools were also
criticized.
272 Thus a number of contentious everyday issues facing housewives
such as rising food prices and children’s education mobilized debate among
women in the pages of Doyôbi.
Fashion and style also received attention in a regular “Vogue” column.
One column discusses how increasingly popular polka dot patterned dresses
look good on everyone without being too gaudy.  Obese women could wear
dark dresses with fine polka dots to “hide their body lines,” while gray, round
polka dots on a dark background “softens the bony frames” of skinny women.
The article continues to describe other color-combinations as well as popular
polka dot dresses in France and the US.
273 Another column was devoted to the
Spanish bolero jacket, which would look good on a “short, black-haired
Japanese” woman, and the Chinese Qipao dresses, which “unfortunately” do
not fit well on most Japanese women, according to the writer.
274  A series of
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advice columns on “working women’s clothing” also appeared.  One piece on
the navy blue and white bus girl uniforms suggests that the number of pleats
be reduced in order to make movement in crowded buses easier, and using
hair bands instead of hats in order to display their neat hair styles.
275
Waitresses should wear dresses that were not too long with open sleeves to
allow free and easy movement.  Their uniforms should match the table colors
and yet not be louder than the customer’s clothing (black or gray were
safest).
276 The author adds that while the white apron should be the identifying
marker of the waitress, recently the apron has gained public significance by
becoming the public uniform of the National Defense Women’s Association,
who wore them over their kimono.  Thus Doyôbi’s politics of the everyday even
extended to the politics of clothing and style, both in the workplace and in
public.  Fashion was not merely seen as ephemeral or diversionary.
The Film Section
One page of Doyôbi was devoted exclusively to film.  In response to
criticisms by readers that there was too much on film, the editors wrote that
the section was “inevitable” considering “what type of role film plays in
modernity.”
277 Western films dominated the section, although some space was
dedicated to Japanese ones.  William Dieterle’s The Life of Louis Pasteur
(1935, starring Paul Muni), a film about the pioneer of sterilization and
vaccination, was praised for its passionate depiction of science used for
humanity instead of a science cloistered into narrow specializations and
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institutions.
278 Michael Curtiz’s Black Fury (1935, again starring Paul Muni), a
film about an immigrant coal miner amidst a bitter coal mining strike, was
praised for its portrayal of U.S. labor struggles (e.g. its depiction of the divisive
tactics of management); however, it was too pro-capital and pro-state, had too
many individualistic and melodramatic moments, and was ambiguous about
the psychological and economic causes of the strike, according to the
reviewer.
279 A special edition of Doyôbi devoted six whole pages to Frank
Capra’s Lost Horizon (1937), a film about a tired diplomat and his fellow
travelers inadvertently discovering Shangri La—a place of eternal youth,
natural beauty, and peace—after a plane crash in Tibet.  Articles (including
one by Yodogawa Nagaharu, Japan’s most famous post-war film critic)
celebrated its technical effects and debated the pros and cons of utopian
thinking.
280 Arnold Fanck and Itami Mansaku’s The New Earth (1937), a joint
German-Japanese production, was criticized for urging poor Japanese farmers
to emigrate to Manchuria instead of focusing on how their situation could be
improved at home.
281 Other films reviewed included Frank Capra’s Mr. Deeds
Goes to Town (1936), King Vidor’s So Red the Rose (1935), Julien Duvivier’s
Golgotha (1935), and Jacques Deval’s Club de femmes (1936).
282 Thus,
Doyôbi covered the latest films from the U.S. and Europe, suggesting a
readership that was somewhat engaged with cinematic culture.  Kyoto’s
Shôchikuza Cinema even placed advertisements in each edition with catchy
plot summaries in order to attract moviegoers.
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Japanese films were not left out.  Shimizu Hiroshi’s lost film, Jiyû no
tenchi (Universe of Freedom, 1936), was praised for at least showing
“staggering Korean laborers;” however, his portrayal was very cold and
mechanistic, according to the reviewer.
283 Kimura Sotoji’s Ani imôto (Elder
Brother, Younger Sister, 1936), a film about a young woman who returns to
her rural home and reveals that she is pregnant by her former employer’s son,
received good reviews for its capture of the “psychological aspects of rural-
urban contradictions.”
284 Kumagai Hisatora’s Sôbô (The People, 1937), a film
about poor Japanese farmers living together at a collective emigration center
in Kobe one week before they depart for Brazil, was praised by a woman
reviewer for capturing the pain of leaving one’s home town in contrast to
Fanck’s idealization of emigration to Manchuria in his film, The New Earth.  In
one issue, Chinese films such as one hit film entitled, Mayoeru hitsuji
(Wandering Sheep) were reviewed.  Chinese films were primarily tragedies
rather than comedies, and inevitably asserted nationalist sentiments,
according to the reviewer.
285 Japanese bunka eiga (“culture films” or
documentaries) that supposedly depicted the “reality” of China were criticized
for being war propaganda in another article.  The reviewer goes on to urge
everyone to “take back and re-analyze the concept of culture” such that it is for
life and the people instead of the state.  He or she praises Soviet films such as
Nikolai Ekk’s The Road to Life (1931), about hobos at an experimental
reformation camp, and Mark Donskoi’s The Song of Happiness (1934), about
a flute player in a collective, are propped up as examples of people’s
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culture.
286 Thus it seems that the Doyôbi editors were quite aware of cinema’s
potential to stimulate critique, and included articles on Japanese (and
Chinese) films accordingly.
The Critique of Nationalist and Commercial Culture
Against the prevailing tide of nationalism and rampant commercialism
within the arts and culture, the articles in Doyôbi always insisted on developing
localized, independent cultural activity.  One article on films introducing Japan
to the world such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s Gendai no nihon (Modern
Japan) and Max Ophüls’s Yoshiwara (1937) criticizes them for portraying
Japan as a place “where sakura always bloom” and as a country full of exotic
pleasure quarters such as Yoshiwara.  In fact, “the women entertainers of
southern Osaka, which corresponds to the Yoshiwara area, were currently
striking for the establishment of an independent union,” the writer adds in an
incisive criticism of Orientalism and nationalism in film.
287 In the literary review
column, the nationalist tendencies of the leading literary journal, Bungakukai
(The Literary World) and some of its main contributors such as Kobayshi
Hideo, Yokomitsu Riichi, and Hayashi Tatsuo were criticized.  The reviewer
writes, “Culture or literature is neither the senseless abstract, fanatical stuff
thought up by Yokomitsu and Kobayashi nor is it something monopolized by
one nation (minzoku).  It is closely intertwined with politics and economics.”
288
Another article on the winning songs chosen by an Asahi Newspaper contest
celebrating the first successful trans-continental flight from Tokyo to London by
a Japanese person castigated the songs for their “foolish” lines about “sakura”
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and “Mt. Fuji.”
289 Radio culture was celebrated in a regular radio review
column.  Listeners should adjust their senses to the “double life of the culture
of the ear” whereby in any given hour one will hear Hungarian classical music
and classical bunraku in close succession, for example, a reviewer writes.
Within such “confusion,” we can sometimes discover something larger, the
article adds.
290 The next column asserts the potential of radio to go beyond the
nationalistic “chauvinism” sweeping the world through mixed, international
choral performances, dramas, and music competitions, as opposed to shows
such as the NBC tenth anniversary special broadcast, which blandly featured
“average” songs from each country.
291 Thus Doyôbi always tried to critique
nationalism and assert an internationalist line in its cultural politics.
Doyôbi also insisted on the promotion of local culture.  The society, film,
and culture sections had many articles on local theater groups, orchestras,
and arts collectives.  Reviews of local theater group performances such as the
Osaka Cooperative Theater’s performance of Hisaita Eijirô’s Dansô
(Dislocation) and the New Tsukiji Theater’s performance of Anton Chekhov’s
The Cherry Orchard were regular features.
292 One article announced the
formation of the “Music Culture Club” in Kyoto—a group of music critics,
amateur performers, and fans dedicated to taking music away from “outdated
specialists, nasty managers, music brokers, evening dresses, flower bouquets,
and outrageously expensive ticket prices,” and breaking down the walls
between each other.  Monthly meetings that included lectures, discussions,
and performances of Schubert, Chopin, Beethoven, and Hindemith were being
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planned.
293 Another article celebrated the boom in the production of small-
scale, amateur films using 8mm 9mm, and 16mm film.  The writer called on
people to film their living and work spaces, and to organize into an association
where they would critically share ideas and techniques.  He invited readers
interested in starting such a group to write to Doyôbi.
294 There was also a
report on the first meeting of the “Kyoto Film Club,” a group of independent
film directors, critics, and fans who met to watch and study films.  The
upcoming meeting was to feature the directors Itami Mansaku and Kinugasa
Teinosuke as well as Doyôbi’s film critics and amateur filmmakers, Nakai,
Nose, and Shinmura Takeshi.
295 Thus similar to the cultural politics of Popular
Front movements in Europe, Doyôbi tried to promote autonomous
organizations that would encourage the proliferation and active appreciation
and production of culture by the people, instead of a passive, commercialized
art dominated by specialists and large media companies.
Reader Criticisms of Doyôbi
In the spirit of creating a critical forum or “committee” among the
readership, Doyôbi also received and responded to criticism from the readers.
Letters “scolded” the tabloid for being too trivial and lacking any coherent
progressive vision.
296 As mentioned above, Doyôbi had to defend itself for
including a section on film by insisting on its importance in popular culture and
modernity.
297 The women’s section was a particularly tense arena of debate.
In the Women’s section of the January 5, 1937 issue, a contributor attacked
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women for their “narrow” concern with commodity prices and household affairs
rather than the so-called real culprit—state policy.
298 Another article castigated
women for simply blaming the “feudal” attitudes of men for the continuity of
discrimination, rather than the capitalist system itself.
299  Thus there was an
ongoing tension between more orthodox Marxists who saw women’s everyday
concerns as trivial compared to the larger struggle for socialism and the
variety of women who wrote about their workplace and household
experiences.  This tension was also apparent in the film section where several
movie reviews criticized films for a lack of deep analysis of social conditions
while some insisted more on the aesthetic techniques and effectiveness of
certain films.
In the May 5, 1937 issue, the Doyôbi editors expressed concern at the
decline in contributions from women, noting that earlier women’s contributions
exceeded those from males.
300 This speaks to the “lack of breathing room” that
women must be feeling, they add.
301 Towards the end of its publication, some
readers also complained that Doyôbi was becoming a “playground for
intellectuals and university students” and more and more alienated from the
realities of working people.
302 The editors mention how they were constantly
debating and criticizing each other’s written language in order to simplify it and
make it more accessible to people.
303 Another criticism that arose was the
“lack of humor” in the tabloid, to which the editors urged readers to contribute
funnier pieces since “it would be nice to have a little more laughter in our
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everyday lives.”
304 Some complained about the number of foreign news
reports, which gradually declined to include more domestic reports and opinion
pieces.
305 Thus instead of maintaining the one-way relationship of producer
and consumer, the tabloid organizers tried to incorporate a variety of criticisms
among their readers into the very structure and content of the tabloid itself.
This was in line with Nakai’s “Logic of Committee” and Doyôbi’s editorial
stance of eventually making the readers the writers of the tabloid.  In the
October 5, 1937 issue—the very last issue of Doyôbi before the authorities
shut it down—the editors boasted that seventy percent of the issue consisted
of contributions.
306
The View from the State
In April 1940, the Justice Ministry investigator, Shimokawa Gen,
published a report on the “Cultural Movement” in Kyoto.  Doyôbi, along with
the other journals Nakai was involved in such as Bi hihyô and Sekai bunka
was investigated in great detail.
307 According to Shimokawa, the Kyoto Cultural
Movement—his term for the numerous journals and newspapers published in
the Kyoto area with cultural themes—along with the campaigns of the Social
Masses Party were the two major efforts to establish a progressive, anti-fascist
“Popular Front” in Japan.
308 These movements, however, never crystallized
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into a wider Popular Front movement that synthesized political, economic, and
cultural concerns into a coherent social program, he adds.
309
The report on Doyôbi details its history, management, readership,
distribution, layout, editorial direction, editorial content, and article content (it
even includes comprehensive selections with short interpretive
commentaries).  Its readership consisted primarily of intellectuals, salarymen,
and women in the Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe areas, Shimokawa writes.
310 It was
so popular that it spawned a short-lived competitor, Nichiyôbi (Sunday) and
major regional newspapers such as the Osaka shimbun and the Kyoto Hinode
shimbun entered into preliminary negotiations to buy Doyôbi out.
311 Thus
Shimokawa concludes that it appealed to the “lower middle classes” as well.
312
Aside from Doyôbi’s distribution network of small bookstores and coffee
shops, it had around two hundred paid subscribers extending as far as Tokyo,
Hiroshima, and Fukuoka.
313 Part of its threat to the state lied in its mass appeal
and the organizers’ avowed mission to make the tabloid “easy to understand”
for mass consumption and “englightenment,” according to Shimokawa.
314
Shimokawa viewed Doyôbi as an extension of the French writer Henri
Barbusse’s Popular Front newspaper, Vendredi (Friday), whose slogan was
“Bread, Peace, and Liberty.”
315 Based on the editorials of one of the other main
organizers, Nose Katsuo, Shimokawa describes Doyôbi as a tabloid “working
for the enlightenment of the petty bourgeois masses and the intellectuals in
order to defend against an encroaching fascism” and as a vehicle for
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preparing the ground for the creation of a Popular Front in Japan.
316 Since
openly espousing Marxism was no longer a tenable option, the organizers
asserted the “destruction of feudal remnants,” “democracy,” “liberalism,” and
“humanitarianism” instead, he writes.
317 He arranges Doyôbi’s content into
eight different rubrics:
1.  Glorifying articles in support of the Soviet Union.
2.  Articles advocating for the protection of liberalism and democracy.
3.  Articles emphasizing constitutional government and
parliamentarianism (human rights violations, etc.).
4.  Humanist articles (emphasis on respect for human beings).
5.  Articles emphasizing the scientific spirit and rationalism.
6.  Critical articles against the Nazification of Japan (Criticism of
newspapers, the Japanese spirit, etc.)
7.  Reports on the Popular Front movements, suggestive articles urging
the formation of a Popular Front in Japan.
8.  Articles emphasizing humanism and internationalism.
318
With the “retreat of Marxism,” the organizers of Doyôbi concealed their
revolutionary agenda behind the principles of liberal-democracy, rationalism,
humanism, and internationalism, according to Shimokawa.
319 For him it was an
undercover and more subversive version of the anti-fascist journal, Sekai
bunka, which was being published at the same time.
Even Doyôbi’s slogan—“Courage Towards Life.  Clarity of Spirit.
Friendship Without Separation. Doyôbi: An Afternoon of Rest and
Reflection”—was interpreted subversively as an attempt to build and expand
the international Popular Front against fascism and eventually instigate
socialist revolution.  The slogan and image of “Saturday” as a day of rest and
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reflection put forth the proper mood of cooperation and friendship, which
according to Shimokawa, was the “necessary feeling for instigating the
Popular Front movement.”
320 “Courage Towards Life” sought to appeal to the
alienation of salarymen and the nihilism of university students towards modern
life.  “Clarity of Spirit” represented the employment of rationality and
intelligence against a fanatical fascism.  “Friendship Without Separation”
meant building an international solidarity between the workers, the petty
bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the intelligentsia.  Finally, “An Afternoon of
Rest and Reflection,” meant creating a space for reflection, which according to
Shimokawa, represented the greatest threat to fascism since “fascism
constantly pushes unexamined and contradictory beliefs and makes people
swallow them.”
321 The excerpts from Nakai and Nose’s editorials were also
interspersed with Shimokawa’s interpretive notes such as “dreams for a new
society,” “anti-fascism,” “criticism of feudal consciousness,” and “promotion of
a liberal spirit.”
322 The film section too was seen as the clever recognition by
the organizers of the effectiveness of film for mass enlightenment.
323  Thus
almost every word was linked to the larger mission of building a socialist
inspired Popular Front against fascism.  It was based on these alleged links to
the Comintern’s advocacy of an international Popular Front of leftist
movements against fascism that Nakai and others were finally arrested in
October 1937.
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Politics of the Everyday
Doyôbi’s politics could indeed be categorized under the principles of
liberalism, democracy, rationality, and humanitarianism—some of the key
components of the democratic revolution.  Several commentators and
participants have interpreted Doyôbi as an attempt to form a progressive “third
force” between communism and fascism.
324 It is important to recognize a
politics at work in Doyôbi that is irreducible to any “ism” or state determination
of it as closet socialism, for example.  It is interesting to note that Shimokawa
uses Nose’s more explicit, “vanguardist” editorial agenda to define Doyôbi’s
politics, rather than Nakai’s more abstract political writings as set forth in “The
Logic of Committee” (published in Sekai bunka) and his editorials.  Moreover,
according to Kuno, Nakai himself was criticized by his more explicitly socialist
and vanguardist colleagues who tended to privilege class politics and the
supposedly universal laws of socialist development.
325 Instead of interpreting
Doyôbi’s politics as a secret attempt to mobilize the working class or foment
proletarian revolution, it is also important to understand the tabloid through
Nakai’s editorial vision or in other words, as the attempt to develop a radical
democratic politics of everyday life.  Doyôbi’s vision went beyond the state and
much of the left’s vision of politics as the struggle between predetermined
social agents within a closed social system.  For many of the editors, politics
was articulated within the contingent popular struggles of the people, not in
some abstract political program or predetermined historical trajectory.
As we have seen from Nakai’s editorials and writings, the defining
problematic for him was the incorporation of people into large capitalist
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organizations and productive mechanisms—the law of production and
commodification increasingly governed all aspects of daily life and created a
kind of productivist technocracy in 1930s Japan.  In this context where
people’s cultural, social, economic, and political lives were all being mobilized
by the state for the war and for building the “New East Asian Order,” Nakai
insisted on focusing on the “here and now” as the basis for constructing a
democratic politics.  Whereas the state sees revolutionary socialism in
Doyôbi’s articles, Nakai sees a myriad of “blooming flowers” representing the
everyday pleasures and struggles, questions and critiques of intellectuals,
salarymen, working women, housewives, and shopkeepers.  Whereas the
state and Doyôbi’s orthodox communist intellectuals viewed the tabloid within
larger ideological frameworks and historical goals (i.e. the inevitability of
socialist revolution), Nakai viewed people’s daily questions about the
workplace, the home, the school, the media, and the legal system as “small
breezes” or the “raw ore” of unexpected historical change.  All of the issues
raised in Doyôbi —from reforming the entrance examination system to
discrimination of Koreans to rising commodity prices—represented potential
nodes of democratic mobilization.  Thus rather than laying out a set political
program for certain predetermined political subjects, Doyôbi sought to create
an arena for the people to articulate a democratic politics relevant to their
multiple lives at hand.
Nakai wrote his theory of politics, “The Logic of Committee,” as he was
engaged in publishing Doyôbi.  While the tabloid never realized his conception
of establishing “the committee” or a radical democratic vehicle for social
transformation, it nevertheless embodied some of its concepts.  The
committee perhaps was the thirty or so intellectuals who launched Doyôbi328
under the editorship of Nakai, Nose and Saitô who wrote many of the articles
in the beginning and selected contributions from the readership.  As a result,
the published articles and contributions usually asserted social democratic
values of class, gender, and ethnic equality, which the state recognized as
closet socialism.  At the same time, however, the editors repeatedly expressed
surprise at the number, variety, and quality of contributions they received that
deepened or specified these progressive principles, often by postcard.
326 In
several issues, the editors wrote that they received so many contributions that
they had to shorten and even omit some articles.
327 Thus the tabloid was not
entirely run with an iron fist “from above.” The inclusion of debate and
criticism, the constant struggle to maintain readability and to avoid jargon, and
the conscious effort to use alternate circulatory methods to gain a mass
audience also resonated with “The Logic of Committee’s” explicit goal of
establishing a political medium firmly rooted in the energies and desires of the
people.  Ultimately, Doyôbi sought to become “the ears and voice of
thousands of people” amidst the productivist, technocratic structures
mobilizing daily life, as Nakai writes in one of his lead editorials.
328
While Doyôbi never successfully created the radically democratic
“committee” rooted in the desires of the people, it did achieve something else
that was potentially threatening to the state.  Rather than openly asserting an
identifiable political agenda or mobilizing people based on explicit ideologies
or historical objectives, Doyôbi insisted on remaining at the level of people’s
everyday struggles and questions.  Or in Nakai’s words, they insisted on
remaining within the messy reality of history rather than reducing that reality to
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some overarching framework or ideology.  In a context where work, leisure,
family, consumption, and political life were incorporated into technocratic
structures of production, people had little space of their own.  However,
instead of asserting some romantic, untouched space of resistance, Nakai and
the organizers insisted on “rest and reflection” or taking a step back from one’s
“commodified and specialized” reality to see what one could find or discover at
hand.  The housewife burdened with debts and rising food prices; the bicycle
shop owner faced with fierce competition, low sales, and high taxes; the
salarymen criticizing the inefficient and unpredictable local bureaucracy; the
film viewer engaging with social issues presented in popular films; the
department store lady asserting pride over her work and anger at men’s
“feudal attitudes”; the fashion reviewer giving practical advice on work
clothing—these and more represent the “flowers” among the “steel rails” of
technocratic society.  These variety of issues were the “here and now” that
needed to be “grasped” and expanded into multiple nodes of critique and
democratic transformation. Doyôbi never privileged a certain axis of political
struggle but sought to expand the liberal-democratic imaginary throughout
society.
While these critiques of the “here and now” did not represent any
immediate threat to the state, the authorities nevertheless still recognized
some danger.  Although he is most likely not referring to the Japanese state,
Shimokawa still notes that “reflection” is a danger to fascism since fascism is
characterized by incessant spiritual mobilization.
329 By displaying and
encouraging people’s everyday pleasures and struggles, and receiving a
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genuinely popular response, Doyôbi was mobilizing at the level of what
mattered most to people, which is precisely what the state found most difficult
to appropriate or completely repress.  While a tangible “third political force” did
not emerge, smaller cultural groups did (i.e. what Shimokawa calls the “Kyoto
Cultural Movement”) and the consumer cooperative movement reached its
peak in 1936-1937.  Those working with purist notions of party building and
mass organizing might deem this a failure.  However, Nakai was never
interested in some pre-determined utopia or historical objective but rather in
what he broadly referred earlier to as “technologies” in everyday life.  That is to
say, creating “chance,” “opportunity,” “points of departure,” and “small
breezes” of critique and change.  “The Logic of Committee” and Doyôbi were
attempts to give these creative energies some egalitarian horizon.   They
sought the constant growth or “deepening” of democratic subjectivity and
sociality amidst the technocratic systems of everyday life.  Michel de Certeau
perhaps best articulates the thought of “deepening subjectivity” through a
politics of the everyday that Nakai was struggling to articulate in his book, The
Practice of Everyday Life.  He quotes Witold Gombrowicz who describes the
“politics” of a small-time official typical of the early twentieth century:
“When one does not have what one wants, one must want what one
has”: “I have had, you see, to resort more and more to very small,
almost invisible pleasures, little extras…You’ve no idea how great one
becomes with these little details, it’s incredible how one grows.”
330
Ultimately, it is the “tactics” of everyday life that Doyôbi tries to give voice to
rather than the “strategies” of political parties and state institutions, which
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sought to direct and therefore defuse the political energies of the people.
331 If
these multiple voices could be transformed into opportunities for unexpected
change and critical momentum at multiple levels of society, Doyôbi can be
said to have realized its mission.
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CONCLUSION
Post-War Continuities and Areas for Further Research
The wartime idea of technology as a creative, mobilizing force
permeating all aspects of life perhaps has reached full flower in post-war,
“democratic” Japan.  In a short essay at the end of the Japanese
government’s report surveying the history of science and technology policy,
Kôhei Suzue, one of the directors of the wartime Technology Board and Vice-
Minister for Science and Technology in the 1960s, mentions some interesting
continuities between the wartime and the post-war periods.  With the
assistance of Dr. Harley Kelly, Chief of the Economy and Science Division of
General Headquarters’ Economy and Science Bureau, Japan was able to
keep its powerful technology bureaucracy largely intact during the U.S.
occupation.
1 Two institutions—the Science Council of Japan and the Science
and Technical Administration Committee (STAC)—planned science and
technology policy (“including human science”) and advised the government.
2
STAC became the nucleus of the Science and Technology Agency, which was
established in 1956.  According to Kôhei, the wartime Technology Board and
the post-war Science and Technology Agency “both conducted large-scale
research and development up to the point of national projects, or projects
which lent themselves to integration rather than being carried out individually
by various ministries.”
3 The idea of integrating all areas of science and
technology policy into a centralized bureaucracy lived on into the post-war.
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Centrally planned scientific and technological development was closely
linked to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s “National Income-Doubling Plan” in
1960, which laid the foundations for Japan’s high-speed economic growth.
This roughly corresponds to Habermas’s thesis of the two conditions for the
formation of a pervasive “technocratic consciousness”—active state
intervention in the economy and the promotion of science and technology as a
leading productive force.
4  A glance at the four reports between 1960 and
1984 outlining the long-term fundamentals of Japan’s science and technology
policy reveals a clear pattern of increasing state-promotion of science and
technology in all areas of life.  While in 1960 the “basic concepts” of the policy
outline referred to qualitative and quantitative increases in research for
economic growth and eliminating the gap with Europe and North America, by
1984 they were “harmony between science and technology and human
society” and “growth of science and technology full of creativity.”
5  In addition
to the “big sciences” such as aerospace and nuclear energy, the Japanese
government promoted research and development in the life sciences, large-
scale civil engineering projects, telecommunications, transportation, the
environment, computer technology, and city planning as well.
6
Against the backdrop of widespread social unrest in the late 1960s and
1970s, authors such as Umesao Tadeo, Koyama Kenichi, Hayashi Yûjiro, and
Masuda Yoneji popularized the concept of “informationalized society” (jôhôka
shakai) as a vision for “post-industrial” Japan.  Similar to the programs put
forth by American futurists such as Daniel Bell, information society theorists
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saw the computer as revolutionizing industrial production through automation
and integration between the office, factory, and the consumer (e.g. “Just-in-
Time Production”).
7  Production would become information-intensive, and
“innovation, planning, design, and marketing would represent an integral and
increasing share in the value of goods and services.” Masuda went so far as to
envision a “computopia” where the increasing availability of information and
leisure would result in a kind of spiritual renaissance and the elimination of
class conflict.
8
At the 1987 Venice Economic Summit, Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone government proposed the establishment of the Human Frontier
Science Program (HFSC), an international consortium dedicated to promoting
basic interdisciplinary research on the “complex mechanisms of living
organisms” ranging from their molecular and cellular makeup to their cognitive
functioning.
9 Perhaps the most symbolic event that illustrated the extent to
which technology permeated the Japanese imagination was the 1985 Tsukuba
International Exposition sponsored by the Science and Technology Agency.
Its theme was “Dwellings and Surroundings—Science and Technology for
Man at Home.”
10 Tsukuba itself was a “science and technology city” composed
of research laboratories, government institutes, businesses, and a large
university dedicated to creating an ideal environment for research and
development.
11 With the proliferation of technology into newer areas such as
information, biotechnology, the home, and urban planning, post-war Japan
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has surpassed the wildest wartime technological visionaries.  More detailed
research, however, is needed to establish the precise continuities between the
wartime technological imaginary and post-war conceptions—especially on how
technology has continued to operate as a system of mobilization.
12
Another area requiring further research concerns just how this more
subjective, creative notion of technology operated in the wartime Japanese
empire.
13  As we saw, many “technology bureaucrats” such as Môri developed
their conceptions in Manchuria during the 1920s and 1930s.  For example,
Ôkochi Masatoshi, head of the industrial concern Riken (Institute for Physical
and Chemical Research) and proponent of “scientific industry” also headed the
Continental Science Board in Manchuria, and his industrial empire included
factories in Korea.  What kinds of activities did he conduct at the Board, and
how exactly did “scientific industry” operate in the colonies? Hayashi Yûjiro,
one of the post-war proponents of information society theory, was a
Technology Board bureaucrat who was sent to Southeast Asia to plan the
establishment of “an institute for research and development for the Co-
Prosperity Sphere of Greater Asia with branches in several areas (almost
identical to the present ASEAN).”
14 He spent three decades at the Economic
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Planning Agency during the post-war, and as a leader of the Japan
Philanthropy Association, he is currently one of the biggest proponents of neo-
liberal “voluntarism” for the “non-profit enterprise” sector.
15 How did his
wartime visions of expanding the cooperative New Order for Science and
Technology throughout the Japanese empire continue on into his post-war
visions of a cooperative “information society” and a dynamic “non-profit
enterprise” sector composed of energetic volunteers? Finally, how did Chinese
and Korean engineers and skilled workers under the Japanese empire adopt
these subjective notions of technology, if at all? Did their conceptions continue
into the post-war developmentalist regimes?
Whither the Political?
In my dissertation, I have demonstrated the existence of a widespread
discourse of technology among Japanese elites as subjective, existential,
ethical, and practical.  All human activity was seen as mediated through
technology and could be described as “cultural,” political,” or “economic”
technology, for example.  Therefore, I contest the view that wartime Japan
was predominantly a period of anti-modern and culturalist ideologies during
which the Japanese state tried to assert a “pure Japanese essence” against
inhuman Western technology as Andrew Feenberg and other commentators of
the period suggest.
16 The wartime technological imaginary was established in
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the context of imperialism, and it continued into Japan’s post-war
transformation in many unexpected ways.
The articulation of technology as embodying certain ways of creative
thinking, acting or being, as well as values of rationality, cooperation, and
efficiency sought to incorporate the practical-political energies of the people
into the utopian project of creating a modernizing, non-capitalist order in East
Asia without class or ethnic conflict.  “Economic technologies” attempted to
employ the abilities and talents of workers to improve productivity and
innovation.  “Cultural technologies” sought to mobilize the powerful affects
created by the mass media to encourage the “cultural construction of East
Asia” and spread technical values.  The New Order for Science and
Technology was the first step toward establishing an efficient, functionalized
society based on occupation and technical process.  Even “typical” technology
such as machines and tools no longer represented alienation and de-
humanization, but creativity and spiritual fulfillment.  In short society was
increasingly represented as a dynamic “auto-poietic” system of technologies
that were forging a new order.
As we saw, however, this exposure of the creative, practical-political
nature of technology revealed a fundamental indeterminacy and ambiguity at
the very heart of technology.  If transformation, creativity, and production
represented technology’s essence, it can go in many unexpected directions.
17
While much of the Japanese ruling elites encoded technology towards
mobilizing every sphere of human action towards constructing a New Order,
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they were not successful in eradicating unexpected employments of those
technologies.  Môri admitted that he was “defeated” by the Chinese peasant,
which motivated him and his colleagues to invent newer economic and political
technologies for their mobilization.  Hitachi workers forced Aikawa and the
producers of The Present Battle to include some of the actual problems and
struggles of factory life in the film—boredom, lack of incentives, frequent
accidents, slowdowns, stoppages, and rural and urban contradictions.  While
Aikawa employed cinematic technologies to capture the spirit of national
solidarity and the “cultural construction of East Asia,” Nakai and his colleagues
borrowed montage techniques from Soviet avant-garde filmmakers to capture
the time of critique and revolution in their short films.  Finally, Nakai used the
power of mass print to stimulate the tactical energies within the technocratic
structures of daily life—film and mass media, the workplace, the home, civil
society, and the marketplace.  In the pages of Doyôbi, people wrote about
their everyday pleasures and struggles, generating potential nodes of
democratic critique that the state took note of.  In sum, while the technical
logics of productivity, efficiency, and innovation increasingly sought to mobilize
and arrange the practical-political energies of the people, unexpected
deployments of these logics in turn appeared within the mobilization of
everyday life.  New technologies of productive power engendered alternative
tactics of employing those technologies.  The technological imaginary could
not fully wipe out or co-opt the political—or what Nakai broadly articulated as
the creative, inventive essence of technology—into its organicist dream of a
hyper-productive, modernized society beyond capitalism and communism.
Whereas the wartime witnessed the development of the technological
imaginary within various mechanisms of social production outside the factory,339
the post-war saw a more intensive attempt to realize a “factory society,” as
Hardt and Negri describe the production of all areas of life, or a “system
society,” as Yamanouchi describes the diffusion of power into integrative
social sub-systems.  From the immediate post-war, the Japanese government
developed plans to create a high technological society—the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics, the 1970 Osaka Exposition, and the 1985 Tsukuba Exposition were
spectacles that promised a globalized utopia integrated and saturated by
technology.
18  From the 1970s until the present, visions of a post-industrial
“technotopia” of automation, knowledge intensive labor, information highways,
futuristic cities, and leisure influenced large sections of the ruling elites.
The result, however, has been downsizing, outsourcing, and an
increasing reliance on the unorganized furiitaa or young freelance workers
who once represented the vanguard of the information society.
19 The
Japanese left of the 1960s and 1970s viewed the immensely popular “techno-
cultural” celebrations of the Tokyo Olympics and the Osaka Expo as
“spectacles whose displays and fetishistic explications of futuristic
technologies distracted the masses from participating in public discourse.”
20
They responded with activities such as the “Folk Guerillas” movement
whereby thousands of people occupied parts of Shinjuku Station in downtown
Tokyo and created a counter-cultural space of debate and music.
21 This
occurred in the context of a strong organized labor and student movement as
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manifested in the immense anti-U.S. Japan Security Treaty protests of 1960
and 1970.
Recent social protest in light of the “information age,” however, has
tactically employed the very same technologies that capitalism has used to
downsize, outsource, and control labor instead of positing some counter-space
“outside” technological culture.  Sharon Hayashi and Anne McKnight examine
a series of “rave demo protests” that sought to “reoccupy” the information
saturated, commercial districts of Shibuya in downtown Tokyo and Shijô in
downtown Kyoto.  These “rave demos” were against Japan’s cooperation with
the occupation of Iraq, Tokyo mayor Shintaro Ishihara’s emergency measures
of public surveillance and mobilization, and the neo-liberal economic agenda
pursued by Ishihara and Prime Minister Koizumi.  They tactically employed
popular forms of youth culture, art, and mass media such as DJ sound trucks
and techno music, rave dancing, punk shows, 3-D videos projected on the
sides of buildings, parodic posters of commercial icons, and colorful cosplay
costumes of anime characters to mobilize political interest.
22  The protesters
consisted of young furiitaa, students, downsized office ladies, salarymen, more
traditional activists and academics, and curious shoppers and onlookers from
the street who stumbled upon the protest.
23
What is significant about these “protests” is their situating of themselves
within mass media techno-culture and the multiple issues facing contemporary
Japanese youth.  Not only were there a number of musical constituencies at
the protests, but other constituencies as well: anti-war demonstrators,
homeless and furiitaa unions, students seeking autonomous cultural spaces,
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pornographic comic book authors protesting censorship, and simply curious or
bored youth.  While the rave-protests had an overall theme of “occupation”
and “reoccupation,” they did not impose a definite “rational” agenda on the
protestors but let them express their multiple concerns instead.  The protests
sought to mobilize multiple nodes of critique and to reclaim the technologized
structures of everyday life that preach support for the war, the information age,
globalization, and so on.  As such they are further examples of what
Yamanouchi calls the “new social movements.” “These movements emphasize
the expression of new aesthetic or cultural values related to their members’
own lifestyles and do not seek the institutionalization of their own rights as
citizens at the nation-state level,” he writes.
24 They consciously reject the
values of integration, productivity, and rationalization at the heart of
technological society by seeking multiple possibilities within it.  Interestingly
enough, Nakai also saw the tactical possibilities of information for non-
integrative, inventive purposes in his capacity as the first Vice-Director of the
Diet Library in the post-war.  Continuing the politics of the everyday he
developed during the war, he helped create a national, comprehensive, and
easily accessible system of information right before his death in 1952.
25
Therefore, in the spirit of the rising new social movements, he continued to
insist on the essential ambivalence of technology—in this case, information
technology—which could be employed for all sorts of inventive, democratic
purposes as opposed to the hegemonic objectives of capital and the state.
                                                   
24 Yamanouchi, 27.
25 For more on Nakai’s activities in the Diet library, see Satô Shinichi, Nakai Masakazu:
‘Toshokan’ no ronrigaku [Nakai Masakazu: The Logic of Libraries] (Tokyo: Kindai bungeisha,
1992).342
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